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ABSTRACT
ENABLING ACCURATE ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE
NETWORK DATA
SEPTEMBER 2010
MICHAEL G. HAY
A.B., DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Gerome Miklau and Professor David Jensen
This dissertation addresses the challenge of enabling accurate analysis of network
data while ensuring the protection of network participants’ privacy. This is an impor-
tant problem: massive amounts of data are being collected (facebook activity, email
correspondence, cell phone records), there is huge interest in analyzing the data, but
the data is not being shared due to concerns about privacy. Despite much research
in privacy-preserving data analysis, existing technologies fail to provide a solution
because they were designed for tables, not networks, and cannot be easily adapted to
handle the complexities of network data.
We develop several technologies that advance us toward our goal. First, we de-
velop a framework for assessing the risk of publishing a network that has been “an-
onymized.” Using this framework, we show that only a small amount of background
knowledge about local network structure is needed to re-identify an “anonymous” in-
dividual. This motivates our second contribution: an algorithm that transforms the
vii
structure of the network to provably lower re-identification risk. In comparison with
other algorithms, we show that our approach more accurately preserves important
features of the network topology. Finally, we consider an alternative paradigm, in
which the analyst can analyze private data through a carefully controlled query in-
terface. We show that the degree sequence of a network can be accurately estimated
under strong guarantees of privacy.
viii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
We participate daily in a variety of networks. For example, through email corre-
spondence, facebook friends, Internet activity, scholarly publications, and face-to-face
communication, we interact with large, complex networks of peers. Due to techno-
logical advances, increasing amounts of our social interactions are being recorded,
resulting in troves of detailed data about the structure of our networked society.
Some believe the availability of this data has the opportunity to transform social
science, much the way data transformed the biological and physical sciences, leading
to a data-driven “computational social science” [68]. Already, the analysis of network
data has advanced our understanding of diverse phenomena such as the robustness
of the Internet, the spread of HIV, and the causes of financial fraud.
However, to achieve this vision, we must address concerns about privacy. The
collected data can be highly sensitive, revealing the intimate details of our daily lives.
Concerns about privacy make data managers reluctant to share it with the scientists
best equipped to analyze it. At present, computational social science is happening,
but only at the institutions that collected the data or by a select few who have
negotiated access to the data. For science to flourish, we must alleviate the privacy
concerns that prevent data sharing.
The goal of this dissertation is to develop algorithms to enable accurate analysis
of network data while preventing the disclosure of sensitive information.
Despite a long history of research in privacy-preserving data publishing and privacy-
preserving data analysis, existing techniques are not well suited for network data.
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Most prior work assumes the private data can be represented as a table of records,
where an individual’s private information is encapsulated in a single record. Network
data does not fit this data model, and poses new challenges for protecting privacy.
Our investigation uses the prior work in the tabular data setting as foundation to
develop new approaches suited for the complexities of network data.
1.1 Problem setting of prior work: privacy in tabular data
We introduce the main concepts in the traditional setting where the private data
consists of a table of records. This is the setting for prior work. Many of the concepts
introduced here carry over to the network setting and serve as a strong foundation
on which to develop techniques for network data.
As a motivating example, consider the data collected and disseminated by the
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) program1 to assess HIV prevalence in devel-
oping countries throughout the world. The data is collected through surveys, in which
respondents are asked for demographic and health information. Part of the survey
includes voluntary HIV testing. Once collected, this data can be used by researchers
to study, among other things, the factors influencing HIV prevalence.
The collected data contains both sensitive and identifying information. Identify-
ing information can be used to associate the data to a real-world entity. For example,
attributes such as gender, age, and geographic location can be identifying. Sensitive
information is any information whose unauthorized disclosure could cause harm. For
example, attributes that indicate HIV status, knowledge/practice of birth control,
etc. could be considered sensitive.
1http://www.measuredhs.com/
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Figure 1.1. Traditional problem setting: each individual contributes a private
record, and analysts wish to compute aggregate queries over the collection of records.
Computational approaches to protecting privacy correspond to interventions in the
flow of information: (A) input perturbation; (B) transformed data release; (C) query
auditing and query answer perturbation; and (D) access control.
The challenge is to allow analysts to study the data in a way that prevents disclso-
sure of sensitive information of survey respondents. There are several computational
approaches to protecting privacy, illustrated in Figure 1.1 and described next.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the flow of information from survey respondents to analysts.
Individual survey respondents (information providers) contribute their private data.
In this setting, each respondent’s data can be encapsulated in a single record. The
private records are collected into a database, which is controlled by the data manager.
Analysts (information consumers) perform computations on it, interacting with the
data through some kind of query processor.
We distinguish between two kinds of information consumers: analysts and adver-
saries. The analyst wants to study the population, by measuring aggregate statistics,
fitting statistical models, etc. For example: an analyst might want to know what age
groups have highest prevalence of HIV. The adversary, on the other hand, wants to
learn facts about specific individuals. For example, an adversary may ask whether
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Alice tested positive for HIV. There are two competing goals: to support the analyst
and hinder the adversary.
To protect privacy we must control the flow of information from providers to
consumers. Essentially, this requires intervening somewhere along the information
pipeline. In Figure 1.1, there are labeled dashed lines at several points of intervention.
We briefly describe some high-level strategies for intervention. Almost all prior work
represents an instantiation of one of these strategies.
Access control A tempting, but ultimately inadequate solution to the problem
is to try to protect privacy through access control. The goal of access control is to
manage a resource so that it is accessible only to authorized users. In this setting, we
may consider using access control to ensure that only “trusted” analysts can access
the data and that access is limited to the parts of the data relevant for their analysis.
In Figure 1.1, it corresponds to an intervention at the point marked D.
There are three challenges with using access control. First, it requires a mechanism
for establishing trust, which may be difficult to design and costly to execute. In other
words, it may be difficult to discern trustworthy analysts from malicious adversaries.
Second, while there are technologies for supporting fine-grained access control policies,
in this setting, the computations are aggregate statistics, which means each analyst
requires access to all of the records. Access control would be a fairly blunt instrument,
essentially providing access to either all or none of the data. Finally access control is
not a complete solution because in many settings, the goal of analysis is to identify
interesting trends and disseminate that knowledge broadly, into the public domain.
So even if access control is used, there still must be a mechanism for safely releasing
the analyst’s findings. For instance, at one data center that uses access control to
restrict access to sensitive data, the findings of an analyst can be published only after
a satisfactory manual review by the data custodian [1].
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Input perturbation With input perturbation, each individual stochastically alters
his/her data before revealing it to the data manager. In Figure 1.1, input perturbation
corresponds to intervening at the point marked A. The classical example of this
approach is Warner’s randomized response, in which the survey respondent flips a
coin and answers truthfully or randomly based on the outcome [120]. The randomized
answers are collected by the data manager and then published. While the randomness
hides an individual response, thereby ensuring privacy, it remains possible, using the
machinery of statistical inference, to derive accurate estimates of aggregate measures.
This strategy is especially appropriate when even the data manager is untrusted.
When the data manager is trusted, it is possible to achieve the same privacy (with
respect to untrusted analysts) but higher accuracy results by intervening further
“downstream,” with approaches such as transformed data release and query answer
perturbation.
While input perturbation may be used in the tabular data setting, it seems poorly
suited in the network data setting, where designing an effective perturbation mecha-
nism seems challenging and often the data is already collected in a centralized repos-
itory, in which case input perturbation is not applicable.
Transformed data release An alternative strategy is transformed data release,
where the individual records are collected by a trusted party, altered to protect pri-
vacy, and then released to the public. This approach is indicated by B in Figure 1.1.
Randomization is one option for protecting privacy. However, compared with input
perturbation, this setting offers greater flexibility in the design of the randomization
operator. Rather than randomize each record independently, it is possible to de-
sign a randomizer that operates on the entire dataset and achieves greater accuracy
(cf. [17, 106]).
In addition to randomization, transformed data release allows for an alternative
strategy to protect privacy: anonymization. Before publishing the data, identifying
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attributes (name, age, gender, location) are removed or sufficiently coarsened so that
each an individual record cannot be distinguished by these features. This provides
privacy through anonymity: the adversary can no longer associate an individual to a
particular record – each person is “hidden in a crowd.” The analyst can still compute
aggregations over the record groups.
This kind of privacy protection has been formalized as k-anonymity [110, 111, 116].
The objective of k-anonymity is to prevent linkage attacks, when an adversary joins
the published “anonymized” data with some other external source based on some com-
mon attributes. For instance, a privacy researcher successfully linked Massachusetts
voter registration records with an “anonymized” table of medical records published
by the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission based on birthdate, sex, and
zip code, and was able to re-identify the medical record of the governor of Mas-
sachusetts [115].
K-anonymity prevents linkage attacks by essentially requiring that potentially
identifying attributes (such as birthdate, zip code, etc.) be coarsened so that each
record becomes indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other records. Research on k-
anonymity has been substantial, and many lessons have been learned about benefits
and potential risks of employing such fairly simple privacy protection strategies.
Query auditing Common to the above approaches is that the data is altered to pro-
tect privacy and then released. An alternative strategy is to not release transformed
data but instead allow the analysts to query the private data through a controlled
interface. The first of two approaches based on this strategy is query auditing. In
Figure 1.1, query auditing corresponds to intervening at the point marked C.
In query auditing, the analysts’ queries are either answered exactly or denied
if there is a chance that revealing the answer could lead to disclosure. The data
manager is responsible for determining whether an answer is safe to release. The
decision depends on what queries have been answered and assumptions about the
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adversary’s a priori knowledge. Unfortunately, prior work suggests that there are
substantial technical hurdles to implementing an effective strategy. In some cases,
the auditing decision is computationally hard [64]. It is also subtle: for instance, a
denial may itself leak private information [60]. But perhaps an even bigger issue is
that protecting privacy may require many query denials, limiting its practical utility.
We describe a second strategy, query answer perturbation, that has a similar
approach but seems to offer more flexibility. Like query auditing, the data is never
released. The analyst interacts with the data through some kind of query interface
and the data manager is responsible for query processing. However, rather than
return exact answers, it returns approximate answers, using random noise to control
the accuracy of the approximation.
Query answer perturbation In query answer perturbation, the data manager
computes the true answer to the query, randomly perturbs it, and returns the per-
turbed answer to the analyst. Just like query auditing, it corresponds to intervening
at the point marked C in Figure 1.1. A common assumption in this setting is that the
answer to a query is a number, and therefore it makes sense to think about adding
(appropriately scaled) random noise to a query answer. (However, there are alterna-
tive perturbation strategies when the queries have non-numerical answers, cf. [91].)
Intuitively noise creates uncertainty about the exact query answer, but it is not ob-
vious how to appropriately calibrate the noise to ensure privacy. Fortunately, recent
work in -differential privacy provides mechanisms for appropriately calibrating noise
to ensure a very strong guarantee of privacy.
Differential privacy formally bounds the amount that an adversary can infer about
a record given the noisy answer, even in the extreme case where the adversary has
complete knowledge of the remaining records. If a query answering mechanism sat-
isfies -differential privacy, then the adversary’s posterior belief (about a person’s
record) can be at most a factor of exp() larger than his prior belief. From an indi-
7
vidual’s perspective differential privacy offers the following assurance: whether they
“opt-in” and participate in the survey, or “opt-out” and exclude their data, the result
will be virtually the same. The value of parameter  is selected by the data manager,
with lower values conferring stronger privacy protection.
Differential privacy can be achieved by adding random noise to the query answer.
The scale of the noise increases inversely with . It also increases with the query’s
sensitivity, informally the amount that a single record can influence the query an-
swer. In the tabular data setting, many common analyses have low sensitivity, so the
amount of noise is small and accurate answers are possible. If viewed as database
queries, many analyses can be expressed using operations such as selection, projection,
grouping, and aggregation, all of which are low sensitivity.
Of course, there are limits on how many queries can be answered accurately. If too
many queries are answered too accurately, then disclosures will occur. In this sense,
query answer perturbation is similar to auditing: at some point, the data manager
must effectively refuse to answer queries.
However, query answer perturbation offers more flexibility. Differential privacy
has nice composition properties: if query q1 is answered with 1-differential privacy
and q2 is answered with 2-differential privacy, answering both queries satisfies (1+2)-
differential privacy. (Intuitively, if the answer to qi increases the informed adversary’s
posterior belief by at most a factor of exp(i) over his (arbitrary) prior belief, then
revealing both answers can increase belief by at most of a factor of exp(1 + 2).)
Therefore, the data manager has the flexibility of trading off lower accuracy in query
answers (smaller ) in exchange for being able to answer more queries. In fact, in
some cases, answering both q1 and q2 requires only max{1, 2}. In addition, it is
possible to restructure a workload of queries to get even more accurate answers for a
fixed . That said, optimal mechanisms that can answer a workload of queries with
maximal accuracy do not yet exist. This is an important issue that currently limits
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the practical applicability of differential privacy. In work outside the scope of this
thesis, we have developed accurate (but non-optimal) mechanisms for answering range
queries [55] and shown that for a given workload, the problem of finding the optimal
mechanism can be formulated as a semi-definite program with rank constraints [76].
In summary, there are several possible ways to protect privacy in the tabular
data setting. Most prior techniques can be viewed as an instance of either input
perturbation, transformed data release, query auditing, query answer perturbation,
or access control. For tables, it is possible to achieve strong privacy and yet also
support accurate data analysis. This is because with tabular data, most analyses can
be expressed as fairly simple aggregations of the data that have low sensitivity. This
makes it possible to preserve aggregate properties, at least approximately, while at
the same time ensuring that individual records are not disclosed.
1.2 Our problem setting: privacy in network data
Network data encodes information about entities and the relationships between
them. The existence of relationships profoundly alters many aspects of the privacy
protection problem. The relationships are often sensitive and must be protected. In
addition, the relationships are also an object of study: many analyses are concerned
with understanding the topology of the network. Therefore approaches designed for
tabular data fail to provide adequate solutions for network data, and we must develop
new approaches to deal with the additional complexities introduced by relationships.
As a motivating example, consider the network data collected by Klovdahl et
al. [65] to study HIV transmission. The data was collected to study a population
that is at high risk of contracting HIV: a population of prostitutes, injecting drug
users, and their associates in a moderate-size city. In contrast to the HIV survey data
collected by measureDHS, in this data, the individuals are connected by relationships
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Figure 1.2. Our problem setting: individuals are connected by relations, forming a
network. We explore three approaches to protecting privacy: simple anonymization,
in which identifiers are replaced and attributes are coarsened or suppressed (a process
we call naive anonymization); transformed data release in which the network structure
is altered; and query answer perturbation, in which noise is added to query answers.
that represent pathways for disease transmission (intercourse or needle sharing). This
allows for new kinds of analyses on the role that network structure can play in disease
transmission. And it also raises new privacy concerns: the relationships are sensitive
and the participants in the network have an expectation that this information will be
kept private.
Network data can be naturally modeled as a graph where nodes represent entities
and edges the relationships among them. In many settings, the entities are people,
but they can also be other things, such as hosts in a computer network. There may be
attributes on nodes as well as edges. An example network is illustrated in Figure 1.2.
The relationships in network data encode additional information about the entities
which may be highly sensitive. Naturally, the existence of an edge may be sensitive
(e.g., in the data collected by Klovdahl et al. [65], an edge reveals a sexual or shared
needle relation). Other aspects of connections may be sensitive as well. For example,
the degree of a vertex may be sensitive: academics in a scholarly collaboration net-
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work may wish to hide their low degree, while participants in a network of romantic
contacts may wish to hide their high degree. Even if the entities in a network are not
individuals, network data may still be sensitive. For example, detailed topological
information about the power grid may reveal vulnerabilities to potential terrorists, or
records of information flow between host machines in a computer network may reveal
applications running on those hosts or facts about host operators. Finally, if there
are attributes on the entities, then just as in the tabular data setting, these may be
also sensitive (e.g., HIV status).
The analyses of network data are more complex and varied than the analyses of
tabular data. Many analyses focus solely on measuring the topology of the network.
This includes computing various network statistics, such as degree distribution, di-
ameter, and transitivity. It also includes searching for interesting structures – for
instance, identifying frequently occurring subgraphs (motif analysis), finding highly
influential nodes (network centrality), or recognizing modular structure (community
discovery). Other analyses focus on correlations between topology and attributes,
such as the study of homophily (the tendency for associations to form among similar
individuals). Finally, a number of analyses are concerned with network dynamics,
either dynamic processes operating over the network (navigation, diffusion) or the
dynamics of the network’s formation. This incomplete summary illustrates the diver-
sity of analyses that are performed on network data. It also illustrates the complexity:
if viewed as database queries, many analyses require joins, in addition to the selection
operations commonly used in tabular data.
In summary, the existence of relationships between individuals makes the problem
considerably different from the traditional tabular data setting. There are differences
in the structure of the data, in what makes the data sensitive, and in how it is ana-
lyzed. These changes may require novel strategies for protecting privacy. Building on
the foundation of work developed in the tabular setting, this thesis explores how to
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protect privacy in the network data setting. We explore three high level approaches
to simultaneously protecting privacy and supporting accurate analysis. These ap-
proaches are illustrated in Figure 1.2.
The first part of this thesis explores whether attribute anonymization might also
provide adequate protection for network data. As described earlier, attribute anon-
ymization is a common strategy for protecting privacy in the tabular data setting.
External identifiers such as name, social security number, are removed and replaced
with synthetic identifiers. In addition, attributes that are potentially identifying
(quasi-identifiers) are coarsened, perturbed, or suppressed.
Applied to a network, anonymization would require replacing node identifiers, such
as names and IP addresses, with synthetic ones. In addition, if nodes possessed other
identifying attributes, these could be coarsened, etc. using established techniques
from tabular data anonymization. Such precautions would prevent attacks based
on attribute knowledge. The network structure, however, would remain intact. We
wonder whether the presence of relationships between the entities create new threats
to privacy. Specifically, we explore the following question:
Can the patterns of connections around an individual node act as an
identifier, making the node vulnerable to a re-identification attack?
To explore this question, we consider factors such as how much an adversary might
know a priori about the graph structure surrounding a target; how much external
information is necessary to successfully re-identify nodes; and what might be the
consequences of re-identification. Our aim is to articulate the threats to privacy
posed by the release of anonymized network data.
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As we will show, there are settings where attribute anonymization provides insuf-
ficient protection. Thus, we are motivated to consider more complex techniques to
protect privacy. In the second part of the thesis, we investigate the following question:
If graph structure is in fact identifying, how can we alter the graph so
that nodes are resistant to re-identification? What is the impact of the
alterations on network topology?
In addressing this question, it is necessary to consider a number of different is-
sues. With tabular data, there are several operations, such as attribute coarsening
and stochastic perturbation, that can be used to lower the risk of re-identification.
With network data, it is not immediately obvious what kind of alterations should be
applied to create anonymity. Nor is it clear how much alteration is necessary, or how
to quantify the privacy benefit of alteration. Can privacy notions such as k-anonymity
be adapted to the graph setting? How do the lessons learned in tabular data anon-
ymization apply? Ultimately, with this approach, we will publish a graph that differs
from the original. It will be important to understand the impact of the alterations on
analyses of topology. How do we meaningfully compare the transformed graph with
the original? How should the analyst account for the fact that the graph was altered?
We also explore the alternative paradigm of query answer perturbation. This is
a substantially different approach than that considered in the earlier parts of this
thesis, and there are important tradeoffs to consider. Compared with transformed
data release, the obvious disadvantage of query answer perturbation is that a graph
is never published. Instead, the analyst only receives answers to some statistics
and there are limits as to how many queries can be accurately answered. However,
the advantage of query answer perturbation is the potential to achieve much higher
accuracy. With transformed data release, the transformations inevitably alter some
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properties of the graph, and some analyses will be greatly distorted. With query
answer perturbation, the mechanisms are tailored to the specific statistics of interest,
and this creates an opportunity to obtain highly accurate results. In addition, we
explore an approach based on differential privacy, which is a much stronger form of
privacy protection than those based on anonymity.
The final component of this dissertation investigates the following question:
Can we accurately measure network statistics under rigorous privacy
standards, such as differential privacy?
Our investigation takes advantage of the existing work in differential privacy. A
number of useful techniques have already been developed for answering queries under
differential privacy, and their application is not limited to queries over tabular data.
In thinking about applying differential privacy to statistics on network data, some
interesting questions emerge. While differential privacy was originally defined for the
tabular setting, it is in principle applicable to any data that can be (conceptually)
broken up into “units” of private information. For network data, what is the appro-
priate “unit” of private information? For instance, is it an edge, a set of edges, or
a node and its entire neighborhood? This is an important question whose answer
determines what the technical condition of differential privacy actually means for the
privacy of the individual. It also has a profound impact on the accuracy with which
network statistics can be estimated. With tabular data, we saw that an individual’s
data has a limited impact on common analyses—i.e., the sensitivity of common anal-
yses is low. What is the sensitivity of common network analyses? Are there limits on
what can be accurately computed under such a strong notion as differential privacy,
and if so, what is an appropriate remedy?
14
As described above, we explore two of the high-level strategies for privacy pro-
tection, transformed data release and query answer perturbation. We chose not to
consider query auditing and access control due to the limitations described earlier. We
also chose not to consider input perturbation. In many settings, the data is already
under the control of a trusted data manager. Network data is often collected by the
data manager as a byproduct of providing some service (e.g., online social networks,
email correspondence, phone call records, Internet traffic). In these settings, input
perturbation is not applicable. That said, there may still be some settings where
it applies, including for instance the previously mentioned study of sexual relation-
ships by Klovdahl et al. [65]. This is a similar context as the one that motivated
the original input perturbation mechanism, Warner’s randomized response. However,
designing an appropriate input perturbation mechanism seems especially challenging
in the context of network data, as the sensitive data is shared between individuals.
We leave this as a consideration for future work.
While, in practice, network data may also have attribute information associated
with nodes, the focus of our work is on network structure—that is, protecting sensitive
structural features and supporting analyses of network topology. There are several
reasons for this. The threats to privacy of sharing attribute information about indi-
viduals have been well-studied in the tabular data setting, and many techniques have
been developed to reduce the threat. What makes the current problem challenging
is the presence of relationships between the individuals. In addition, many network
analyses are concerned exclusively with topology, so developing solutions that sup-
port the accurate analysis of network topology is an important goal by itself. Finally,
enabling accurate analysis of structure is a necessary component of any solution that
supports the combined analysis of attributes and structure. We view our work as the
first steps along the critical path to a comprehensive solution. Future work will ex-
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plore ways to support analyses that involve a combination of structural and attribute
information.
1.3 Overview of contributions
Toward the goal of enabling accurate network analysis while protecting privacy,
we make three main contributions:
• We develop a framework for evaluating the risk of publishing a network after
removing obvious identifiers. Using this framework, we demonstrate that there
is substantial risk: adversaries can use knowledge of graph structure to re-
identify entities in the published network.
• To mitigate the risk, we design an algorithm that transforms the network prior
to publication. The transformed network resists re-identification attacks and at
the same time the transformations preserve important topological features of
the original network.
• Using the paradigm of query answer perturbation, we explore whether it is pos-
sible to accurately compute network statistics under strong privacy protections.
For some statistics, such as clustering coefficient, we identify some limitations.
However, we show that the degree sequence can be accurately estimated under
differential privacy.
These contributions are described in more detail below.
1.3.1 Assessing the risk of network data publication
In Chapter 3, we study the threats to privacy of publishing a network after anon-
ymizing node identifiers and removing identifying attributes. We refer to this strategy
of privacy protection as naive anonymization. We consider how an adversary may
use partial knowledge of the network structure surrounding a set of target entities
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to re-identify them. Once re-identified, additional properties about the targets may
be revealed in the published data. For instance, the adversary may learn that two
targets are connected. We study both the general threat of re-identification as well
as the specific threat of edge disclosure.
The risk of naive anonymization depends on how much the adversary knows and
on how easily nodes can be distinguished by their network structure. We study the
relationship between knowledge, structure, and risk and make the following contribu-
tions.
We present a framework for measuring the risk of naive anonymization. It has
several innovative features. It includes a flexible model of adversary knowledge, al-
lowing a data manager to assess risk with respect to a range of adversary capabilities.
It is efficient to compute, making it applicable for large graphs. It can be used to
assess both re-identification risk and edge disclosure. We believe this framework is a
valuable resource for gaining insight into the relationship between adversary knowl-
edge, graph structure, and re-identification risk. Furthermore, it is a practical tool
that a data manager can use to assess risk prior to publication.
We use our framework to assess the risk of several real networks. We find diversity
in risk: some networks are naturally more resistant to structural re-identification than
others. Nevertheless, on some real-world networks, the risk is high, especially if an
adversary has knowledge beyond a target entity’s immediate neighborhood. The
significance of our study is that it demonstrates that there can be considerable risk in
naive anonymization. Our findings establish a need for more sophisticated techniques.
Finally, we use theoretical analysis to gain insight into how properties such as den-
sity and degree distribution affect a network’s vulnerability to adversarial attack. We
prove that in large Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs, density determines re-identification
risk, with sparse graphs having low risk and dense graphs having very high risk. We
also prove that power-law random graphs, despite their heavy-tailed degree distribu-
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tions, have low risk in the limit of large graphs. We believe our theoretical analysis
gives insight into how graph structure affects re-identification, which can inform the
design of more sophisticated anonymization techniques.
This work first appeared as a technical report in 2007 [51], then in the proceedings
of the International Conference on Very Large Data Bases, 2008 [54], and has been
accepted for publication in the International Journal on Very Large Data Bases.
1.3.2 Mitigating risk through network transformation
When simple strategies such as removing obvious personally identifiable informa-
tion fail to protect privacy, the data manager must consider alternative strategies for
releasing network data. In Chapter 4, we consider the problem of how to transform a
network to prevent entity re-identification. An effective transformation strategy will
ensure that an adversary cannot re-identify entities in the published network, but
at the same time preserve many important topological features of the network. We
make the following contributions.
We introduce a new privacy definition that characterizes what it means for a
transformed network to be resistant to re-identification attacks. Our definition is an
adaptation of k-anonymity that is called graph k-anonymity. If a published graph is
graph k-anonymous, it means that an adversary cannot successfully re-identify nodes:
his confidence in the identity of a target will be at most 1/k. The parameter k is set
by the data manager, with higher k resulting in greater protection, though achieving
it will also require more alterations to the graph. Our definition is configurable in
the sense that privacy can be defined with respect to a particular class of adversary
capability. It is also general: other recently proposed graph privacy definitions can
be viewed as instantiations of our definition, with specific choices of adversary.
We introduce an algorithm for transforming a graph to achieve both privacy and
accurate preservation of topology. The basic idea is to cluster the nodes of the graph
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into groups and describe the network topology in terms of the groups. As we prove
formally, it satisfies graph k-anonymity by enforcing that the minimum group size is
at least k. To maximize the utility of the transformed graph, the algorithm searches
for a clustering that preserves as much of the topological structure as possible, subject
to the privacy condition.
We empirically evaluate the utility of the transformation algorithm and compare
it with other graph anonymization techniques that have been recently proposed. On
a number of graphs, both real and synthetic, we measure how transformation distorts
common graph properties such as degree distribution, path lengths, and clustering.
Our experiments reveal a number of findings. At small k, many graph properties
are approximately preserved; as k increases, we observe a tendency toward random
graphs. Compared with other techniques, our approach performs comparably and
in some cases, preserves more utility. In particular, because its transformations are
guided by the topology of the graph, it tends to do a much better job of preserving
distinct “engineered” features. For example, on the HOT graph, which is an ideal-
ized model of the Internet, the graph’s low degree correlation is preserved under our
technique.
This work appeared (together with the material in the previous chapter) in the
proceedings of the International Conference on Very Large Data Bases, 2008 [54], and
has been accepted for publication in the International Journal on Very Large Data
Bases.
1.3.3 Estimating network statistics under strong privacy
The last component of this thesis considers an alternative paradigm—query answer
perturbation—and investigates whether we can accurately measure common network
statistics under strong privacy guarantees, such as differential privacy. Because of
the shift in paradigm, the problems and techniques differ considerably from those
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presented in Chapters 3 & 4. Towards the goal of accurate statistics and strong
privacy, we make the following contributions.
A small but vital contribution is to determine how adapt differential privacy to
graph structured data. In Chapter 2, after we present the original definition and its
semantic interpretations, we present several alternative adaptations and describe the
implications for the privacy-utility tradeoff inherent in them. One variant we intro-
duce is called k-edge -differential privacy. It prevents an adversary from learning not
only about individual edges, but any set of edges of size up to k. For nodes of low
degree (less than k), this captures the “opt-in/opt-out” semantics of differential pri-
vacy. For nodes with large degree, some aggregate features about their neighborhood
may be leaked—this is an inevitable compromise if we also want to enable accurate
network analysis. The data manager chooses k as well as .
Our main contribution is a differentially private algorithm for estimating the de-
gree sequence of a graph. We choose to focus on the degree sequence because it is one
of the most widely studied properties, and it has profound influence on a network’s
structure and function [7, 16, 87, 99]. While existing differentially private techniques
can be used to obtain a noisy estimate of the degree sequence, the accuracy is poor.
In Chapter 5, we present an innovative algorithm that achieves privacy, accuracy,
and scalability: The algorithm satisfies k-edge -differential privacy. It produces an
estimate of the degree sequence that is provably accurate, and shown empirically to
be orders of magnitude more accurate than existing techniques. In addition, its linear
time complexity allows it to scale to the massive graphs studied today. We believe
this work is one of the first concrete positive results of applying differential privacy
to network data.
The algorithm has broader applicability than estimating degree sequences. As part
of this work, we define a new kind of histogram, called an unattributed histogram, and
show how our technique can be used to estimate any unattributed histogram. While
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less informative than a conventional histogram—because it hides the association be-
tween bin and frequency—an unattributed histogram is significant because it can be
estimated much more accurately under differential privacy. And although it is less
informative, there are some applications where the discarded information is irrele-
vant and so an unattributed histogram is sufficiently detailed. Estimating the degree
sequence of a graph is one such application, and we describe others in Chapter 5.
To achieve its high accuracy, the algorithm uses an innovative strategy that we
believe has applications beyond this particular instantiation. The strategy uses an
existing differentially private mechanism to obtain a noisy answer and then uses
statistical inference to reduce error. The inference stage exploits natural constraints
that hold on query answers, yet are often violated by the random noise that was
added to ensure privacy. For the degree sequence query, the inference stage produces
a massive reduction in error. Our results demonstrate that the differentially private
mechanism adds more noise than is strictly necessary, and inference is able to filter
out much of the “extra” noise without weakening the privacy protection. We believe
inference may be a computationally efficient way to effectively sample from a more
complex, correlated noise distribution that is tailored to the particular query and
input. We have explored its application to other kinds of queries: in work that lies
outside the scope of this thesis, we show that it can be an effective component of a
mechanism to support histograms [55] and arbitrary workloads of linear queries [76].
Given these positive results for the degree distribution, it is natural to wonder
what other network properties can be computed under differential privacy. An ad-
ditional contribution of this thesis is a review of known results and a discussion of
limitations (Chapter 6). Unfortunately, we find that there are limits as to what can be
accurately computed under differential privacy. For instance, we prove that cluster-
ing coefficient cannot be accurately estimated under differential privacy. One reason
this query is challenging is that differential privacy protects against even a nearly
21
omniscient adversary, and for such adversaries, even an approximate answer can leak
private information. We show that if the adversary is less informed, knowing only a
small subgraph of the entire network, then clustering coefficient (and several other
statistics) can be answered with relatively little noise while still ensuring rigorous
privacy protection.
The work on estimating degree sequences presented in Chapter 5 combines results
from two conference publications, the first appearing in the International Conference
on Data Mining, 2009 [52] and the second to appear in International Conference
on Very Large Data Bases, 2010 [55]. The work on computing clustering coefficient
and protecting against weaker adversaries was done in collaboration with Rastogi and
Suciu and appeared in the Symposium on Principles of Database Systems, 2009 [105].
We believe the contributions described above help advance our goal of enabling
accurate network data analysis while simultaneously protecting privacy. Our work
combines a mix of practical tools—methods for risk assessment and algorithms for
network anonymization—with more foundational insights into the limits and possibil-
ities for accurate analysis under rigorous privacy standards. In Chapter 2 we present
background material. The above contributions are described in detail in Chapters 3-
6. Concurrent with our work, a number of others have explored this topic and we
review their contributions in Chapter 7 and conclude in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
In this chapter, we review two privacy definitions, k-anonymity and differential
privacy. Both of these definitions assume tabular data, or at least that an individual’s
private data is encapsulated in a single record. We discuss how to adapt differential
privacy to graphs in Section 2.4, and in Chapter 4 we present a novel privacy definition
for graphs that is inspired by k-anonymity. Also in this chapter, we review some
common network analyses and define network statistics that will be used in this
dissertation.
2.1 K-anonymity
K-anonymity is a privacy definition that characterizes a table’s resistance to re-
identification attacks. Before giving the formal definition, we illustrate with an ex-
ample.
In the original table (Table 2.1(a)), even if we were to remove names, t2 has a
unique combination of Birth, Sex, and Zip attributes and so Beth, the individual
corresponding to t2, can be identified by an adversary with knowledge of these at-
tributes. To prevent such linkage attacks, attributes Birth, Sex, and Zip have been
coarsened in Table 2.1(b). This table has the property that each combination of these
attributes occurs at least 3 times. Therefore Table 2.1(b) is 3-anonymous with respect
to Birth, Sex, and Zip. Table 2.1(a) is only 1-anonymous because some tuples are
uniquely identified by this combination of attributes.
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Table 2.1. Example to illustrate k-anonymity. (a) a table T of medical records; this
table is 1-anonymous. (b) table T after removing the Name attribute and coarsening
attributes Birth, Sex, and Zip; this table is 3-anonymous.
(a) Example table T
Name Birth Sex Zip Condition
t1 Alice 1985 F 14850 Viral Inf.
t2 Beth 1985 F 14853 Cancer
t3 Carol 1985 F 14850 Cancer
t4 Dave 1986 M 14851 Heart Dis.
t5 Ellen 1986 F 14853 Flu
t6 Fred 1986 M 14621 Heart Dis.
t7 Greg 1981 M 14222 Flu
t8 Hank 1962 M 14850 Heart Dis.
t9 Ian 1944 M 14850 Heart Dis.
t10 John 1959 M 14850 Heart Dis.
(b) Example table with coarsened at-
tributes
Birth Sex Zip Condition
t1 1985 F 1485* Viral Inf.
t2 1985 F 1485* Cancer
t3 1985 F 1485* Cancer
t4 198* * 14*** Heart Dis.
t5 198* * 14*** Flu
t6 198* * 14*** Heart Dis.
t7 198* * 14*** Flu
t8 19** M 14850 Heart Dis.
t9 19** M 14850 Heart Dis.
t10 19** M 14850 Heart Dis.
The formal definition of k-anonymity relies on the concept of a quasi-identifier.
Let T be a table with relational schema T (A1, A2, . . . , Am). Let A denote the set of
attributes {A1, A2, . . . , Am}.
Definition 2.1 (Quasi-identifier). A set of attributes Q = {Q1, . . . , Qd} ⊆ A is a
quasi-identifier if these attributes are sufficient to uniquely identify a tuple in T and
may be externally available to an adversary.
In the previous example, the quasi-identifier is Q = {Birth, Sex, Zip}. Condition
is not included because this is private data that is unlikely to be available externally.
However, the other attributes are readily available in external data sources. In fact,
these attributes were used by a privacy researcher to re-identify the governor of Mas-
sachusetts in a table of medical records [115].
A table is k-anonymous if none of its records can be uniquely identified by their
quasi-identifier. Some notation: For a tuple t ∈ T let t[Ai] denote the value of
attribute Ai on tuple t, and similarly for a set of attributes A′ = {Ai1 , . . . , Aid} ⊆ A,
let t[A′] be equal to (t[Ai1 ], . . . , t[Aid ]).
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Definition 2.2 (k-anonymity [110, 111, 116]). Given a quasi-identifier Q, a table T
is k-anonymous with respect to Q if for each t ∈ T , there exists at least k − 1 other
tuples t′1, . . . , t
′
k−1 such that t[Q] = t′1[Q] = · · · = t′k−1[Q].
As suggested by the example, k-anonymity is usually achieved through the coars-
ening of attribute values. A naive algorithm for k-anonymity is to partition the tuples
into groups of size k or larger, and then locally recode the attribute values so that
tuples are indistinguishable within groups. This achieves anonymity but may result
in considerable data loss because if tuples have vastly different values for Q, then their
values will be heavily coarsened. To maximize the utility of the published table, it is
necessary to find the minimal coarsening that achieves the desired level of anonymity.
Several have looked at the complexity of finding the optimal coarsening. The first
complexity result considers coarsening the table through attribute suppression. The
optimal table is the one that achieves k-anonymity for a given k and minimizes the
number of suppressions. This problem has been shown to be NP-hard [93]. Other
variants of the problem, including ones that are not limited to suppression, have also
been shown to be NP-hard [3, 4, 33, 127]. Note however, that the hardness comes
from trying to maximize utility, so even a non-optimal solution will still satisfy the
privacy condition. (With query auditing, it is computationally hard to even check
that the privacy conditions are met.) Many heuristic algorithms have been proposed
for making a table k-anonymous (cf. [4, 5, 15, 46, 69, 70, 71] and references therein).
K-anonymity is a simple, intuitive definition, and it is easy to verify that an output
satisfies the definition. Unfortunately, in the last few years, research has identified
a number of limitations in k-anonymity. While it prevents re-identification, it does
not necessarily prevent the disclosure of sensitive information. For example, suppose
an adversary knows that Ian is 66 year-old male and lives in Ithaca, NY (zip code:
14850). If Table 2.1(b) is published, then the adversary, while unable to re-identify
Ian, can nevertheless infer that he suffers from heart disease. This is an instance of a
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homogeneity attack, in which there exists a set of tuples that not only have matching
quasi-identifiers but are also homogenous with respect to a sensitive attribute.
Remedies have been proposed to address the homogeneity attack. However, even
when groups are not homogenous, it may be possible for an adversary to make prob-
abilistic inferences about sensitive attributes. In addition, some of the “remedies”
introduce additional complexities into the anonymization process, which create new
opportunities for adversarial attack. We highlight some of the vulnerabilities that
have been identified in the literature.
• Background knowledge Even when the tuples within a group are not ho-
mogenous, the adversary may be able to use background knowledge to eliminate
some values. To protect against both homogeneity and background knowledge
attacks, a number of alternative privacy conditions have been developed. They
are similar to k-anonymity but impose additional constraints on the distribution
of sensitive attribute values within each group, essentially requiring some diver-
sity in the distribution [19, 79, 84, 86, 88]. While these additional constraints
protect against background knowledge attacks, they do not guard against the
other attacks described below.
• Learning Privacy breaches can occur when the adversary is able to learn cor-
relations from the anonymized data and then use these correlations to infer the
sensitive attribute values of individual records [61]. For example, in a table of
medical records, the adversary may observe a correlation between smoking and
cancer. Suppose Bob is a smoker and his tuple is in a group with three other
tuples, none of whom are smokers. Then, if the table reveals that one person in
this group has cancer, the adversary may be able to confidently infer that Bob
is the one with cancer. The only known remedy to this attack is differential
privacy.
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• Composition A composition attack [45] can occur when multiple agencies
release anonymized data and some records occur in more than one dataset. This
may allow the adversary to infer sensitive attributes by taking the intersection
of values across datasets. Such a scenario might occur, for example, if two area
hospitals release anonymized patient records and some patients have visited
both hospitals. One way to address composition attacks is to require that
agencies who manage overlapping datasets work in conjunction. There are some
techniques for releasing multiple datasets in a way that protects privacy [125].
• Minimality The minimality attack [123] exploits the fact that many anonym-
ization algorithms publish the table that satisfies the privacy requirement and
also minimizes some measure of information loss. This allows the adversary
to infer sensitive values by process of elimination: for some configurations of
sensitive attribute values, the published table would not be minimal. There are
some algorithms that are resistant specifically to minimality attacks [28, 123]
and other algorithms were recently developed that are resistant to any attack
based on knowledge of how the algorithm operates [126].
An attack may not always result in the exact disclosure of an individual’s attribute
value; it may only result in an educated guess about the value. Furthermore, it may
not apply on all instances. Nevertheless, these attacks show that k-anonymity does
not ensure privacy in a rigorous sense. It fails to account for how the adversary might
reason, especially given background knowledge about the individuals represented in
the data and knowledge about how the algorithm operates.
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2.2 Differential privacy
In this section, we review differential privacy and existing techniques for answer-
ing queries under differential privacy. In Chapter 5, we use these techniques as a
component of our solution.
The original definition of differential privacy modeled the private data as a set
of records, where each record corresponds to an individual. To define differential
privacy, we consider a database I that contains sensitive information about a set of
individuals, and a randomized algorithm A that operates on I. Differential privacy
ensures that the output of the algorithm does not disclose the presence or absence of
an individual’s data. Suppose an individual’s data is removed from I, resulting in a
new database I ′. Differential privacy requires that whether the input is I or I ′, the
probability of a given output is nearly the same.
More formally, let I be a set of records where each record corresponds to an
individual’s private data. For sets A and B, we use ⊕ to denote symmetric difference:
A⊕B′ = {A∪B}−{A∩B}. Database I ′ is a neighbor of I if |I⊕I ′| = 1. Let nbrs(I)
denote the set of neighbors of I, i.e., nbrs(I) = {I ′ | |I ⊕ I ′| = 1}. For algorithm
A, let Range(A) be the set of possible outputs of A. For example, if A computes
the number of records in the database satisfying a given predicate, then Range(A) is
equal to set of non-negative integers. The following definition of differential privacy
is due to Dwork [34].1
Definition 2.3 (-differential privacy). An algorithm A is -differentially private if
for all instances I, any I ′ ∈ nbrs(I), and any subset of outputs S ⊆ Range(A), the
following holds:
Pr[A(I) ∈ S] ≤ exp()× Pr[A(I ′) ∈ S]
1Differential privacy has been defined inconsistently in the literature. The original definition
(called -indistinguishability) defines neighboring databases in terms of Hamming distance [38].
Note that -differential privacy (as defined above) implies 2-indistinguishability.
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where probability Pr is over the randomness of A.
The parameter  measures the disclosure and is typically also an input to the
algorithm. For example, the techniques used in this work add random noise to their
outputs, where the noise is a function of . The choice of  is a matter of policy,
but typically  is “small,” say at most 1, making the probability “almost the same”
whether the input is I or I ′.
An example illustrates why this protects privacy. Suppose a hospital wants to
analyze the medical records of their patients and publish some statistics about the
patient population. A patient may wish to have his record omitted from the study, out
of a concern that the published results will reveal something about him personally and
thus violate his privacy. The above definition assuages this concern because whether
the individual opts-in or opts-out of the study, the probability of a particular output
is almost the same. Clearly, any observed output cannot reveal much about his
particular record if that output is (almost) as likely to occur even when his record is
excluded from the database.
Semantic characterization of differential privacy The example suggests that
differential privacy prevents an adversary from learning private information about an
individual. This intuition is formalized in the following result, adapted from Dwork
et al. [38]. An informed adversary is one who knows all records in the database except
for one. Let t be any tuple. Let At denote an informed adversary who knows I−{t}.
Definition 2.4 (Semantic security [38]). Let f be any boolean predicate over databases.
Algorithm A is -semantically secure if for all I, tuples t, informed adversaries At,
and any subset of outputs S ⊆ Range(A), the following holds:
exp(−)× Pr[f(I) = 1] ≤ Pr[f(I) = 1 | A(I) ∈ S] ≤ exp()× Pr[f(I) = 1]
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where the probability is taken with respect to the randomness in A and the prior
beliefs of At.
This semantic notion of privacy is equivalent to differential privacy.
Proposition 2.1 (Equivalence [38]). Algorithm A satisfies -differential privacy if
and only if A satisfies -semantic security.
Hiding multiple records Differential privacy is defined with respect to the addi-
tion or removal of a single record. However, it extends naturally to protecting the
addition or removal of a set of records. When we consider adapting differential pri-
vacy to graphs, we will use this observation to protect the set of edges surrounding a
node.
Definition 2.5 ((k, )-differential privacy). An algorithm A is (k, )-differentially
private if for all instances I, any I ′ such that |I ⊕ I ′| = k, and any subset of outputs
S ⊆ Range(A), the following holds:
Pr[A(I) ∈ S] ≤ exp()× Pr[A(I ′) ∈ S]
where probability Pr is over the randomness of A.
Note that -differential privacy is the special case of (1, )-differential privacy. By
a transitivity, A satisfies (1, )-differential privacy if and only if A satisfies (k, k)-
differential privacy.
A relaxation of differential privacy As we will later see, some properties cannot
be accurately measured under the strong requirements of differential privacy. Several
relaxations of differential privacy have been proposed, including the one defined be-
low. As we later discuss, under this relaxation, it is possible to accurately compute
some network statistics that cannot be accurately answered under strict -differential
privacy.
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Definition 2.6 ((, δ)-differential privacy [36]). An algorithm A is (, δ)-differentially
private if for all instances I, any I ′ ∈ nbrs(I), and any subset of outputs S ⊆
Range(A), the following holds:
Pr[A(I) ∈ S] ≤ exp()× Pr[A(I ′) ∈ S] + δ
where probability Pr is over the randomness of A.
2.3 Differentially private query answering
We review a technique by Dwork et al. [38] for answering numerical queries under
differential privacy. Known as the Laplace mechanism, it achieves differential privacy
by adding random noise to query answers, where the noise is carefully calibrated to
the query. We will use this technique as a component of our solution.
The input to the Laplace mechanism is Q, a sequence of queries where the answer
to each query is a number in R. The algorithm computes the true answer Q(I) to
the queries on the private data and then adds random noise to the answers. The
noise depends on the query sequence’s sensitivity. For vectors vectors x and y, let
‖x− y‖1 denote their L1 distance: ‖x− y‖1 =
∑
i |xi − yi|.
Definition 2.7 (Sensitivity). The sensitivity of Q, denoted ∆Q, is defined as
∆Q = max
I,I′∈nbrs(I)
‖Q(I)−Q(I ′)‖1 .
Intuitively, if a query has high sensitivity, then adding or removing an individual’s
private data can have a large effect on the query answer. There are many queries
with low sensitivity, such as the one in the following example.
Example 1. Let I be a database of employment records and let query sequence Q be
a salary histogram—specifically, Q[1] returns the number of records whose salary is
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less than $10K, Q[2] the number with salary between $10K and $20K, and so on, up
to Q[10], the number with salary between $90K and $100K. A neighboring database
instance, I ′, has one additional or one less record, which affects exactly one of the
histogram counts by 1. Therefore, the sensitivity of Q is ∆Q = 1.
To ensure privacy, query answers are randomly perturbed with noise proportional
to their sensitivity.
The following algorithm ensures differential privacy for any Q. Let 〈Lap(σ)〉d
denote a d-length vector of independent random samples from a Laplace distribution
with mean zero and scale σ. (The Laplace distribution has density function f(y) ∝
exp(−|y|/σ).)
Proposition 2.2 (Laplace mechanism [38]). Let Q˜ denote the randomized algorithm
that takes as input a database I, a query Q of length d, and some  > 0, and outputs
Q˜(I) = Q(I) + 〈Lap(∆Q/)〉d
Algorithm Q˜ satisfies -differential privacy.
We rely on Proposition 2.2 to ensure privacy for the query sequences we propose
in this work. We emphasize that the proposition holds for any query sequence Q, re-
gardless of correlations or constraints among the queries in Q. Such dependencies are
accounted for in the calculation of sensitivity. (For example, consider the correlated
sequence Q that consists of the same query q repeated k times, then the sensitivity
of Q is k times the sensitivity of 〈q〉.)
One can also use the above mechanism to answer multiple query sequences. This
is useful in interactive settings, where the analyst’s query may depend on the answers
to previous queries. Differentially private algorithms can be composed: the protocol
that allows the analyst to issue ` query sequences, each one using the -differentially
private mechanism above, is `-differentially private [92].
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Hiding multiple records The Laplace mechanism can be configured to provide
(k, )-differential privacy, thereby protecting a set of records. The Laplace mechanism
can be instantiated with ′ = /k—i.e., the algorithm outputs the following:
Q˜(I) = Q(I) + 〈Lap(∆Q/′)〉d
To make this concrete, suppose k = 10 and  = 1.0. Then ′ = 0.1. This in-
stantiation of the Laplace mechanism satisfies both (1, 0.1)-differential privacy and
(10, 1.0)-differential privacy, and even (100, 10.0)-differential privacy and so on.
2.4 Differential privacy for graphs
In the above definition, the database is a table whereas in the present work, the
database is a graph. Below we adapt the definition of differential privacy to graphs.
The semantic interpretation of differential privacy rests on the definition of neigh-
boring databases. Since differential privacy guarantees that the output of the algo-
rithm cannot be used to distinguish between neighboring databases, what is being
protected is precisely the difference between neighboring databases. In the above
definition, a neighboring database is defined as the addition or removal of a single
record. With the hospital example, the patient’s private information is encapsulated
within a single record. So differential privacy ensures that the output of the algorithm
does not disclose the patient’s medical history.
With network data, which is primarily about relationships among individuals, the
correspondence between private data and database records is less clear. To adapt
differential privacy to graphs, we must choose a definition for neighboring graphs
and understand the privacy semantics of that choice. We propose three alternatives
offering varying degrees of privacy protection.
We model the input as a graph, G = (V,E), where V is a set of n entities and E
is a set of edges. Edges are undirected pairs (u, v) such that u and v are members of
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V . While the meaning of an edge depends on the domain—it could connote friend-
ship, email exchange, sexual relations, etc.—we assume that it represents a sensitive
relationship that should be kept private. The focus of the present work is concerned
with graph structure, so the inclusion of attributes on nodes or edges is left for future
work.
The first adaptation of differential privacy to graphs is mathematically similar
to the definition for tables. Neighboring graphs are defined as graphs that differ
by one “record.” Given a graph G, one can produce a neighboring graph G′ by
either adding/removing an edge in E, or by adding/removing an isolated node in V .
Restricting the definition to isolated nodes ensures that the change to V does not
require additional changes to E to make it consistent with V .
Definition 2.8 (Edge -differential privacy). An algorithm A is edge -differentially
private if for all graphs G = (V,E) and G′ = (V ′, E ′) such that |V ⊕V ′|+|E⊕E ′| = 1,
and any subset of outputs S ⊆ Range(A), the following holds:
Pr[A(G) ∈ S] ≤ exp()× Pr[A(G′) ∈ S]
An edge-differentially private algorithm protects individual edges from being dis-
closed. For some applications, edge-differential privacy seems to be a reasonable
privacy standard. For example, consider the study of Kossinets and Watts [67], in
which they analyze a graph derived from the email communication among students
and faculty of a large university. What makes this dataset sensitive is that it reveals
who emails whom; edge-differential privacy protects email relationships from being
disclosed.
However, in some applications, it may be desirable to extend the protection be-
yond individual edges. For example, Klovdahl et al. [65] analyze the social network
structure of “a population of prostitutes, injecting drug users and their personal as-
sociates.” In this graph, an edge represents a sexual interaction or the use of a shared
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needle. Edges are clearly private information, but so too are other properties like node
degree (the number of sexual/drug partners) and even membership in the network.
A second adaptation of differential privacy to graphs provides much stronger pri-
vacy protection. In node-differential privacy, two graphs are neighbors if they differ
by at most one node and all of its incident edges.
Definition 2.9 (Node -differential privacy). An algorithm A is node -differentially
private if for all graphs G = (V,E) and G′ = (V ′, E ′) such that |V ⊕ V ′| = 1
and E ⊕ E ′ = {(u, v)|u ∈ (V ⊕ V ′) or v ∈ (V ⊕ V ′)}, and any subset of outputs
S ⊆ Range(A), the following holds:
Pr[A(G) ∈ S] ≤ exp()× Pr[A(G′) ∈ S]
Node-differential privacy mirrors the “opt-in/opt-out” notion of privacy from the
hospital example. It assuages any privacy concerns, as a node-differentially private
algorithm behaves almost as if the participant did not appear in at all.
While node-differential privacy is a desirable privacy objective, it may be infeasible
to design algorithms that are both node-differentially private and enable accurate
network analysis. A differentially private algorithm must hide even the worst case
difference between neighboring graphs, and this difference can be large under node-
differential privacy. For instance the empty graph (n isolated nodes) is a neighbor of
the star graph (a hub node connected to n nodes).
To span the spectrum of privacy between edge- and node-differential privacy, we
introduce an extension to edge-differential privacy that allows neighboring graphs to
differ by more than a single edge. In k-edge-differential privacy, neighboring graphs
can differ by up to k edges.
Definition 2.10 (k-edge -differential privacy). An algorithmA is k-edge -differentially
private if for all graphs G = (V,E) and G′ = (V ′, E ′) such that |V ⊕V ′|+|E⊕E ′| ≤ k,
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and any subset of outputs S ⊆ Range(A), the following holds:
Pr[A(G) ∈ S] ≤ exp()× Pr[A(G′) ∈ S]
A larger setting of k leads to greater privacy protection. If k = 1, then k-edge-
differential privacy is equivalent to edge-differential privacy. If k = |V |, then k-
edge-differential privacy is even stronger than node-differential privacy, as the set of
neighboring graphs under k-edge-differential privacy is a superset of the neighbors
under node-differential privacy. If 1 < k < |V |, then k-edge-differential privacy
prevents the disclosure of aggregate properties of any subset of k edges. Notice that
for those nodes whose degree is less than k, it provides essentially equivalent protection
as node-differential privacy. Nodes whose degree is k or larger face more exposure.
However, nodes with large degree also have greater influence on the structure of the
graph. If our goal is to also allow analysts to accurately measure the graph structure,
then it may be necessary to expose high degree nodes to greater privacy risk.
2.5 Network analyses and statistics
We provide a brief overview of some common network analyses to illustrate the
diversity of analyses that are done on network data. We also define several network
statistics that are used later in the dissertation. In Chapter 4, we use these statistics to
evaluate how the privacy-preserving transformations impact network topology. Also,
in Chapters 5 and 6, we describe answer perturbation techniques for approximating
some of these statistics.
Many analyses focus solely on measuring the topology of the network as defined by
the edge table. Such analyses include the distribution of node degrees, the distribution
of path lengths, and measures of clustering or transitivity. These basic structural
properties of networks compensate for the difficulty in visualizing large networks.
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Significant research effort has been devoted to models of network formation that
generate graphs possessing the structural properties seen in the real world [10, 21, 26,
50, 73, 74, 72, 122].
Some analyses pinpoint specific structural features of the network. Analysis of
network centrality [42] seeks to identify influential nodes. In addition, community
discovery [100] divides the network into meaningful clusters. Motif analysis [94] iden-
tifies interesting structures that occur repeatedly in a network.
Another category of research focuses on understanding the function of the network
by modeling processes that occur within the network. Such processes include search
or navigation within networks [112, 121] and diffusion across networks (e.g., rumors
or epidemics spreading in a group) [63].
While the above analyses focus on the structure of the graph, the presence of
attributes on edges or nodes allow for some new analyses and variants of those above.
For example, homophily, the tendency for associations to form among similar indi-
viduals, can be measured in a network with attributes on nodes [89, 104]. Network
models have been developed that model the correlation between structural features
and attributes [50]. Finally, network data can include temporal information, allowing
the study of network dynamics. This includes the development of models of network
formation and evolution [73] and models to accurately predict future links [67, 80].
This gives a brief overview of the diverse ways in which networks are analyzed.
More complete surveys of network analysis appear in the literature [32, 99].
Network statistics Below we define some of the network statistics that we use in
this dissertation. Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph where |V | = n and |E| = m.
• Density The edge density of a graph is the number of edges divided by the
number of possible edges: m/
(
n
2
)
.
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• Path statistics A path from u to v is a sequence of edges that traverse from u
to v. The shortest path between u and v is the path with the minimum number
of edges, and its length is the number of edges. The diameter of a graph is the
length of the longest shortest path.
• Connected components A connected component is a maximal subgraph such
that for any pair of nodes in the subgraph, there is a path connecting them.
Some statistics related to connected components include the number of con-
nected components and the relative size of the largest connected component.
• Distortion Distortion is a statistic that captures how closely a graph resembles
a tree [117]. To compute distortion of G, we first construct a spanning tree T .
Then for each edge (u, v) in G, we compute the distance (length of shortest path)
between u and v in T . The distortion is the average distance over all edges in
G. Thus, it measures how path lengths of G are distorted (i.e., lengthened) if
we are restricted to only traversing edges in tree T .
• Degree In an undirected graph, the degree of a node u is the number of neigh-
bors of u (i.e., nodes v such that (u, v) ∈ E). In a directed graph, the in-degree
is the number of incoming edges, the out-degree is the number of outgoing edges.
The degree sequence of a graph is a non-decreasing sequence of the degrees of
the nodes in the graph.
• Degree variability For a degree sequence d = (d1, . . . , dn), the coefficient of
variation CV (d) is defined as CV (d) = σ(d)/〈d〉 where 〈d〉 is the average degree
and σ(d) =
∑n
i=1(di − 〈d〉)2/(n − 1). Graphs with homogenous degrees have
low CV and graphs with diverse degree sequences, such as power-law graphs,
have high CV [7].
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• Degree correlations The s-metric is a measure of degree correlation [78]. It
is defined as s(G) =
∑
(u,v)∈E d(u)d(v) where d(u) is the degree of node u. A
high s(G) indicates that high degree nodes are connected to one another. The
normalized s-metric is s(G)/smax(G) where smax(G) is the maximum possible
s of any graph with the same degree sequence as G. (In practice, it is compu-
tationally intensive to find the true maximum, so we approximate it with the
Havel-Hakimi graph [16], which is efficient to construct and tends to have very
high s.)
• Clustering Clustering coefficient measures the likelihood that two neighbors
of a node are themselves connected. It is defined as C(G) = 1
n
∑
u
24(u)
d(u)(d(u)−1)
where 4(u) is the number of triangles (cliques of size 3) containing u.
• Transitivity A closely related measure to clustering coefficient is transitivity.
It is defined three times the number of triangles in the graph divided by the
number of paths of length two.
• Motif A motif is a subgraph pattern, and motif analysis is the process of
finding “interesting” subgraph patterns, such as those that are unlikely to arise
by chance given some model of network formation.
The above statistics are highlighted because they are used elsewhere in the disserta-
tion. Newman [99] and da F. Costa [32] provide more comprehensive summaries of
common network statistics.
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CHAPTER 3
ASSESSING RE-IDENTIFICATION RISK
We consider the problem of publishing network data in such a way that permits
useful analysis yet avoids disclosing sensitive information. Most existing work on pri-
vacy in data publishing has focused on tabular data, where each record represents a
separate entity, and an individual may be re-identified by matching the individual’s
publicly known attributes with the attributes of the anonymized table. Anonym-
ization techniques for tabular data do not apply to network data because they fail
to account for the interconnectedness of the entities (i.e., they destroy the network
structure).
Because network analysis can be performed in the absence of entity identifiers
(e.g., name, social security number), a natural strategy for protecting sensitive in-
formation is to replace identifying attributes with synthetic identifiers. We refer to
this procedure as naive anonymization. It is a common practice and presumably,
it protects sensitive information by breaking the association between the real-world
identity and the sensitive data.
However, naive anonymization may be insufficient. A distinctive threat in network
data is that an entity’s connections (i.e., the network structure around it) can be
distinguishing, and may be used to re-identify an otherwise anonymous individual. We
consider how a malicious individual (the adversary) might obtain partial knowledge
about the network structure around targeted individuals and then use this knowledge
to re-identify them in the anonymized network. Once re-identified, the adversary
can learn additional properties about the targets; for instance, he may able to infer
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the presence or absence of edges between them. Since individual connections are
often considered sensitive information, such edge disclosure constitutes a violation of
privacy. Whether naive anonymization provides adequate protection depends on the
structure of the network and the adversary’s capability. In this chapter, we provide
a comprehensive assessment of the privacy risks of naive anonymization.
Although an adversary may also have information about the attributes of nodes,
the focus of this chapter is on disclosures resulting from structural or topological re-
identification, where the adversary’s information is about the structure of the graph
only. The use of attribute knowledge to re-identify individuals in anonymized data
has been well-studied, as have techniques for resisting it [85, 88, 110, 111, 116]. More
importantly, many network analyses are concerned exclusively with structural prop-
erties of the graph, therefore safely publishing an unlabeled network is an important
goal in itself. For example, the following common analyses examine only the net-
work structure: finding communities, fitting power-law models, enumerating motifs,
measuring diffusion, and assessing resiliency [99].
In this chapter, we make the following contributions:
• Adversary Model We propose a flexible model of external information used
by an adversary to attack naively-anonymized networks. The model allows us
to evaluate re-identification risk efficiently and for a range of different adversary
capabilities. We also formalize the structural indistinguishability of a node with
respect to an adversary with locally-bounded external information (Section 3.1).
• Empirical Risk Assessment We evaluate the effectiveness of structural at-
tacks on real and synthetic networks, measuring successful re-identification and
edge disclosures. We find that real networks are diverse in their resistance to
attacks. Nevertheless, our results demonstrate that naive anonymization pro-
vides insufficient protection, especially if an adversary is capable of gathering
knowledge beyond a target’s immediate neighbors (Section 3.2).
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• Theoretical Risk Assessment In addition to the empirical study, we perform
a theoretical analysis of random graphs. We show how properties such as a
graph’s density and degree distribution affect re-identification risk. A significant
finding is that in sufficiently dense graphs, nodes can be re-identified even when
the graph is extremely large (Section 3.3).
The findings of this chapter tell us what makes nodes vulnerable to re-identification
attacks. This understanding serves as a basis for designing effective strategies for
anonymizing network data, a subject which is taken up in Chapter 4.
3.1 Modeling the adversary
In this section we describe the capabilities and motivations of the adversary in
the context of network data. First, we describe the process of naive anonymization
and how the adversary may attack it. Second, we define the threats of node re-
identification and edge disclosure. Third, we explain how anonymity is achieved
through structural similarity, which motivates a model of adversary knowledge based
on degree signatures. Finally we review alternative models of the adversary.
3.1.1 Naive anonymization
Formally, we model a network as an undirected graph G = (V,E). The naive
anonymization of G is an isomorphic graph, Ga = (Va, Ea), defined by a random
bijection Π : V → Va. For example, Figure 3.1 shows a small network represented
as a graph along with its naive anonymization. The anonymization mapping Π, also
shown, is a random, secret mapping.
Naive anonymization prevents re-identification when the adversary has no infor-
mation about individuals in the original graph. Formally stated, an individual x ∈ V ,
called the target, has a candidate set, denoted cand(x), which consists of the nodes
of Ga that could feasibly correspond to x. To assess the risk of re-identification, we
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Figure 3.1. A social network represented as a graph (left), the naive anonymization
(center), and the anonymization mapping (right).
assume each element of the candidate set is equally likely and use the size of the
candidate set as a measure of resistance to re-identification. Since Π is random, in
the absence of other information, any node in Ga could correspond to the target
node x. Thus, given an uninformed adversary, each individual has the same risk of
re-identification, specifically cand(x) = Va for each target individual x.
However, if the adversary has access to external information about the entities,
he may be able to reduce the candidate set and threaten the privacy of individuals.
3.1.2 Threats
In practice the adversary may have access to external information about the enti-
ties in the graph and their relationships. This information may be available through
a public source beyond the control of the data owner, or may be obtained by the ad-
versary’s malicious actions. For example, for the graph in Figure 3.1, the adversary
might know that “Bob has three or more neighbors,” or that “Greg is connected to at
least two nodes, each with degree 2.” Such information allows the adversary to reduce
the set of candidates in the anonymized graph for each of the targeted individuals.
For example, the first statement allows the adversary to partially re-identify Bob:
cand(Bob) = {2, 4, 7, 8}. The second statement re-identifies Greg: cand(Greg) = {4}.
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Re-identification can lead to additional disclosures under naive anonymization.
If an individual is uniquely re-identified, then the entire structure of connections
surrounding the individual is revealed. If two individuals are uniquely re-identified,
then the presence or absence of an edge between them is revealed directly by the
naively anonymized graph. Such an edge disclosure, in which an adversary is able
to accurately infer the presence of an edge between two identified individuals, can
be a serious privacy threat. In the present work, we consider the general threat of
re-identification as well as the more specific threat edge disclosure.
Throughout this work, we model the adversary’s external information as access to
a source that provides answers to a restricted knowledge query evaluated for a single
target node of the original graph G.
An adversary attempts re-identification for a target node x by using Q(x) to refine
the feasible candidate set. Since Ga is published, the adversary can easily evaluate
any structural query directly on Ga, looking for matches. The adversary will compute
the refined candidate set that contains all nodes in the published graph Ga that are
consistent with answers to the knowledge query on the target node.
Definition 3.1 (Candidate Set under Q). For a knowledge query Q over a graph,
the candidate set of target node x w.r.t Q is candQ(x) = {y ∈ Va | Q(x) = Q(y)}.
Example 2. Referring to the example graph in Figure 3.1, suppose Q is a knowl-
edge query returning the degree of a node. Then for targets Ed, Fred, Greg we
have Q(Ed) = 4, Q(Fred) = 2, Q(Greg) = 4, and candidate sets candQ(Ed) =
candQ(Greg) = {2, 4, 7, 8} and candQ(Fred) = {1, 3}.
Given two target nodes x and y, the adversary can use the naively anonymized
graph to deduce the likelihood that the nodes are connected. In the absence of
external information, the likelihood of any edge is simply the density of the graph
(the fraction of all possible edges that exist in the graph).
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If the candidate sets for x and y have been refined by the adversary’s knowledge
about x and/or y, then the adversary reasons about the likelihood x and y are con-
nected based on the connections between the candidate sets for x and y. Thus we
define the edge likelihood to be the Bayesian posterior belief assuming each candidate
is an equally likely match for the targeted nodes.
Definition 3.2 (Edge likelihood under Q). For a knowledge query Q over a graph,
and a pair of target nodes x and y, the inferred likelihood of edge (x, y) under Q is
denoted probQ(x, y) and defined as:
|{(u, v) | u ∈ X, v ∈ Y }|+ |{(u, v) | u, v ∈ X ∩ Y }|
|X| · |Y | − |X ∩ Y |
where X = candQ(x) and Y = candQ(y).
The denominator represents the total number of possible edges from a node of one
candidate set to a node of the other candidate set, and accounts for the case where
the intersection of the candidate sets is non-empty.
Example 3. Continuing the example above, the inferred likelihood of edge (Ed, Fred)
is:
probQ(Ed, Fred) = (4 + 0)/(4 ∗ 2) = 0.500
because there are 4 edges present in Ga between the disjoint candidate sets candQ(Ed)
and candQ(Fred). The inferred edge likelihood of edge (Ed,Greg) is:
probQ(Ed,Greg) = (5 + 5)/(4 ∗ 4− 4) = 0.833
because 5 edges are present in Ga between the identical candidate sets candQ(Ed)
and candQ(Greg). These edge likelihoods should be compared with the prior edge
density of 2 ∗ 11/(8 ∗ 7) = .393.
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Alice Bob Carol
Dave Ed
Fred Greg Harry
(a) graph
Node ID H0 H1 H2
Alice  1 {4}
Bob  4 {1, 1, 4, 4}
Carol  1 {4}
Dave  4 {2, 4, 4, 4}
Ed  4 {2, 4, 4, 4}
Fred  2 {4, 4}
Greg  4 {2, 2, 4, 4}
Harry  2 {4, 4}
(b) structural signatures
Equivalence Relation Equivalence Classes
≡H0 {A,B,C,D,E, F,G,H}
≡H1 {A,C} {B,D,E,G} {F,H}
≡H2 {A,C}{B}{D,E}{G}{F,H}
≡A {A,C}{B}{D,E}{G}{F,H}
(c) equivalence classes
Figure 3.2. (a) A sample graph, (b) external information consisting of structural
signatures H0,H1 and H2 computed for each individual in the graph, (c) the equiva-
lence classes of nodes implied by the structural signatures. For the sample data, ≡H2 ,
corresponds to automorphic equivalence, ≡A.
In Section 3.2, we measure the threats of edge disclosure and node re-identification
on real networks.
3.1.3 Anonymity through structural similarity
Intuitively, nodes that look structurally similar may be indistinguishable to an
adversary, in spite of external information. A strong form of structural similarity
between nodes is automorphic equivalence. Two nodes x, y ∈ V are automorphically
equivalent (denoted x ≡A y) if there exists an isomorphism from the graph onto itself
that maps x to y.
Example 4. Fred and Harry are automorphically equivalent nodes in the graph of
Figure 3.1. Bob and Ed are not automorphically equivalent: the subgraph around Bob
is different from the subgraph around Ed and no isomorphism proving automorphic
equivalence is possible.
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Automorphic equivalence induces a partitioning on V into sets whose members
have identical structural properties. It follows that an adversary — even with exhaus-
tive knowledge of a target node’s structural position — cannot identify an individual
beyond the set of entities to which it is automorphically equivalent. We say that
two such nodes are structurally indistinguishable and observe that nodes in the graph
achieve anonymity by being “hidden in the crowd” of its automorphic class members.
Some special graphs have large automorphic equivalence classes. For example, in
a complete graph, or in a graph which forms a ring, all nodes are automorphically
equivalent. But in most graphs we expect to find small automorphism classes, likely
to be insufficient for protection against re-identification.
Though automorphism classes may be small in real networks, automorphic equiv-
alence is an extremely strong notion of structural similarity. In order to distinguish
two nodes in different automorphic equivalence classes, it may be necessary to use
complete information about their positions in the graph. For a weaker adversary
with limited knowledge, nodes that are not automorphically equivalent may in fact
be indistinguishable. For example, for an adversary who only knows the degree of
targeted nodes in the graph, Bob and Ed are indistinguishable (even though they are
not automorphically equivalent). This motivates the notion of bounded structural
knowledge we describe next.
3.1.4 Adversary model based on structural signatures
We now describe the adversary model. It is based on a class of knowledge queries,
of increasing power, which report on the local structure of the graph around a node.
These queries are inspired by iterative vertex refinement, a technique originally devel-
oped to efficiently test for the existence of graph isomorphisms [31]. In Section 3.1.5,
we discuss alternative adversary models.
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The queries are denoted Hi for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The weakest knowledge query,
H0, simply returns the label of the node. (We consider here unlabeled graphs, so H0
returns  on all input nodes.) The queries are successively more descriptive: H1(x)
returns the degree of x, H2(x) returns the multiset of each neighbors’ degree, and so
on. The queries can be defined iteratively, where Hi(x) returns the multiset of values
which are the result of evaluating Hi−1 on the set of nodes adjacent to x:
Hi(x) = {Hi−1(z1),Hi−1(z2) . . . ,Hi−1(zm)}
where z1 . . . zm are the nodes adjacent to x.
Example 5. Figure 3.2 contains the same graph from Figure 3.1 along with the
computation of H0, H1, and H2 for each node. For example: H0 is uniformly .
H1(Bob) = {, , , }, which we abbreviate in the table simply as 4. Using this
abbreviation, H2(Bob) = {1, 1, 4, 4} which represents Bob’s neighbors’ degrees.
In practice, we might expect that if an adversary can learn the degrees of the
target’s neighbors, he would also be able to learn about edges in the neighborhood.
In this case, instead of learning Hi, the adversary would learn a subgraph where the
subgraph is induced by the edges adjacent to nodes that lie within at most i− 1 edge
traversals of the target. This additional knowledge would make the adversary more
powerful, and thus the Hi signature is a more conservative model. The Hi signatures
have the advantage that they are efficient to evaluate, whereas measuring subgraph
knowledge requires checking for subgraph isomorphisms, an NP-Hard problem. Thus,
the Hi signature can be viewed as an efficient way to calculate a lower bound on the
risk of the subgraph adversary. In Section 3.1.5, we discuss prior work, including our
own, that has considered models based on knowledge of subgraphs surrounding the
target.
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For each query Hi, we define an equivalence relation on nodes in the graph in the
natural way.
Definition 3.3 (Relative equivalence). Two nodes x, y in a graph are equivalent
relative to Hi, denoted x ≡Hi y, if and only if Hi(x) = Hi(y).
Example 6. Figure 3.2(c) lists the equivalence classes of nodes according to rela-
tions ≡H0 ,≡H1 , and ≡H2 . All nodes are equivalent relative to H0 (for an unlabeled
graph). As i increases, the values for Hi contain successively more precise structural
information, and as a result, equivalence classes are divided.
To an adversary limited to knowledge query Hi, nodes equivalent with respect to
Hi are indistinguishable. The following proposition formalizes this intuition:
Proposition 3.1. Let x, x′ ∈ V . If x ≡Hi x′ then candHi(x) = candHi(x′).
Iterative computation of H continues until no new vertices are distinguished. We
call this query H∗. In the example of Figure 3.2, H∗ = H2. The vertex refinement
technique is the basis of efficient graph isomorphism algorithms which can be shown
to work for almost all graphs [8]. In our setting, this means that equivalence under
H∗ is very likely to coincide with automorphic equivalence.
3.1.5 Alternative adversary models
Throughout this work, we use the structural signatures described above as a pa-
rameterized model of external information that can capture the power of a range
of adversaries. Our structural signatures have the advantage that they are efficient
to evaluate even on large graphs, are amenable to theoretical analysis, and they are
conservative model of structural knowledge.
One of our guiding principles is that adversary knowledge tends to be local to the
targeted node, with more powerful adversaries capable of exploring the neighborhood
around a node with increasing diameter.
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In practice, external information about a published social network may be acquired
through malicious actions by the adversary or from public information sources. In
addition, a participant in the network, with some innate knowledge of entities and
their relationships, may be acting as an adversary in an attempt to uncover unknown
information. A legitimate privacy objective in some settings is to publish a graph in
which participating individuals cannot re-identify themselves. For the participant-
adversary, whose knowledge is based on their participation in the network, existing
research about institutional communication networks suggests that there is a horizon
of awareness of about distance two around most individuals [43].
Other work on network anonymity has also focused on adversaries whose structural
knowledge is based on a local neighborhood around a target node [29, 82, 128, 132,
134]. An exception is the recent work by Narayanan et al. [97], which uses an auxiliary
network to attack a target network, and work by Zou et al. [136], which protects
against an adversary with unbounded structural knowledge.
In previous work [51], we considered alternative models of adversary knowledge, in-
cluding partial subgraphs and signatures determined by connections to hubs. In evalu-
ating adversaries with knowledge of partial subgraphs around a target, re-identification
risk is generally lower than with degree signatures, but depends on how complete the
known subgraph is. It is also computationally difficult to compute candidate sets
because testing a potential candidate requires looking for a subgraph isomorphism.
Hubs are highly connected nodes observed in many network datasets. In a Web
graph, a hub may be a highly visited website. In a graph of email connections, hubs
often represent influential individuals. Because hubs are often outliers in a graph’s
degree distribution, the true identity of hub nodes is often apparent in a naively-
anonymized graph. In addition, an individual’s connections to hubs may be publicly
known or easily deduced. We found that on real networks, the rate of re-identification
using knowledge of hub connections was relatively low.
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics for the real and synthetic graphs studied.
Statistic Real Datasets Synthetic Datasets
HepTh Enron NetTrace HOT Power-Law Tree Mesh
Nodes 2510 111 4213 939 2500 3280 2500
Edges 4737 287 5507 988 7453 3279 4900
Minimum degree 1 1 1 1 2 1 2
Maximum degree 36 20 1656 91 166 4 4
Median degree 2 5 1 1 4 1 4
Average degree 3.77 5.17 2.61 2.10 5.96 1.99 3.92
Edge density 0.0007 0.0235 0.0003 0.0022 0.0024 0.0006 0.0016
Avg. cand. set size (H1) 558.5 12.0 2792.1 635.5 549.7 1821.8 2138.1
Avg. cand. set size (H2) 25.4 1.5 608.6 81.1 1.4 1659.8 1818.1
Percent re-identified (H1) 0.2 2.7 0.5 0.9 0.9 < 0.1 < 0.1
Percent re-identified (H2) 40.4 73.9 11.1 5.9 82.5 < 0.1 < 0.1
As mentioned above, the focus of this work is on supporting the topological
analysis of graphs. We therefore assume that attributes are not used to aid in re-
identification, and our assessment of utility does not include analyses that depend on
attribute values. Other authors have proposed anonymization schemes that protect
against re-identification using attributes [29, 30, 134].
3.2 Empirical risk assessment
In this section we evaluate the risk of publishing the naive anonymization of
a network through an empirical assessment on several real and synthetic network
datasets.
For each dataset, we consider each node in turn as a target. We assume the
adversary computes the structural signature of that node, and then we compute the
corresponding candidate set. We report the distribution of candidate set sizes across
the population of nodes to characterize how many nodes are protected and how many
are identifiable.
We use the following seven datasets. The HepTh dataset is a graph of coauthors
in theoretical high-energy physics. The dataset is derived from arXiv, an online
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repository of papers. We extracted a subset of the authors and considered them
connected if they wrote at least two papers together.
The Enron dataset is derived from a corpus of email sent to and from managers
at Enron Corporation, made public by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
during its investigation of the company. Two individuals are connected if they corre-
sponded at least 5 times.
The NetTrace dataset was derived from an IP-level network trace collected at a
major university. The trace monitors traffic at the gateway; it produces a bipartite
graph between IP addresses internal to the institution, and external IP addresses. We
restricted the trace to 187 internal addresses from a single campus department and
the 4026 external addresses to which at least 20 packets were sent on port 80 (http
traffic).
The HOT dataset is a model of the Internet of a single service provider (ISP).
Its Heuristically Optimal Topology (HOT) is designed to reflect the economic and
technological constraints that influence the topology. It has a hierarchical structure
with a core of interconnected low degree (high-bandwidth) routers at its center and
high-degree (low-bandwidth) routers at its periphery [77].
The Power-Law dataset is a random graph that is generated based on a model of
growth and preferential attachment [10]. Its degree distribution follows a power-law.
In some of the experiments, we also consider a slightly different dataset, Clustered
Power-Law, which is constructed using the same model except that when edges are
inserted into the graph, triangles are formed with some probability (we set p = 0.4).
The Mesh dataset is a 50 × 50 grid topology, where each node is connected to
the four adjacent nodes in the grid. The Tree dataset is a balanced tree of arity 3.
All datasets have undirected edges, with self-loops removed. We eliminated a small
percentage of disconnected nodes in each dataset, focusing on the largest connected
component in the graph. Detailed statistics for the datasets are shown in Table 3.1.
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Figure 3.3. The relationship between candidate set size and structural signature
knowledge Hi for i = 1..4 for four real graphs and three synthetic graphs. For each
Hi, the bars show the percentage of nodes whose candidate sets have sizes in the
following buckets: [1] (black), [2, 4], [5, 10], [11, 20], [21,∞] (white).
3.2.1 Node re-identification
Recall from Section 3.1.4 that nodes contained in the same candidate set for
knowledge Hi share the same value for Hi, are indistinguishable according to Hi, and
are therefore protected if the candidate set size is sufficiently large.
Figure 3.3 is an overview of the likelihood of re-identification under H1,H2,H3
and H4 knowledge queries. For each Hi, the graph reports on the percentage of nodes
whose candidate sets have sizes in the following buckets: [1] , [2, 4], [5, 10], [11, 20],
[21,∞]. Nodes with candidate set size 1 have been uniquely identified, and nodes with
candidate sets between 2 and 4 are at high risk for re-identification. Nodes are at
fairly low risk for re-identification if there are more than 20 nodes in their candidate
set.1 Each Hi is represented as a different point on the x-axis.
Figure 3.3 shows that for the HepTh data, H1 leaves nearly all nodes at low risk
for re-identification, and it requires H3 knowledge to uniquely re-identify a majority
of nodes. For Enron, under H1 about 15% of the nodes have candidate sets smaller
than 5, while only 19% are protected in candidate sets greater than 20. Under H2,
re-identification jumps dramatically so that virtually all nodes have candidate sets
1We do not suggest these categories as a universal privacy standard, but merely as divisions that
focus attention on the most important part of the candidate set distribution where serious disclosures
are at risk.
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less than 5. These two real graphs are roughly similar in behavior to the synthetic
Power-Law graph, as they display features similar to a power-law graph.
NetTrace and HOT have substantially lower disclosure overall, with very few
identified nodes under H1, and even H4 knowledge does not uniquely identify more
than 10% of the nodes. For NetTrace, this results from the unique bipartite structure
of the trace dataset: many nodes in the trace have low degree, as they are unique or
rare web destinations contacted by only one internal host. The HOT graph has high
structural uniformity because it contains many degree one nodes that are connected
to the same high degree node, and thus structurally equivalent to one another.
The synthetic Tree and Mesh graphs display very low re-identification under all
Hi. This is obvious given that these graphs have highly uniform structure: the nodes
in Mesh have either degree 2 or 4, the nodes in Tree have degree 1, 3 or 4. We
include them here for completeness as these graphs are studied in Section 4.3.
A natural precondition for publication is a very low percentage of high-risk nodes
under a reasonable assumption about adversary knowledge. Three datasets meet that
requirement for H1 (HepTh, NetTrace, HOT). Except for the extreme synthetic
graphs Tree and Mesh, no datasets meet that requirement for H2.
Overall, we observe that there can be significant variance across different datasets
in their vulnerability to different adversary knowledge. However, across all datasets,
the most significant change in re-identification is from H1 to H2, illustrating the
increased power of adversaries that can explore beyond the target’s immediate neigh-
borhood. Re-identification tends to stabilize after H3—more information in the form
of H4 does not lead to an observable increase in re-identification in any dataset. Fi-
nally, even though there are many re-identified nodes, a substantial number of nodes
are not uniquely identified even with H4 knowledge.
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Figure 3.4. The inferred edge probabilities resulting from attempted re-identification
using structural signatures H1,H2,H3,H4.
3.2.2 Edge disclosure
We measure the risk of edge disclosure possible under adversaries with knowledge
of degree signatures. Our sample datasets are sparse graphs – their edge densities
are all quite low, as reported in Table 3.1. This means that the expectation of any
particular edge existing in the graph is low.
To measure the risk of edge disclosure, we considered each edge present in the
original graph and considered its inferred edge likelihood under various Hi. That is,
we imagine an adversary using Hi knowledge to re-identify the individuals partici-
pating in each edge of the true graph, and report the inferred edge probability over
the set of all true edges. For each Hi we get a range of inferred edge probabilities, as
illustrated in Figure 3.4.
The results show that with H1 knowledge alone, the risk of edge disclosure is
relatively limited. In the Hep-Th data, 80% of the edges have an inferred edge
probability of less than 0.01, which constitutes a small shift in an adversary’s certainty
about the presence of those edges. In the Enron and NetTrace data, roughly half
the edges have inferred probabilities between 0.10 and 1, which represent a significant
shift in the adversary’s expectation.
Of much more concern, however, is the fact that with H2 knowledge (or greater)
many edges are disclosed with certainty – the inferred edge probability is 1 for a
majority of edges across all datasets. It is also important to note that even when
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candidate sets tend to be large (such as in NetTrace and HOT), edges can be
disclosed with high likelihood. In NetTrace and HOT this likely reflects a hub
node with a unique degree connected to many degree-one nodes. Even though the
candidate set of degree one nodes may be large, every node in that candidate set is
connected to the hub, and density of connections between the candidate sets is one,
resulting in certain edge disclosure.
3.3 Theoretical risk assessment
The results of the previous section show that re-identification risk varies across
graphs. We want to understand and explain this variation. In some cases, such
as Tree and Mesh, the low re-identification risk can be explained by the regular
topology, which makes it hard to distinguish nodes by their local structure. However,
across the other graphs, the reason for diversity in risk is unclear.
In this section, to gain insight into the factors affecting re-identification risk, we
study random graphs. Random graphs are governed by parameters which control
some aspect of the graph’s topology; by varying the parameters, we can measure
how this property affects re-identification risk. Here, we study how re-identification
risk is affected by two key graph properties, density and degree distribution. To
study the relationship between graph density and anonymity, we analyze the Erdo¨s-
Re´nyi (ER) model [39, 40, 47], the simplest random graph model. Following that,
we study random graphs with power-law degree distributions. These results help us
to understand under what conditions distinctive structures arise in graphs, and thus
provide insight into the foundations of anonymity for graphs.
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3.3.1 Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graphs
The ER model generates a graph by sampling each of the
(
n
2
)
edges independently
with probability p. As the number of nodes, n, increases, these graphs exhibit different
behaviors depending on how p scales with n.
We consider three cases. In a sparse random graph p = c/n, in a dense random
graph p = c log n/n, and in a super-dense random graph, p = c (where c is a constant).
The first two cases are of interest because when c > 1, with high probability the
graph includes a giant connected component of size Θ(n) and a collection of smaller
components (in the sparse case) or the graph is completely connected (in the dense
case) [40].
To motivate the theoretical results that follow, Figure 3.5 shows experimental
simulations on ER random graph of 100K nodes and varying edge probabilities. The
trend lines measure the percentage of nodes uniquely identified by H1, H2, and H3
knowledge.
The figure shows that for sparse graphs, very few nodes are uniquely identified,
even with the more powerfulH3 knowledge. Intuitively, nodes cannot be distinguished
because a sparse graph lacks sufficient edge density to create diversity in structure.
Because the edge probability is p = c/n, the expected node degree, which is p(n− 1),
goes to c as n → ∞. Because the expected degree is constant, for sufficiently large
n, structural patterns must repeat, leading to complete structural uniformity in the
limit. The following theorem formalizes this intuition, showing that no degree of Hi
knowledge can distinguish nodes in a large sparse ER random graph.
Theorem 3.1 (Sparse ER random graphs). Let G be an ER random graph containing
n nodes with edge probability given by p = c/n for c > 1. (i) The expected sizes of the
equivalence classes induced by Hi are Θ(n) for any i ≥ 0; (ii) with probability going
to one, the sizes of the equivalence classes induced by Hi are Ω(nα), for any i ≥ 0
and any 0 < α < 1.
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Proof. We begin with H1. Consider a graph of size n. Let Ni denote the degree of
the i-th node, i ≤ n. As n→∞,
P (Ni = k)→ c
k
k!
e−c
Note that for any k = ω(1), the probability of Ni = k goes to zero as n → ∞.
Thus, it suffices only consider the case where k is a constant.
Let M1,k(n) denote the expected size of the equivalence class of H1 corresponding
to node degree k when the graph is of size n and let M1,k = limn→∞M1,k(n). We
have
M1,k = lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
P (Ni = k)
= Θ(n)
In order to establish the second result, we restrict ourselves to a random subset of the
n nodes of size nα, where α < 1. Note that the fraction of nodes in this subset goes
to zero as n→∞. This allows us to show that, as n→∞, the degrees of the nodes
in this subset are independent random variables. Application of a Chernoff bound
then produces P [Lk ≤ (1 − δ)nαcke−c/k!] ≤ e−(δ2cke−c/k!)nα where Lk is the number
of nodes in the subset having degree k as n→∞. As |Mi,k| ≥ Lk, we conclude that
|M1,k(n)| = Ω(nα) with probability going to one for all k.
Similar arguments hold forHi, i = 2, . . .. Consider a node x. We first note that the
Hi equivalence class that x belongs to is determined by the subgraph rooted at x that
includes all nodes within distance i of it. Now, as n→∞, with probability going to
one, this subgraph is a tree. Moreover the probability of the above subgraph deviating
from a tree is O(1/n). Another observation is that every Hi induced equivalence class
contains at least one node, whose distance i subgraph is a tree in the limit as n→∞.
This follows because anyHi consistent multi-set can be used to construct a tree. Thus
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any distance i subgraph centered at a node that is not a tree is hidden by commonly
found trees.
Consider a tree, t, of height i or less. Let N(t) be a set containing the numbers
of children for all nodes in the tree that are at distance j = 0, 1, . . . , i − 1 from the
root. Let Gi(x) denote the distance i subgraph centered at node x and let Ti denote
the set of all possible height i or less trees. Then
P (Gi(x) = t) =
∏
k∈N(t)
ck
k!
e−c +O(1/n), t ∈ Ti
= Θ(1)
P (Gi(x) /∈ Ti) = O(1/n)
Note that as n grows, the distribution of the number of children that a node within
the tree has is Poisson.
Since each equivalence class contains at least one height i or less tree in the limit
as n → ∞, it follows from the above expressions that the expected size of each
equivalence class is Θ(n). Last a similar argument as used for H1 establishes the
second property.
From the standpoint of protecting anonymity, this is an encouraging result for this
class of graphs, assuming we are concerned with publishing large graphs. (In simula-
tions, we found that some re-identification occurs in random graphs of less than 106
nodes.)
As we consider more dense ER random graphs, structural diversity increases and
re-identification becomes a near certainty very quickly. Figure 3.5 suggests that as
graphs become dense (p = clog(n)/n), while nodes remain well-hidden against H1
adversaries, H2 knowledge is sufficient to re-identify virtually all nodes in the graph.
The following theorem supports the simulations.
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Figure 3.5. For H2 and H3 the number of uniquely re-identified individuals in a
classical random graph goes from zero to 100% quickly when there is sufficient edge
density. But regardless of the density, the number of nodes with a unique degree is
close to zero, showing that H1 is insufficient for unique re-identification.
Theorem 3.2 (Dense ER random graphs). Let G be an ER random graph containing
n nodes with edge probability given by p = c log n/n for c > 1.
1. With high probability a node belongs to an equivalence class induced by H1 that
grows to infinity as n→∞.
2. The expected sizes of equivalence classes induced by H2 goes to zero as n→∞.
The second property indicates that for a given H2 signature, the expected number
of nodes having that signature grows more slowly than n. Given the simulation results,
the most likely cause of this result is that the H2 signatures are unique.
Proof. As n→∞, the degree distribution converges to the Poisson distribution with
mean c log n. Let Ni(n) denote the degree of node i in a graph of size n and consider
degrees of the form Ni(n) = δc log n, 0 < δ. Then, as n→∞, we have
P [Ni = δc log n] =
1√
2piδc log nnc(1−δ+δ log δ)
, 0 < δ
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A Chernoff bound argument can be used to show that, whp, a node’s degree lies
within the range (δ0c log n, δ1c log n) where δ0 is the largest value of δ < 0 such that
c(1 − δ + δ log δ) = 1 and δ1 is the smallest value of δ > 1 to satisfy that equation.
Note that P [Ni = δc log n] decreases more quickly than 1/n whenever δ /∈ [δ0, δ1] and
more slowly otherwise. We focus now on the range of degrees (δ0c log n, δ1c log n),
and let Lδ denote the number of nodes with degree δc log n, δ ∈ [δ0, δ1]. Randomly
select a set of nodes of size nα, where α is chosen such that, c(1−δ+δ log δ) < α < 1.
As in the previous theorem, we can show that the degrees of these nodes become
independent random variables as n→∞. Apply now a Chernoff bound (as n→∞)
to obtain
P [Lδ < (1− β)nα(2piδc log n)−1n−c(1−δ+δ log δ)] ≤
e−β
2nα(2piδc logn)−1n−c(1−δ+δ log δ)/2
Because of the choice of α, the right hand side goes to zero. Thus Lδ → ∞ as
n → ∞ whp and therefore the size of the equivalence class corresponding to degree
δc log n goes to infinity as n → ∞. Since a node takes its degree from the range
(δ0c log n, δ1c log n) whp, it belongs to an equivalence class whose size goes to infinity
whp as n→∞.
The proof of the second property is more involved. We sketch the proof. Consider
a node with degree k, we need only consider k ∈ (δ0c log n, δ1c log n). Moreover, we
need only consider degrees of the neighbors in the same range. Furthermore, we can
assume that the degrees of the neighbors are independent of each other as n → ∞.
Application of a straightforward generalization of Theorem 5.7 in [96] to the case of
a non-uniformly random balls and urns problem allows us to write
P [X1 = k1, . . . , Xs = ks] ≤
e
√
δc log n
s∏
i=1
(piδc log n)
ki
ki!
e−piδc logn
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where pi is the probability that a neighbor selects degree i. Here (X1, . . . , Xs) consti-
tutes theH2 signature of the node. Now, it is easy to argue using Chernoff bounds that
neighbors only choose degrees clustered around c log n (c log n+ l, l = 0,±1,±2, . . .).
Hence
P [X1 = k1, . . . , Xs = ks] ≤
e
√
δc log n
(pc lognδc log n)
δc logn∏s
i=1 ki!
e−pc lognδc logn ≤
a((log n)−1/2)δc logn(e−b(logn)
−1/2
)δc logn
Where a is a constant. The second inequality follows from
∏
i ki > 1. Now con-
sider the expected number of nodes with signature (k1, . . . , ks), Mk1,...,ks . It is upper
bounded by
Mk1,...,ks ≤ an((log n)−1/2)δc logn(e−b(logn)
−1/2
)δc logn
which goes to zero as n→∞.
Lastly, we include a known result for the case of a super-dense graph where p =
1/2. The following theorem, originally due to Babai and Kucera [8] and rephrased
below, shows that with high probability every node will be uniquely identified using
H3 knowledge:
Theorem 3.3 (Super-dense ER random graphs). Let G be an ER random graph on
n nodes with edge probability p = 1/2. The probability that there exist two nodes
x, y ∈ V such that x ≡H3 y is less than 2−cn for constant value c > 0.
This result provides a sufficient condition for unique re-identification of the entire
population in a graph.
Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 are disappointing from an anonymity perspective. However,
most social and communication networks appear to be sparse, and so Theorem 3.1
may be more applicable. Furthermore, real networks often have heavy-tailed degree
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distributions, which is not the case for ER graphs. To capture the heavy-tailed degree
distribution, we also study re-identification risk in power-law graphs.
3.3.2 Power-law graphs
Several graph models have been proposed that exhibit the heavy-tailed degree
distributions often observed in real networks, including the power law random graph
(PLRG) model [6]. In this model, a graph is constructed by first assigning a degree
to each node, where the degree is sampled from a power law distribution. Edges are
inserted by randomly choosing endpoints until every node has as many edges as its
specified degree. (This can result in self-loops or multiple edges between a pair of
nodes, which are often removed to form a simple graph that closely approximates the
original degree distribution.)
The PLRG, and other power-law models, generate graphs with constant average
degree as the number of nodes increases. Thus the edge density is low, and despite
the skew in node degree, we find that the structural diversity is insufficient for re-
identification. We state this formally for PLRG because it is the easiest power-law
graph model to analyze.
Theorem 3.4 (Power-law random graphs). Let G be a PLRG on n nodes. With
probability going to one, the expected sizes of the equivalence classes induced by Hi is
Θ(n), for any i ≥ 0.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3.4 proceeds in a similar manner to the proof of Theo-
rem 3.1 except that the Poisson distribution is replaced by P (Ni = k) = ak
−α > 0,
k = 0, 1, . . . where a is a constant such that
∑∞
k=0 P (Ni = k) = 1.
3.3.3 Discussion
The theoretical results of this section complement the empirical results of the pre-
vious section. We see that re-identification risk depends on graph size: the empirical
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results for the 2500 node Power-Law graph show high re-identification risk; however,
Theorem 3.4 shows that once a power-law graph is sufficiently large, nodes will be
anonymous.
In fact, the critical factor determining re-identification risk in large random graphs
is not the degree distribution, but density. Sparse graphs (including power law graphs)
have low re-identification risk, whereas dense graphs have high re-identification risk.
This is an important finding as it shows that even in extremely large graphs, nodes are
not necessarily well hidden. It depends on the topological properties of the graph.
This one reason why the Hi structural signatures can be a valuable tool for data
owners, as they allow them to efficiently assess re-identification risk even on large
graphs.
3.4 Conclusion
We have focused on what we believe to be one of the most basic and distinctive
challenges for protecting privacy in network datasets—understanding the extent to
which graph structure acts as an identifier. We have formalized adversary knowledge
and evaluated their impact on real and synthetic networks as well as models of random
graphs. Our findings suggest that there is considerable risk in publishing the naive
anonymization of a graph. In the next chapter, we investigate strategies for mitigating
re-identification risk through more complex transformations of the graph.
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CHAPTER 4
MITIGATING RE-IDENTIFICATION RISK
The previous chapter was about risk assessment. The main finding was that
there is considerable risk in publishing the naive anonymization of a graph because
informed adversaries can use their knowledge to re-identify nodes and in some cases,
infer particular edges. In this chapter, we focus on risk mitigation. We make the
following contributions:
• Privacy Definition First, we propose a privacy condition, which formally
specifies a limit on how much the adversary can learn about a node’s identity.
We compare it with other definitions that have been proposed in the literature
and discuss its limitations (Section 4.1).
• Anonymization Algorithm Then we propose a novel algorithm to achieve
this privacy condition. The algorithm produces a generalized graph, which
describes the structure of the original graph in terms of node groups called su-
pernodes. The generalized graph retains key structural properties of the original
graph yet ensures anonymity (Section 4.2).
• Algorithm Evaluation We perform a comprehensive evaluation of the utility
of the generalized graphs. This includes a comparison with other state-of-the-
art graph anonymization algorithms (Section 4.3).
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4.1 Structural anonymity
In the previous sections, the size of the candidate set is used as a measure of
re-identification risk. This is a natural measure for naive anonymization. A node can
be a candidate only if its local graph structure is an exact match to the adversary’s
knowledge. Therefore each candidate is an equally plausible guess for the target.
However, as we move beyond naive anonymization to consider strategies that alter
the graph structure, the size of the candidate set is no longer an appropriate measure
of risk.
If the graph structure has been altered by the anonymization process, the alter-
ations may have changed the structure around the target. Therefore a candidate may
include not only exact matches in the published graph, but also partial matches. In
addition, not all matches are equally likely. The probability of a candidate depends
on the adversary’s prior belief about the structure around the target, and on the
likelihood that the algorithm altered that structure to produce the observed output.
We introduce a new privacy condition to account for these differences. Invariably,
the first step of any algorithm is to perform naive anonymization to create uncertainty
about the true identities of the nodes. Recall Π : V → Va, the secret mapping between
identifiers in the original graph and the synthetic identifiers in the anonymized graph.
The adversary’s goal is to learn this mapping; the data owner’s goal is to sufficiently
alter the graph so that the adversary fails to achieve its goal.
Our privacy definition is a condition on the adversary’s posterior belief after having
seen the published graph. The posterior belief depends on the published graph, the
algorithm that produced the published graph, and the adversary’s prior belief. A
successful anonymization is one that meets the following definition:
Definition 4.1 (Graph k-anonymity under Q). Let Q be a structural knowledge
query. An anonymized graph Ga satisfies graph k-anonymity with respect to Q if
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∀x ∈ V, ∀y ∈ Va : Pr[Π(x) = y | Ga] ≤ 1/k
where the probability depends on the randomness of the algorithm that produced Ga
and the adversary’s prior probability over input graphs G.
If we make the natural assumption that the adversary has no other external infor-
mation other than Q, then the adversary’s prior probability is uniform over all graphs
G such that in G, the structure around x agrees with Q(x).
Revisiting naive anonymization, there is a relationship between graph k-anonymity
and our previously used measure of risk, the size of the candidate set. If the proba-
bility distribution over candidates is uniform, this condition simply requires at least
k candidates: a naive anonymization satisfies graph k-anonymity under Q if for any
x, |candQ(x)| ≥ k.
Finally, as we will see in Section 4.2, some anonymizations are graph k-anonymous
with respect to any Q. We simply say in this case that the output satisfies graph
k-anonymity.
Relation to alternative privacy conditions and limitations The above condi-
tion of graph k-anonymity is similar to, and in some sense encompasses other defini-
tions recently proposed for graph data. Liu and Terzi [82] propose a condition which
requires that in the published graph each degree in the graph occurs at least k times.
Such an output satisfies graph k-anonymity with respect to H1 (i.e., degree). Zhou
and Pei [134] require that in the published graph each neighborhood (the subgraph
induced by a node and its neighbors) be isomorphic to at least k − 1 others. Such
an output satisfies graph k-anonymity with respect to N where N is the knowledge
query that returns the neighborhood subgraph of a node. Note it also satisfies graph
k-anonymity with respect to H1 since query N also reveals node degree.
The above definitions are graph analogues of k-anonymity [110, 111, 116], a privacy
condition defined for tables. Each assumes the adversary has some knowledge about
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a target entity (analogous to knowledge of the quasi-identifier) and the anonymity
condition requires that this knowledge cannot be used to distinguish entities in the
published data. The graph data privacy conditions differ on how much knowledge
the adversary is assumed to have (node degree, neighborhood, etc.); analogous to
differences in the choice of quasi-identifier.
Like k-anonymity, the above definitions also have limitations. In a homogeneity
attack, while the adversary is not able to distinguish among a set of candidates, all of
the candidates share a common property. Because the candidates are homogenous,
the adversary has learned something about the target, even though re-identification
did not occur. In tabular data, definitions such as `-diversity [85] and t-closeness [79]
have been introduced to counter the threat of homogeneity attacks.
An instance of the homogeneity attack is edge disclosure (Section 3.1). A pub-
lished graph which is graph k-anonymous may still be vulnerable to edge disclosure.
To address the threat of edge disclosure, Cormode et al. [29] introduce an edge safety
condition (described in Section 4.3.1 of this work). While this prevents edge disclo-
sure, it appears to do so at a significant expense to utility, based on the experimental
results in Section 4.3.3. In addition, we measure the risk of edge disclosure of our
proposed algorithm and find in practice it is low for reasonable k (Section 4.3.5).
Other attacks have been proposed on tabular data anonymizations, and analogues
of these attacks may apply to graph anonymization. Attacks include the composi-
tion attack [45], the minimality attack [123], and the deFinetti attack [61]. While
some of these attacks can be remedied by imposing additional conditions (e.g., m-
invariance [125] defends against the composition of multiple releases of a dynamic
table), developing data publication techniques that resist all of them is an open prob-
lem, not only for graph data, but for tabular data as well. Differential privacy [38]
ensures protection from all of the above attacks, but it remains unclear whether ef-
ficient and accurate data publication is possible under differential privacy [34, 35].
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As discussed in Section 7, some differentially private algorithms for graph data have
been developed, but they output answers to particular queries and do not publish a
graph.
4.2 Graph generalization algorithm
In this section we describe an anonymization technique that protects against re-
identification by generalizing the input graph. We generalize a graph by grouping
nodes into partitions, and then publishing the number of nodes in each partition,
along with the density of edges that exist within and across partitions. The adversary
attempts re-identification in the generalized graph, while the analyst uses it to study
properties of the original graph.
4.2.1 Graph generalization
To generalize a naively-anonymized graph Ga = (Va, Ea), we partition its nodes
into disjoint sets. The elements of a partitioning V are subsets of Va. They can be
thought of as supernodes since they contain nodes from Ga, but are themselves the
nodes of a undirected generalized graph G = (V , E). The superedges of E include
self-loops and are labeled with non-negative weights by the function d : E → Z∗. GV
is a generalization of Ga under a partitioning V if the edge labels report the density
of edges (in Ga) that exist within and across the partitions:
Definition 4.2 (Generalization of graph). Let V be the supernodes of Va. G is a
generalization of Ga under V if, for all X, Y ∈ V , d(X, Y ) = |{(x, y) ∈ Ea| x ∈ X, y ∈
Y }|.
G summarizes the structure of Ga, but the accuracy of that summary depends
on the partitioning. For any generalization G of Ga, we denote by W(G), the set of
possible worlds (graphs over Va) that are consistent with G. Intuitively, this set of
graphs is generated by considering each supernode X and choosing exactly d(X,X)
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edges between its elements, then considering each pair of supernodes (X, Y ) and
choosing exactly d(X, Y ) edges between elements of X and elements of Y . The size
of W(G) is a measure of the accuracy of G as a summary of Ga.
The partitioning of nodes is chosen so that the generalized graph satisfies privacy
goals and maximizes utility, as explained in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 respectively. In
the extreme case that all partitions contain a single node, then the graph generaliza-
tion G does not provide any additional anonymity: W(G) contains just the graph Ga
(the function d encodes its adjacency matrix). At the other extreme, if all nodes are
grouped into a single partition, then G consists of a single supernode with a self-loop
labeled with |Ea| (the total number of edges in the original graph). W(G) is thus
the set of all graphs over Va with |Ea| edges. In this case the generalization provides
anonymity, but is unlikely to be useful to the analyst since it reflects only the edge
density of the original graph.
In studying a generalized graph, the analyst can sample a single random graph
from W(G) and then perform standard graph analysis on this synthetic graph. Re-
peated sampling can improve the accuracy of analysis. We study in Section 4.3 the
bias and variance of estimates of graph properties based on graphs sampled from
W(G).
4.2.2 Anonymity of generalized graphs
To ensure anonymity we require that the adversary have a minimum level of
uncertainty about the identity of any target node in V . We use the size of a partition
to provide a basic guarantee against re-identification and require that each partition
have size at least k. This ensures that the output satisfies graph k-anonymity with
respect to any structural query Q.
Proposition 4.1. Let G be a generalized graph such that each supernode X has at
least k nodes. Then G satisfies graph k-anonymity.
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Proof. The intuition for this claim is that the generalized graph summarizes the
graph in terms of supernodes and contains no information that allows the adversary
to distinguish between two nodes in the same supernode. Therefore, each of the
k or more nodes in the same supernode must be equally likely candidates and the
probability of any one node being the target is at most 1/k.
We now give a formal proof. Given an input graph G, there are two key steps to
producing a generalized graph: (a) first the nodes of the graph are relabeled, as with
naive anonymization; and then (b) the nodes are partitioned into groups. We assume
the algorithm that chooses the partition does not depend on the particular labels on
the nodes; since it receives a naive anonymization, the labels are arbitrary. Therefore
we can commute these two operations without affecting the final output. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that the nodes are relabeled after the partition is
chosen.
Let Π : V → Va denote the function which relabels nodes. Let P denote the
partition of V into groups. The output G is completely determined by G, Π, and P .
For convenience, let f be the function that takes as input G,Π, P and outputs G.
To show graph k-anonymity, we must show that an adversary cannot use G to
re-identify a target node x. Formally, we must show that for any x ∈ V and any
y ∈ Va, Pr[Π(x) = y | G] ≤ 1/k where the probability comes from the randomness in
the algorithm and the adversary’s prior belief.
To prove this, we will show that
Pr[Π(x) = y|G] = Pr[Π(x) = y′|G]
for any two nodes y and y′ that are in the same supernode of G. Since there at least
k nodes in each supernode, this implies Pr[Π(x) = y|G] ≤ 1/k for any y.
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Since the conditional probability Pr[Π(x) = y|G] = Pr[Π(x) = y,G]/Pr[G] and
the denominator does not depend on y, it suffices to show that Pr[Π(x) = y,G] =
Pr[Π(x) = y′,G].
We can write Pr[Π(x) = y,G] as:
Pr[Π(x) = y,G]
=
∑
pi:pi(x)=y
Pr[Π = pi,G]
=
∑
pi,g,p:
G=f(g,pi,p)
and pi(x)=y
Pr[Π = pi,G = g, P = p]
=
∑
pi,g,p:
G=f(g,pi,p)
and pi(x)=y
Pr[P = p|G = g]Pr[Π = pi]Pr[G = g]
where Pr[P = p|G = g] is the probability the algorithm outputs partition p given
the input graph g; Pr[Π = pi] is the probability of a particular relabeling, which is
equal to 1/|V |! for any pi; and Pr[G = g] is the adversary’s prior belief that the input
graph is g.
Consider one term in the above summation by fixing the input graph g, the par-
tition p, and the map pi. Let x′ denote the node that maps to y′ under pi, i.e.,
pi(x′) = y′. Construct an alternate mapping pialt such that the mapping for x and x′
are flipped and all other mappings are unchanged: pialt(x) = pi(x
′) and pialt(x′) = pi(x)
and pialt(x
′′) = pi(x′′) for all x′′ 6∈ {x, x′}. There is a corresponding term in the sum-
mation for Pr[Π(x) = y′,G] where pi is replaced with pialt. Since x and x′ appear
in the same partition, we can permute their relabelings without changing the gen-
eralized graph; i.e., f(g, pi, p) = f(g, pialt, p). Since each term in the above summa-
tion for Pr[Π(x) = y,G] can be paired with an equal term in the summation for
Pr[Π(x) = y′,G], then Pr[Π(x) = y,G] = Pr[Π(x) = y′,G] and this completes the
proof.
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Requiring a minimum supernode size of k only imposes an upper bound on the
adversary’s confidence in the true identity of his target. For some graphs and some
adversaries, the adversary’s confidence may be much less than 1/k.
For example, consider an adversary who knows only the degree of its target. The
candidates for the target include any node such that in some possible world, its degree
matches the target’s degree. For each supernode, we can determine a range of degrees
such that for each degree in that range and each node in that supernode, there exists
a possible world where that node obtains that degree. For supernode X, the range
is determined by mindegree and maxdegree, which are defined as mindegree(X) =
max(0, d(X,X)−(|X|−1
2
)
)+
∑
Y ∈V max(0, d(X, Y )−(|X|−1)|Y |) and maxdegree(X) =
min(|X| − 1, d(X,X)) +∑Y ∈V min(|Y |, d(X, Y )).
The degree range of each supernode determines the candidates, however, not all
candidates are equally likely. Intuitively, a node is more likely if there are more
possible worlds in which its degree matches the target.
In general, it may be computationally hard to determine the adversary’s posterior
probability of a candidate being the target. The brute force solution—enumerating
all possible worlds and computing candidate set in each one—requires exponential
time. We conservatively require k-sized partitions but observe that in practice this
may provide much stronger protection than that implied by the value of k.
4.2.3 Algorithm description
We now present the graph generalization algorithm, which we call GraphGen. The
input to the GraphGen is Ga and privacy parameter k. The output is a generalized
graph G. Pseudocode for the algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
Subject to the privacy constraint, which requires the supernodes of G to be of size
at least k, we would like to find the generalized graph that best fits the input graph.
We estimate fitness via a maximum likelihood approach. We consider a uniform
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Algorithm 1 GraphGen, an algorithm that generalizes a graph to ensure anonymity.
Input: Ga = (Va, Ea), graph to generalize
k, minimum supernode size
Output: G, a generalized graph such that each supernode contains at least k nodes
1: G ← Initialize(Ga) {All nodes in one partition.}
2: tcycle ← 5|Va|
3: for t← 1 to ∞ do
4: T ← Schedule(t) {Temperature T cools as t increases.}
5: S ← Successors(G, k)
6: G ′ ← arg maxG′∈S 1|W(G′)| {Find max likelihood successor}
7: 4L← 1|W(G′)| − 1|W(G)| {Change in likelihood}
8: if 4L > 0 then
9: G ← G ′
10: else
11: G ← G ′ with probability e4L/T
12: end if
13: if G updated less than 0.02% of last tcycle steps then
14: return G
15: end if
16: end for
Successors subroutine returns a set of generalized graphs that can be derived
from G by making a small change, such as splitting or merging a supernode in
G.
Input: G, current generalized graph
k, minimum supernode size
Output: a set of generalized graphs, the successors to G
1: S ← ∅ {The set of successors}
2: u← Choose random node
3: X ← Find supernode that contains u
4: if |X| > 2k then
5: G ′ ← Split(X,G) {Choose greedy split of X}
6: S ← S ∪ {G ′}
7: end if
8: for Y such that X, Y are neighbors or share a neighbor do
9: if |X| > k then
10: G ′ ← MoveNode(u,X, Y,G)
11: S ← S ∪ {G ′}
12: end if
13: G ′ ← MergeAndSplit(X, Y,G)
14: S ← S ∪ {G ′}
15: end for
16: return S
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probability distribution over the possible worlds W(G). For a graph g ∈ W(G) we
define PrG[g] = 1/|W(G)| where the number of possible worlds is:
|W(G)| =
∏
X∈V
(
1
2
|X|(|X| − 1)
d(X,X)
) ∏
X,Y ∈V
( |X||Y |
d(X, Y )
)
Without regard to the anonymity condition, the generalized graph that maximizes
likelihood is the one with each node in a separate partition. Then, as explained above,
|W(G)| = 1 and PrG[Ga] = 1. In general, likelihood is greater with more supernodes
because each supernodes introduces more parameters to fit a fixed amount of data.
But subject to the minimum size constraint, generalized graphs can vary greatly in
their fit to the input graph. GraphGen uses local search to explore the exponential
number of generalized graphs.
The design of the search GraphGen is based on techniques for solving a related
social network analysis problem: stochastic block-modeling [99]. The objective of
stochastic block-modeling is to cluster the nodes of the graph so that nodes in the
same group play a similar “social role” in the graph. While the high-level idea is the
same, there are a few key distinctions from our work. First, our differing motivations
result in different likelihood functions. In stochastic block-modeling, the goal is to
build a predictive model of the data and so the likelihood includes a penalty term
for model complexity; in contrast, our goal is to fit the original graph as closely as
possible given the anonymity condition. Second, the anonymity condition imposes a
new constraint on the search space, which makes search more complex.
To find the generalized graph that maximizes the likelihood function, GraphGen
searches using simulated annealing [109]. Each valid generalized graph (i.e., those
such that each supernode at least k nodes) is a state in the search space. Starting
with a generalized graph that has a single partition (i.e., supernode) containing all
nodes, GraphGen proposes a change of state, by splitting a partition, merging two
partitions, or moving a node to a different partition. The proposal of changing the
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current state from generalized graph G to some new generalized graph G ′ is evaluated
based on the change in likelihood that results. The proposal is always accepted if
it improves the likelihood and accepted with some probability if it decreases the
likelihood. The acceptance probability starts high and is cooled slowly until, as it
approaches zero, a move is accepted only if it increases the likelihood. We terminate
search when fewer than 0.02% of proposals are accepted.
GraphGen may return a partitioning that is only locally maximal. Whether this
happens depends in part on the cooling schedule of simulated annealing; if cooled
slowly enough, it will return the global maximum with high probability [109]. Nev-
ertheless, finding the globally optimal partition is an intractable problem, and we
cannot quantify how close the output is to the optimum. In experimental results
not shown, we did a more systematic exploration of the search space using random
restarts. On the Enron graph with k = 3, the log-likelihood of the output partition
ranged from −362.6 to −353.3; in contrast, a greedy algorithm returns a partition
with log-likelihood of only −511.5.
To make search more efficient, we cache the statistics needed to compute like-
lihood. We maintain a cache of edge counts d(X, Y ) to facilitate computing the
likelihood. Furthermore, when considering a move in search space, it is only neces-
sary to compute the change in likelihood, which is more efficient since a move only
affects a subset of terms in the likelihood equation. For example, to split supernode
X into X ′ and X ′′, the only affected terms are the ones involving X. There is a term
for each neighbor Y of X (i.e., Y such that d(X, Y ) > 0). Since the input graphs are
typically sparse, X has few neighbors, resulting in only a small number of affected
terms. In the worst-case, computing the change in likelihood requires time that is
linear in the size of the input graph.
We also made a few design choices that make search more efficient. A supernode
is split in a greedy fashion: a randomly chosen node is moved from X to a new group
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X ′, and then for each of the next k − 1 nodes, we select the node that maximizes
the likelihood when moved from X to X ′. Second, when we consider merging two
supernodes or moving a node between supernodes, we only consider supernodes X, Y
that are neighbors or share a neighbor. This is locally optimal, in that if Y does not
satisfy this condition, then merging X and Y can only decrease the likelihood of the
current generalized graph. While these choices may exclude the optimal assignment,
results indicate that they are effective heuristics: they greatly reduce runtime without
any decrease in likelihood.
4.2.4 Capitalizing on limited adversaries
The GraphGen algorithm places each node in a supernode with at least k−1 other
nodes. This is a conservative approach in that it ignores the fact that some nodes
may be structurally well-hidden in the original graph. Nodes may be automorphically
equivalent, or so similar that only an adversary with substantial structural knowledge
can distinguish them.
Such a conservative approach has consequences for utility, as graph structure is
coarsened to the supernode level. We would like an approach that can take advantage
of situations in which the adversary is known to have limited knowledge of graph
structure or where the graphs contain many structurally homogenous nodes.
We propose an extension of GraphGen that anonymizes the graph with respect to
a fixed model of adversary knowledge. The idea is to only anonymize nodes that are
vulnerable to re-identification by the given adversary. By focusing the anonymization
on the vulnerable nodes, it may be possible to preserve more of the structure of the
input graph.
To incorporate into the algorithm, the first step is to identify the vulnerable nodes.
Given adversary model Q and group size k, a node x is vulnerable if |candQ(x)| < k.
For example, if Q is H1, then the only nodes that are vulnerable are the ones whose
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degree occurs less than k times. Then, the privacy condition on the generalized graph
is altered so that the only requirement is that if a supernode contains a vulnerable
node, then its size must be at least k. This means that a invulnerable node can be
placed in a supernode of size 1.
This relaxed privacy condition can be incorporated into the search procedure by
allowing state changes that place invulnerable nodes into supernodes of size less than
k. Alternatively, the search can execute as described above, and then supernodes that
contain only invulnerable nodes can be replaced with individual supernodes for each
invulnerable node. (Supernodes containing a mixture of vulnerable and invulnerable
nodes must remain intact to ensure that the vulnerable nodes are protected.) In
Section 4.3.4, we evaluate the latter approach for the H1 and H2 adversary models
and measure the improvement in utility that results. We refer to these variants of
the algorithm as GraphGen(H1) and GraphGen(H2) respectively. The pseudocode is
shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 GraphGen(Q) a modification of Algorithm 1 that protects against Q
adversaries.
Input: Ga = (Va, Ea), graph to generalize
k, minimum supernode size
Q knowledge query representing adversary capability
Output: G, a generalized graph that satisfies graph k-anonymity with respect to Q
adversaries.
1: S ← {u ∈ Va | |candQ(u)| < k} {Vulnerable nodes}
2: G ← GraphGen(Ga, k)
{Replace supernodes that contain only invulnerable nodes}
3: for supernode X in G do
4: if X ∩ S = ∅ then
5: replace X with a supernode for each u ∈ X
6: end if
7: end for
8: return G
These alternative anonymization algorithms satisfy graph k-anonymity, but for
restricted adversaries.
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Corollary 1. The output of GraphGen(H1) satisfies graph k-anonymity with respect
to H1. Similarly, the output of GraphGen(H2) satisfies graph k-anonymity with re-
spect to H2.
This follows from Proposition 4.1: vulnerable nodes remain in groups of size k
and are therefore protected, and invulnerable nodes are by definition nodes that the
adversary cannot re-identify with confidence greater than 1/k and therefore it is not
necessary to generalize them.
4.3 Evaluating graph anonymization algorithms
We now present an extensive empirical evaluation of the GraphGen algorithm. We
evaluate its utility, compare it to competing techniques, and measure the effectiveness
of the utility enhancements proposed in Section 4.2.4.
The first goal of our experimental evaluation is to assess the overall utility of
anonymized graphs. We would like to quantify the extent to which the anonymized
graphs produced by GraphGen (and competing techniques) can serve as an accurate
approximation of the original private graph. This is challenging because there are
no well-defined metrics to determine the similarity of two graphs. As methods for
producing anonymized networks emerge, it is becoming increasingly important to
develop a reliable means for assessing their utility.
Our basic approach is to consider a suite of graph properties, measure both the
original graph and the anonymized graph and compare the difference. If the anon-
ymized graph differs from the original for some graph property, as it often does, an
essential question is whether the difference is substantial. To help answer this ques-
tion, we include, as a reference point, a random graph of the same size and density as
the original graph. With respect to a particular measure, if the original graph looks
very different from a random graph, then it is useful to compare the anonymized
graph to both the original and the random graph. The more closely the anonymized
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graph resembles a random graph, the less useful it is. With the GraphGen approach,
as group size k increases, the anonymized graph converges on a random graph, and
we can measure the rate of convergence by varying k. On the other hand, when the
original graph and a random graph appear similar, then the measured property does
not distinguish the original from a random graph and thus cannot be used to assess
whether anonymization has preserved the structure of the original graph.
As another yardstick for measuring the loss in utility, we evaluate the anonym-
ization algorithms on some carefully chosen combinations of metrics and synthetic
graphs. Inspired by research in the networking community [7, 117], we consider a
few graphs that have a deliberately engineered structure and then use metrics that
capture how well this structure is preserved in the anonymized graph. For instance,
we consider a graph that is a tree and measure the extent to which the graph remains
tree-like after anonymization. While some of these graphs are unlikely to arise in
practice, we find the experiments give useful insights into the effect of anonymization
and help distinguish the behavior of competing techniques. It is also important given
that real technological networks are often highly structured and poorly approximated
by random graphs [78].
The second goal of the experimental evaluation is to compare GraphGen against
competing techniques. One challenge is that the privacy guarantees are not always
compatible and so an “apples to apples” comparison is not straightforward. We
attempt to address these disparities in privacy guarantees by aligning our technique
with others so that privacy conditions are comparable (Section 4.3.4), and by assessing
the extent to which our approach is vulnerable to attacks (Section 4.3.5). Despite
the incompatible privacy semantics in some cases, we believe that comparisons of
the algorithms are still useful: their strengths and weaknesses are exposed and their
tendency to bias graph measures is revealed.
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We note that the goal of publishing an anonymized graph is not only to support
the specific graph properties studied here. The hope is that the released dataset
can be used for a wide range of investigations determined by graph topology. If
measuring a specific graph property is the final objective of an analyst, alternative
mechanisms for releasing that property alone should be considered (see discussion of
some techniques in Section 7). At any rate, many analyses cannot be distilled into
simple graph properties, and analysts often require sample datasets to refine their
algorithms or interpret results.
4.3.1 Compared anonymization algorithms
In the first set of experiments, we compare the GraphGen algorithm described in
Section 4.2 against two other algorithms for graph anonymization: the algorithm of
Cormode et al. [29], denoted BCKS, and the algorithm of Liu and Terzi [82], denoted
LT.
The BCKS algorithm is similar to GraphGen in that it partitions nodes into
supernodes and outputs a generalized graph. However, in addition to preventing
re-identification, the resulting generalized graph is also guaranteed to prevent edge
disclosure. The privacy condition ensures that each supernode contains at least k
nodes and that edge disclosure is bounded by 1/k. This is done by requiring that the
supernodes satisfy an additional safety condition, which states that if two nodes share
a neighbor, they must be placed in separate supernodes. The GraphGen algorithm
may not prevent edge disclosure, especially at small k (see Section 4.3.5).
Another important difference is that the BCKS algorithm’s strategy for choosing
supernodes is guided by privacy concerns—partitions are chosen to ensure low edge
disclosure risk—whereas the strategy of GraphGen is guided by utility. As one might
expect, we find that GraphGen achieves higher utility than BCKS.
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It should also be mentioned that the approaches proposed by Cormode et al. [29]
can handle richer graph data representations, including attributes on nodes and edges
and multiple edge types. The focus of the empirical evaluation in [29] is on queries
that involve attributes and short path queries. The focus of our study is to measure
the effects of anonymization on graph topology.
The LT algorithm alters the graph through the insertion and removal of edges with
the goal of making nodes more structurally uniform. The output is a single graph,
not a generalized graph. The algorithm alters the graph until each node degree occurs
at least k times. This prevents re-identification by an adversary whose knowledge is
limited to node degree (i.e., an H1 adversary). It may not protect against a more
powerful adversary (e.g., an H2 adversary). Given the weaker privacy condition, the
LT can achieve better utility than BCKS and GraphGen on some measures.
The LT algorithm anonymizes the graph in a two-stage process. First, it finds the
minimum change to the degree sequence such that the privacy condition is satisfied
(each degree must appear at least k times), and the degree sequence can be realized
(the sequence of integers must satisfy certain graph theoretic constraints). Then, it
attempts to transform the original graph into a new graph that matches this degree
sequence.
This second stage is non-trivial and Liu and Terzi [82] consider several alternative
algorithms. We implement and compare against SimultaneousSwap. This algorithm
is the only one that allows both edge insertions and deletions and appears to perform
better than some of the alternative approaches proposed in [82] that only allow edge
insertions. It is a greedy algorithm that starts with a canonical graph conforming to
the anonymized degree sequence and rewires it in such a way that preserves its degree
sequence but increases the edge overlap with the original graph.
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4.3.2 Overview of experiments
To assess how anonymization impacts utility, we compare the original graph to the
anonymized output based on several important graph properties (described below).
For each property, we measure it on the original graph and on the anonymized output.
For the algorithms that output a single graph, we simply measure the property on the
output graph. For the algorithms that output a generalized graph G, we estimate the
graph property by drawing 100 sample graphs from W(G), measuring the property
of each sample, and then aggregating measurements across samples. We report the
average and show the standard deviation using error bars. The error bars give a sense
of how much variation there is among the graphs in W(G).
If the samples are drawn uniformly from W(G), this models an analyst who be-
lieves that each graph in W(G) is equiprobable. In these experiments, we perform
biased sampling taking samples uniformly from W(G) subject to the constraint that
the minimum degree is one. This makes it more likely that the sampled graph will
contain a large connected component. All of the input graphs contain a single con-
nected component, and we assume this fact is revealed to the analyst.
As a baseline, we also measure the property on a sample of 100 random graphs
that are the same density as the original graph. We refer to this baseline as Random.
Note this baseline is equivalent to applying a graph generalization algorithm where
k = |V |. It has maximum privacy, but low utility as the only property of the original
revealed is the number of nodes and edges.
We repeat this procedure for each graph and each setting of k ∈ {2, 5, 10, 20}.
Note that while k is a common parameter across the algorithms that controls the
size of the group, the resulting privacy is not the same: while GraphGen and BCKS
ensure graph k-anonymity, LT ensures only graph k-anonymity with respect to degree
(H1).
We report results on the datasets that were described earlier in Section 3.2.
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4.3.3 Results
We now present a comparison of the algorithms across several different graph
metrics. Results are presented one metric at a time. We conclude with a general
discussion of the findings in Section 4.3.3.5.
The results of the experiments are shown in Figures 4.1-4.3. Each figure presents
the results for a single graph metric. The value of the metric for the true graph is
shown as a dashed black line. As a reference point, the light gray region shows the
value of the metric for a random graph. It is a region because it depicts a range of ±1
standard deviation around the average value over conforming random graphs. Note
that for each measure, the scales of the y-axis vary across datasets, so in some cases,
while the gap between lines is large, the numerical difference is quite small.
4.3.3.1 Paths
We consider several measures related to paths.
Connectedness Each of the anonymization algorithms may alter the connectivity
of the graph, either dividing a connected component or merging two components.
Each of the input graphs contains a single connected component, so we evaluate
whether anonymization divides it. Figure 4.1(a) shows the results. Generally, the
anonymized graphs contain a single large component, encompassing about 95% or
more of the nodes. However, on the sparsest graphs—NetTrace, HOT, and Tree—
the largest connected component of the anonymized graphs can contain as few as 70%
of the nodes.
Shortest Path Lengths We evaluate how anonymization affects path lengths in
the graph. We measure the length of a shortest path between a pair of randomly
chosen nodes and compute the average length over 200 random pairs. When the
graph contains multiple connected components, we only sample pairs from the largest
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(c) Distortion of paths in minimum spanning tree.
Figure 4.1. The effect of anonymization on three graph measures related to paths.
The results for three algorithms are compared, with varying privacy parameter k, on
seven different graphs. The value of the given measure on the true graph is shown as
a black dotted line. The value of the measure for sampled random graphs matching
the density of the original is shown as a gray region.
connected component. Since the measure itself is random, there can be variation due
to sampling. We measured this variation and found it small compared to the bias
introduced by anonymization and so for presentation purposes we only report the
average from a single sample.
Figure 4.1(b) shows the results. The effect of anonymization varies greatly across
datasets. The greatest change occurs on Mesh where path lengths are dramatically
shortened. In fact, for LT and BCKS, path lengths are much closer to those of a
random graph than to the original graph. With the GraphGen graphs, while paths are
shortened, they remain considerably longer. GraphGen tends to group neighboring
nodes together, thus it does not introduce as many shortcut paths that can connect
distant regions of the mesh graph.
The distortion of path lengths on Mesh is perhaps not too surprising. For highly-
structured graphs such as a mesh or a lattice, even a small amount of perturbation can
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greatly shorten paths by introducing a few shortcuts paths that can connect distant
regions of the mesh with only a few hops [122] and meshes [62].
Generally, across all input graphs, the average path lengths of an BCKS graph
appears to converge to those of Random as k increases. Convergence sometimes
occurs at small k (e.g., Mesh, Enron, HepTh). Convergence occurs whether or not
path lengths are shorter or longer in random graphs than with the original.
LT produces graphs with shorter path lengths than the original graph. It is very
accurate on some graphs (NetTrace, Power-Law).
There are no consistent trends for GraphGen. Sometimes paths are shorter, some-
times longer. Increasing k does not have a consistent effect on path lengths. On some
graphs, particularly Tree, the path lengths can be considerably longer than on the
original graph.
Tree-like shortest paths We also include a graph theoretic measure called dis-
tortion, which in some sense captures how closely a graph resembles a tree [117]. To
compute distortion of G, we first construct a spanning tree T . Then for each edge
(u, v) in G, we compute the distance between u and v in T . The distortion is the
average distance over all edges in G. Thus, it measures how path lengths of G are
distorted (i.e., lengthened) if we are restricted to only traversing edges in tree T . If
G is a tree, then distortion is 1. A random graph has a distortion of approximately
log n.
Figure 4.1(c) shows the distortion of the anonymized graphs. We focus on Tree,
because the original graph is in fact a tree and so its distortion is 1. Anonymized
graphs have a distortion measure exceeding 1, indicating the anonymized graphs are
no longer tree-like. Distortion is high for LT and BCKS across all k. In fact, the
distortion measure of the anonymized graphs is often closer to a random graph than
the original tree. For GraphGen graphs, while distortion increases with k, it is very
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low at small k. Thus, it appears as though GraphGen more accurately preserves the
tree-like structure of Tree.
In the other graphs, anonymization tends to produce graphs with higher distortion
than the original graph. LT performs comparably to GraphGen, except on Mesh,
where the distortion of GraphGen is much lower and closer to the original graph. On
HOT, which has low distortion indicating tree-like structure, both GraphGen and
LT preserve its tree-like structure at small k.
4.3.3.2 Degree-related measures
The degree distribution of a graph is an important property of a graph. We look at
several different metrics that capture how anonymization affects degree distributions.
Mallows distance First, we compare the distributions using Mallows distance, a
standard metric for comparing two distributions. Let d = d1, . . . , dn be the degree
sequence of the original graph G where di corresponds to the i
th largest node degree
in G. Let d′ be the degree sequence of an anonymized graph. Mallows distance (also
known as Earth Mover’s distance [75]) is the Lp distance between the two sequences
Mallowsp(d, d
′) =
( 1
n
n∑
i=1
|di − d′i|p
)1/p
We use p = 1. Thus, the Mallows distance captures how much, on average, each node
degree is altered by anonymization. E.g., a distance of 1 means each node’s degree is
changed on average by ±1.
Figure 4.2(a) shows some trends across datasets and k. Mallows distance tends
to increase with k, though sometimes inconsistently for GraphGen. The anonymized
graphs tend to have lower Mallows distance than Random, indicating that the degree
sequence of the anonymized graph preserves some of the “structure” of the original
degree sequence.
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(a) Error in degree distribution, measured by Mallows distance
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(c) Diversity of degree distribution
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(d) Degree correlations
Figure 4.2. The effect of anonymization on four measures related to the degree
distribution. Again, the results for three algorithms are compared, with varying
privacy parameter k, on seven different graphs. The value of the given measure on
the true graph is shown as a black dotted line. The value of the measure for sampled
random graphs matching the density of the original is shown as a gray region.
In comparing algorithms, BCKS performs worse than the other approaches, with
Mallows distance rapidly approaching that of Random with increasing k. LT almost
always has the lowest Mallows distance, which is expected given that the LT algorithm
explicitly tries to minimize the change to the degree sequence. On graphs where the
original graph has nearly uniform degree—Mesh and Tree—the LT alters the degree
sequence only slightly to satisfy its privacy condition, resulting in a Mallows distance
of zero or near zero on these graphs. GraphGen is typically between LT and BCKS.
Maximum degree Figure 4.2(b) compares the maximum degree of the original
graph with the maximum degree in the anonymized graph. The figure shows a clear
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trend: as k increases, the maximum degree of each anonymized graph converges to
the maximum degree of Random. On Mesh and Tree, the max degree is higher in
Random and the max degree of anonymized graphs increase (except for LT which
stays constant). For the other graphs, the max degree of Random is lower than that
of the original, sometimes much lower. For example, on NetTrace, the maximum
degree is 1656 but Random has a max degree of around 10. For all approaches,
anonymization reduces the max degree by more than half at k = 5. When the
maximum degree is an outlier, such distortion is in some sense inevitable given the
privacy condition: each node degree must be homogenous with at least k − 1 other
node degree. Nevertheless, such a significant change in degree suggests that the graph
structure has been significantly altered.
While all approaches converge to Random, their rates of convergence differ. The
max degree of BCKS changes the most rapidly with k. Surprisingly, on the graphs
where the maximum degree is larger than that of a random graph, the max degree of
GraphGen decreases less rapidly than LT.
Degree variability In addition to measuring the maximum degree, we also measure
the variation in the degree distribution. The coefficient of variation CV (d) measures
the diversity of degree distribution d. It is defined as CV (d) = σ(d)/〈d〉 where 〈d〉 is
the average degree and σ(d) =
∑n
i=1(di − 〈d〉)2/(n − 1). Graphs with homogenous
degrees have low CV and graphs with diverse degree sequences, such as power-law
graphs, have high CV [7].
Figure 4.2(c) shows that, like maximum degree, the CV of anonymized graphs
converges towards random graphs as k increases, except on Power-Law, where di-
versity remains high at k = 20. The comparison between algorithms is similar as it
is with max degree.
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Degree correlations We also measure degree correlations—i.e., the correlation
between a node’s degree and the degrees of its neighbors. It is an important property
that influences processes on networks [32]. We measure correlations using the smetric.
For graph G = (V,E) it is defined as s(G) =
∑
(u,v)∈E d(u)d(v) where d(u) is the
degree of node u. A high s(G) indicates that high degree nodes are connected to
one another. We report a normalized s measure s(G)/smax(G) where smax(G) is the
maximum possible s of any graph with the same degree sequence as G. (In practice,
it is computationally intensive to find the true maximum, so we approximate it with
the Havel-Hakimi graph [16], which is efficient to construct and tends to have very
high s.)
This measure is particularly interesting on the HOT graph. The HOT graph
is explicitly engineered so that high degree nodes are at the periphery of the graph
connected to low degree nodes, resulting in a low s(G) measure. In contrast, in a
random graph, high degree nodes are likely to be connected to each other, resulting
in a high s measure [7].
Figure 4.2(d) shows that in the anonymized version of HOT, increasing k results
in an increased s measure. GraphGen preserves the low s measure better than LT
and substantially better than BCKS. On the other graphs, the performance varies
considerably, with correlations sometimes tending to Random (e.g., HepTh), some-
times diverging from it (e.g., NetTrace), and sometimes remaining constant (e.g.,
Tree).
4.3.3.3 Clustering
Clustering coefficient measures the likelihood that two neighbors of a node are
themselves connected (in a social network, whether a friend of a friend is also a
friend). It is defined as C(G) = 1
n
∑
u
4(u)
(d(u)(d(u)−1))/2 where 4(u) is the number of
triangles (cliques of size 3) containing u and d(u) is the degree of u.
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Figure 4.3. The effect of anonymization on clustering coefficient.
We report on graphs that have substantial clustering (C(G) > 0.15). For the
graphs where clustering coefficient is low, the anonymization tends to preserve the
low clustering coefficient (they never exceeded 0.15). The graphs with high clus-
tering include Enron and HepTh. We also include a synthetic graph, Clustered
Power-Law, which is similar to Power-Law except that the random graph gener-
ation process is biased to introduce triangles [57]. We set the probability of triangle
formation to be 0.4.
Figure 4.3 shows how anonymization reduces the clustering coefficient of clustered
graphs. Even at k = 2, the BCKS has substantially lower clustering coefficient than
the original graph. At larger k, all anonymized graphs have substantially reduced
clustering. At small k, GraphGen preserves the greatest amount of clustering.
With GraphGen, it is difficult to preserve clustering coefficient, especially at large
k. The process of randomly sampling from W(G) tends to destroy clustering coeffi-
cient. The sampled structure within each supernode is simply a random graph with
a density determined by the weight of the supernode’s self edge. Unless they are very
dense, random graphs have low clustering coefficient. Real world graphs, are typically
very sparse, and so as k increases the density within a supernode decreases.
4.3.3.4 Runtime
We also measure the runtime of the different algorithms. We report results on
one of the largest graphs, NetTrace; runtimes on the other graphs are qualitatively
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Table 4.1. On NetTrace, a comparison of runtimes (seconds).
Algorithm k = 2 k = 5 k = 10 k = 20
BCKS 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
LT 43.4 29.6 74.2 52.7
GraphGen 3628.8 3171.9 15311.1 1560.1
similar. While GraphGen is considerably slower than the alternative algorithms,
runtime is a secondary concern as the algorithms are run “offline” by the data owner.
Table 4.1 shows that the runtime of BCKS does not depend on group size, agreeing
with previous theoretical analysis [29]. The runtime of the LT algorithm varies across
k: its runtime is dominated by the graph construction process, which depends on the
number of rewiring iterations, something that varies considerably depending on the
particular instance, leading to variation in runtime. Finally, the runtime of GraphGen
appears to decrease with k. This is due to the fact that when groups are large, the
supergraph is comparably more sparse. Therefore, the number of the successors (see
Algorithm 1) is smaller, and so each step in the search runs faster.
4.3.3.5 Discussion
The experiments give insight into how the topological properties of graphs are af-
fected by anonymization. Path lengths tend to more closely resemble path lengths in
a random graph, whether they are shorter or longer than the original graph. Highly
variable degree distributions (as occurs in power-law graphs) tend to become more
uniform and high degree nodes have their degrees reduced. In graphs that are highly
clustered, the effect of anonymization is to substantially reduce the clustering coeffi-
cient. However, the results also show that it is possible to provide privacy and still
preserve some aspects of the original graph.
For graphs with a deliberately engineered structure (such as Mesh, Tree, and
also HOT), anonymization can introduce significant distortion. The GraphGen al-
gorithm, because it explicitly accounts for structure in its anonymization, preserves
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these qualities relatively well. For example, paths remain long in Mesh, Tree remains
tree-like, and degree correlation of HOT remains low.
In terms of comparing the different algorithms, we find that LT and GraphGen
perform consistently better than BCKS. While LT clearly has an advantage over
GraphGen on some metrics, the performance of GraphGen is often comparable and
sometimes better than the performance of LT. In the next section, we resolve the
difference in the privacy standards between these algorithms and present an more
apples-to-apples comparison.
Recall that the error bars around the measures for GraphGen and BCKS measure
the variability across samples from theW(G). Since the original graph G is a member
W(G), one might expect that the error bars would overlap the measure recorded on
G. This does not always occur, suggesting that while G is a possible world that is
consistent with G, it is unlikely to be sampled by chance. It may be possible to bias
the sampling to make G more likely, but it is not clear how this impacts privacy.
As mentioned earlier, the GraphGen and BCKS approaches differ in how the gen-
eralized graph is constructed; in GraphGen it is guided by utility concerns and in
BCKS it is guided by privacy concerns. The edge safety condition of BCKS requires
two neighbors of a node to be placed into separate supernodes. However, the Graph-
Gen often places a node’s neighbors together and it appears to lead to better utility.
It may be that the edge safety condition, while it ensures that the output does not
allow edge disclosures, may conflict with some of the utility metrics considered here.
4.3.4 Utility of enhanced graph generalization algorithm
In this section, we evaluate the proposed enhancements to GraphGen described in
Section 4.2.4. By focusing the anonymization only on the nodes that are vulnerable to
re-identification, we hypothesize that we can improve the utility of GraphGen, which
conservatively generalizes all nodes. We compare GraphGen against two alternatives:
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GraphGen(H1) which guards against H1 adversaries, and GraphGen(H2) which pro-
tects against the stronger H2 adversary. Since GraphGen(H1) provides the same
privacy guarantee as LT, we also include a direct comparison of those approaches.
Based on our earlier assessment in Section 3.2, we expect that GraphGen(H1) will
alter the input graph much less than GraphGen, as most nodes are naturally well-
hidden against an H1 adversary. For GraphGen(H2), it will depend on the dataset.
Many nodes are vulnerable in HepTh and almost all nodes are vulnerable in Enron
and Power-Law, so we may not expect much improvement on those datasets. For
the other datasets, many nodes are well hidden at H2 and so GraphGen(H2) may
generalize these graphs much less than GraphGen.
We summarize the performance difference between GraphGen and its variants
using a suitably normalized measure of each of the properties described in in Sec-
tion 4.3.3. We normalize each measure in terms of the distance between between
GraphGen and the original graph G. Let P denote a graph property and P (g) de-
note the evaluation of P on graph g. The normalized score of anonymized graph
A is defined as |P (A)−P (G)||P (GraphGen)−P (G)| . A score of less than 1 indicates that algorithm A
preserves the property more accurately than GraphGen.
Since GraphGen(H1) and GraphGen(H2) guard against weaker adversaries than
GraphGen, the expectation is that the normalized score will be closer to zero, indi-
cating closer agreement with the original graph.
Table 4.2 shows the results for GraphGen(H1). The results show in general that
by targeting the anonymization to protect against H1 adversaries, it is possible to
improve utility. The magnitude of the improvement is not consistent across datasets,
with datasets such Tree and Mesh seeing large gains and Enron seeing relatively
small gains. Sometimes utility degrades (a normalized score exceeding one). Gener-
ally this is when the original GraphGen algorithm is a very accurate approximation of
the original graph (e.g., distortion on Mesh), so the denominator of the normalized
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Table 4.2. A comparison of utility of GraphGen(H1) and GraphGen at k = 10.
Numbers are normalized scores where less than 1 indicates GraphGen(H1) is more
accurate than GraphGen.
Statistic HepTh Enron NetTrace HOT Power-Law Tree Mesh
Giant comp. size 0.014 0.348 0.19 0.695 0 0.333 0.086
Avg. path lengths 1.369 6.174 1.016 0.919 0.002 0.431 0.046
Distortion 0.648 0.973 0.972 0.624 0.665 0.006 0.483
Mallows distance 0.54 0.959 0.946 0.653 0.256 0.005 0.009
Max. degree 1.023 0.982 1.001 0.994 0.997 0.349 0.398
Degree diversity 0.584 1.015 1 0.95 0.911 0.006 0.034
Degree correlation 0.712 0.972 1.039 1.013 0.403 0.065 0.015
Clustering coeff. 0.508 0.869 0.223 0.318 0.954 0.002 0.023
Table 4.3. A comparison of utility of GraphGen(H2) and GraphGen at k = 10.
Numbers are normalized scores where a number less than 1 indicates GraphGen(H2)
is more accurate than GraphGen.
Statistic HepTh Enron NetTrace HOT Power-Law Tree Mesh
Giant comp. size 0.921 1.03 0.926 0.923 1.079 0.772 0.086
Avg. path lengths 0.947 0.793 1.031 0.818 1.098 0.671 0.046
Distortion 0.964 1.31 1.02 0.822 1.24 0.018 0.483
Mallows distance 0.996 1.005 0.996 0.841 0.998 0.014 0.009
Max. degree 1.018 0.998 0.999 0.983 1.004 0.481 0.398
Degree diversity 0.997 0.999 1 0.973 1.002 0.004 0.034
Degree correlation 1.004 1.018 1.002 1.013 0.97 0.075 0.015
Clustering coeff. 0.995 1.009 0.93 0.643 0.926 0.006 0.023
measure is small. Table 4.3 shows that utility improves with GraphGen(H2), but the
improvement is much less than with GraphGen(H1).
Comparison between GraphGen(H1) and LT While the utility of LT was com-
pared against BCKS and GraphGen in Section 4.3.3, these algorithms are not directly
comparable in terms of their privacy guarantees because LT places restrictions on the
adversary’s knowledge. However, we can directly compare LT with GraphGen(H1)
because they both provide equal privacy protection.
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Table 4.4. A comparison of utility of GraphGen(H1) and LT at k = 10. Numbers
are normalized scores where a number less than 1 indicates GraphGen(H1) is more
accurate than LT. (A dash indicates that LT perfectly matched the original, so the
normalized score is undefined. A 0* indicates that both LT and GraphGen(H1)
perfectly matched the original.)
Statistic HepTh Enron NetTrace HOT Power-Law Tree Mesh
Giant comp. size 0.003 - 0.007 1.195 0* 0.423 0*
Avg. path lengths 0.242 0.151 1.484 0.296 0.016 3.438 0.032
Distortion 0.473 0.55 1.425 0.661 0.84 0.002 0.039
Mallows distance 9.555 0.872 0.958 0.934 1.323 0.643 3.465
Max. degree 1.48 0.92 0.937 0.775 0.807 - -
Degree diversity 46.66 8.311 0.928 1.016 1.482 0.273 8.151
Degree correlation 2.483 12.204 0.71 0.112 0.803 0.051 0.871
Clustering coeff. 0.492 1.025 0.002 1.684 0.579 0.138 0.556
Table 4.4 compares LT and GraphGen(H1) using a measure which is normalized
to LT. Thus a score less than 1 indicates that GraphGen(H1) more accurately approx-
imates the original graph, and a score exceeding 1 indicates that LT is more accurate.
(A dash indicates that LT matches the original, so the normalized score is undefined;
and a 0* indicates that both LT and GraphGen(H1) perfectly match the original.)
The results suggest that the approaches perform somewhat comparably. There is
only one measure (distortion) in which one algorithm is consistently more accurate
across the datasets, and there is no dataset where one algorithm is consistently more
accurate.
4.3.5 Assessing edge disclosure in generalized graphs
Recall our assessment (Section 3.2.2) of edge disclosure under naive anonymiza-
tion, which showed that it is possible for a knowledgeable adversary to accurately
determine whether two nodes are connected. We revisit edge disclosure here, mea-
suring the extent to which graph generalization reduces the risk of edge disclosure.
While graph generalization prevents re-identification (Section 4.2.2), edge disclo-
sure may still be possible. For example, if an adversary can determine which supern-
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Figure 4.4. Risk of edge disclosure in generalized graphs across different datasets
and settings of k.
ode contains Alice and which supernode contains Bob he can estimate the likelihood
of an edge between Alice and Bob based on the weight of the superedge between their
respective supernodes. The weight reveals the number of edges in the original graph
between the nodes in Alice’s supernode and the nodes in Bob’s supernode. A higher
weight increases the likelihood they are connected.
To assess the risk of edge disclosure, we conservatively assume that the adversary
can successfully identify the supernode of each target node. In practice, we expect
that this will be difficult for an adversary with limited knowledge, so our results may
exaggerate the risk. Given two target nodes u and v in G, the adversary computes
the likelihood of edge between u and v by first identifying their supernodes in G,
denoted X and Y respectively, and then observing the superedge weight, d(X, Y ).
The likelihood of edge (u, v) is d(X, Y )/|X||Y | or, in the case when X = Y—i.e., the
targets share a supernode—the edge likelihood is 2d(X,X)/|X|(|X| − 1).
Our experiment is as follows. Given a graph G and a setting of k, we produce
a generalized graph Gk and measure its edge disclosure risk. For each edge in the
original graph G, we measure its likelihood given Gk. Each edge likelihood ` is a
number in [0, 1] which we discretize into five categories from “low” (` ∈ [0, 0.10)) to
“high” (` = 1.0). We report the percentage of edges in each category. This is similar
to the experiments in Section 3.2.2 except rather than vary adversary knowledge, we
assume a powerful adversary who knows the mapping of nodes to supernodes.
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Figure 4.4 shows the results across several input graphs and settings of k. (Note
the grayscale used here differs from the one used in Figure 3.4.) The results show
that when k = 2, some edges are disclosed in all datasets. This is not surprising
because at k = 2, whenever two neighbors are placed into the same supernode, the
edge between them is disclosed—the weight of the self-superedge is either 1 (if they
are connected) or 0 (if they are not).
At k = 5, a small portion of edges is disclosed in two graphs, HepTh (2.1%)
and Enron (6.9%), but for the other graphs no edges are disclosed. Overall, edge
disclosure diminishes rapidly with increasing k. By k = 20, edge likelihoods are less
than half across all graphs.
The experiments show that for reasonable settings of k, the process of graph
generalization greatly reduces the threat of edge disclosure. Our assessment is con-
servative and may overstate the threat. To prevent disclosure even at small k, one
must explicitly place neighboring nodes in separate supernodes. This is done in the
BCKS algorithm, which uses a safety condition to ensure that superedge weights are
bounded by 1/k. However, this additional safety condition has considerable cost in
utility as shown in Section 4.3.3.
4.4 Conclusion
We proposed anonymizing a graph by generalizing it: partitioning the nodes and
summarizing the graph at the partition level. This approach is shown to satisfy graph
k-anonymity under any structural query. We show that a wide range of important
graph analyses can be performed accurately on the generalized graphs published.
An important area for future investigation is to develop bounds on the distortion
introduced by anonymization. Analytical bounds could be developed through analysis
of the generalized graphs, or empirical bounds could inferred through careful sampling
of the possible worlds implied by the generalized graphs. We also hope to investigate
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techniques that will safely permit the analyst to sample higher quality representatives
from the set of possible worlds, for example, by biasing sampling towards the true
graph.
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CHAPTER 5
ACCURATE ESTIMATION OF THE DEGREE
SEQUENCE UNDER DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
The previous chapters explored transformed data release as a paradigm for sharing
sensitive network data in a way that protects privacy. In this chapter, we consider an
alternative paradigm: query answer perturbation. In this setting, the analyst poses
queries and receives noisy answers. To protect privacy, the noise must be large enough
to hide the contributions of an individual’s private data, however, the hope is that for
statistics of interest, the scale of the noise is small relative to the scale of the statistic,
and the noisy answer is an accurate approximation of the truth. We explore whether
this paradigm is a viable solution for computing common network statistics.
Compared with transformed data release, the obvious disadvantage of query an-
swer perturbation is that a graph is never published. Instead, the analyst only receives
answers to some queries. However, with transformed data release the analyst receives
a transformed graph, and as we saw in the previous chapter, the transformations can
distort important properties of the graph. For instance, we saw that transformations
often diminished the degree of high degree nodes, a bias that could cause analysts to
underestimate node centrality. The advantage of query answer perturbation is the po-
tential to get accurate and unbiased answers by tailoring the perturbation techniques
to the specific statistics of interest.
This chapter and the one that follows investigate whether it is possible to accu-
rately compute network statistics under rigorous guarantees of privacy.
In this chapter, we focus on a specific utility goal—estimating the degree se-
quence of a graph. The degree sequence of a graph is a monotonic non-decreasing
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sequence of the degrees of its nodes. A directed graph has two degree sequences:
an out-degree sequence and an in-degree sequence. For example, for the graph in
Figure 5.2(a), its out-degree sequence is 〈0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3〉 and its in-degree sequence
is 〈0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 4〉.
We choose to focus on the degree sequence because it is one of the most widely
studied properties of a graph. It influences the structure of a graph and processes that
operate on a graph, and a diverse line of research has studied properties of random
ensembles of graphs consistent with a known degree sequence [78, 87, 101].
The simple strategy of releasing the exact degree sequence fails to provide ade-
quate privacy protection. Some graphs have unique degree sequences (i.e., all graphs
matching this degree sequence are isomorphic) making the release of the degree se-
quence no safer than naive anonymization. In general, it is unclear how to determine
what the degree sequence reveals about the structure of the graph. The problem is
compounded when either the adversary has partial knowledge of graph structure, or
the degree sequence is only one of several statistics published. Our goal is to design
an approach that provides robust privacy protection against powerful adversaries and
is compatible with releasing multiple statistics.
Prior work in differential privacy provides an excellent foundation for exploring
this question. Differential privacy protects against any adversary, even one with nearly
complete knowledge of the private data. While originally described in settings where
an individual’s private data is encapsulated in a single record (such as the tabular
setting), it is adaptable to the graph setting (Section 2.2). It also composes well:
one can release multiple statistics under differential privacy, so long as the algorithm
for each statistic satisfies differential privacy. Thus, a differentially private algorithm
for the degree sequence can be combined with differentially private algorithms for
other statistics into a single privacy framework. While existing differentially private
algorithms, such as the Laplace mechanism (Section 2.2), can be easily adapted to
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obtain noisy answers to queries about the degree sequence, the added noise introduces
considerable error.
The main contribution of this chapter is an algorithm for accurately estimating
the degree sequence of a network in a way that protects the privacy of network
participants. The algorithm has several desirable properties:
• Privacy The algorithm satisfies -differential privacy, which means that the
output of the algorithm does not disclose the presence or absence of an edge,
even when the adversary has nearly complete knowledge of the graph. The
proof of privacy is spread across Sections 5.2 & 5.3 as our technique has multiple
components.
• Accuracy Using experiments on real data, we show that the technique is
extremely accurate and orders of magnitude more accurate than existing tech-
niques (Section 5.5). In theoretical analysis, we prove that error scales with
number of distinct degrees whereas existing techniques have error that scales
with the number of nodes (Section 5.3).
• Scalability We analyze the complexity of the algorithm in Section 5.4 and
show the algorithm runs in linear time. In experiments, we show the algorithm
is fast and can scale to large inputs: it computes a private estimate of a 200
million node degree sequence in under 6 seconds.
• Configurability As described in Section 5.2, the algorithm can be instan-
tiated in two different ways and the choice impacts how noise is introduced into
the degree sequence: experiments show that one approach tends to add rela-
tively more noise to low degrees; the other adds relatively more noise to high
degrees. The analyst can choose among the approaches depending on which
part of the sequence is most significant. More importantly, we believe this is an
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interesting finding that leaves open questions for future work on whether the
two strategies can be combined to have lower error throughout the sequence.
• Innovation A key component of our approach is using statistical inference
to filter out some of the noise that was added for privacy. While prior work in
differential privacy has considered the idea of post-processing the noisy answers,
our work is (to the best our knowledge) unique in that this is the first instance
where post-processing is shown to improve accuracy. The boost in accuracy
depends on properties of the input sequence, and we quantify the conditions
that lead to high accuracy results (Section 5.3).
A second contribution of this work is to recognize that our technique has broader
applicability: a degree sequence is an instance of a more general measurement, which
we call an unattributed histogram. We define unattributed histograms in the next
section, but for now it suffices to say that while they are less informative than a
conventional histogram—because they hide some information, namely the association
between bin and frequency—they are significant in the context of data privacy because
we will show that we can estimate unattributed histograms much more accurately
than conventional histograms under differential privacy. Importantly, unattributed
histograms have many useful applications, including, but not limited to, measuring
the degree sequence of a graph.
We present our algorithm in this more general setting of estimating an unattrib-
uted histogram under differential privacy. (Some issues arise for the special case of
estimating degree sequences, which we highlight.) In the next section, we define unat-
tributed histograms, give examples, and contrast them with conventional histograms.
We also give an overview of our algorithm, conveying the main ideas behind our
approach.
Admittedly, the degree sequence is just one property of a graph, and there is
evidence that a number of other properties are not constrained by the degree sequence
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alone [78, 87]. Nevertheless, because of the degree sequence’s profound influence on
the structure of the graph, we believe it is important to know how accurately it can
be estimated, independent of other properties. In the following chapter, we look at
other network statistics, review known results, including some additional work of our
own, and discuss limitations.
5.1 Overview of the task and solution
We start with an overview of the problem—computing an unattributed histogram
under differential privacy—and our solution. An unattributed histogram is a new
concept, so we describe it, give examples, and discuss its practical application. Our
solution uses an innovative technique in differential privacy: it involves post processing
the output of a differentially private mechanism to obtain a more accurate answer.
A key component of our solution is choosing a query strategy where constraints hold
among the answers. The constraints are what drives the post-processing phase.
5.1.1 Task: computing unattributed histograms
We introduce the concept of an unattributed histogram by contrasting it with a
conventional (attributed) histogram.
A histogram on attribute A in relational schema R(A,B, . . . ) summarizes the
distribution of values of A occurring in R. We assume the domain of A, dom, is
ordered. A histogram is computed with respect to a partition of dom into disjoint
intervals, called bins. For each bin, the histogram reports the number of tuples in R
whose value of A falls in the interval specified by the bin. In examples, we partition
the domain into unit-length intervals, i.e., each bin contains only a single value from
the domain.
For example, Figure 5.1(a) shows a table of fictitious medical records having the
schema R(Name,Age,Gender, Condition). We compute a histogram on the attribute
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Name Age Sex Condition
Alice 23 F Healthy
Bob 45 M Asthma
Carol 59 F Flu
Dave 25 M Flu
Ed 70 M Asthma
(a) Relation R
Condition Frequency
Asthma 2
Cancer 0
Flu 2
Healthy 1
(b) Conventional histogram
Frequency
0
1
2
2
(c) Unattributed
histogram
Query Definitions: C : 〈c([x1]), c([x2]), . . . , c(xn)〉 for xi ∈ dom
S : 〈c([xpi(1)]), c([xpi(2)]), . . . , c([xpi(n)])〉
F : 〈f1, . . . , fN〉 where fi =
∑n
i=1 I[c([xi, yi]) ≥ k]
True answer Private output Inferred answer
C(I) = 〈2, 0, 2, 1〉 C˜(I) = 〈1.9,−0.3, 2.1, 0.8〉
S(I) = 〈0, 1, 2, 2〉 S˜(I) = 〈−0.1, 1.1, 2.2, 1.8〉 S(I) = 〈−0.1, 1.1, 2.0, 2.0〉
F(I) = 〈3, 2, 0, 0, 0〉 F˜(I) = 〈3.1, 2.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.4〉 F(I) = 〈3.1, 2.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2〉
(d) Query strategies
Figure 5.1. (a) Example table R on which we compute histograms; (b)
A conventional histogram on attribute Condition, whose domain is dom =
{Asthma,Cancer,Flu,Healthy}; (c) An unattributed histogram on Condition; (d)
Definitions and sample values for alternative query sequences: C computes a conven-
tional histogram, S returns the frequencies of the histogram in rank order, F computes
a cumulative histogram on the frequencies.
Condition. The domain of Condition is { Asthma, Cancer, Flu, Healthy } and or-
dered lexicographically. A conventional histogram on Condition is shown in Fig-
ure 5.1(b).
In contrast to a conventional histogram, an unattributed histogram reports only
the frequencies, and omits the association between bin and frequency. For example,
Figure 5.1(c) shows an unattributed histogram on the Condition attribute. This
result reveals the frequencies but hides which condition goes with which frequency.
For instance, it shows that some condition never occurs (frequency is zero) but not
which condition this is. We call it an unattributed histogram because the frequencies
are not attributed to their values. The result of an unattributed histogram is a
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multiset of frequencies, which can be returned in any order. We adopt a convention
of reporting the frequencies in ascending order.
We can further contrast conventional and unattributed histograms by comparing
their expression in SQL. Both histograms can be expressed as GROUP BY queries in
SQL, the only differences being the column name selection and the order of results.
The following is an SQL expression for a conventional histogram that returns results
ordered by bin:
SELECT A, COUNT(*) AS Frequency FROM R GROUP BY A ORDER BY A
The expression for an unattributed histogram omits A from the results and orders
the results by frequency:
SELECT COUNT(*) AS Frequency FROM R GROUP BY A ORDER BY Frequency
One can think of an unattributed histogram as a projection on the result of a conven-
tional histogram that retains only the frequency column, removing the bin column
from the result. A technical detail: the above SQL expressions compute histograms
over the active domain of A—values from the domain of A that do not appear in
R are omitted from the results. Our differentially private techniques will compute
unattributed histograms over dom and therefore bins with a frequency of zero are
included in the result.
While unattributed histograms may be unconventional, they have practical appli-
cation. There are some settings where the purpose of computing a histogram is not
to learn the frequency of a particular bin or bins, but to simply learn the overall dis-
tribution of frequencies. For example, if the tuples of R represent queries submitted
to a search engine, and A is the search term, then an unattributed histogram shows
106
Alice Bob Carol
Dave Ed
Fred Greg Harry
(a) Example network G
Src Dest
Alice Bob
Bob Dave
Bob Ed
Carol Bob
Dave Fred
Dave Ed
Fred Greg
Greg Dave
Greg Ed
Greg Harry
Harry Ed
(b) Edge table
Src Frequency
Alice 1
Bob 2
Carol 1
Dave 2
Ed 0
Fred 1
Greg 3
Harry 1
(c) Attributed degree se-
quence
Frequency
0
1
1
1
1
2
2
3
(d) Unattributed
degree se-
quence
Figure 5.2. (a) Example graph G for which we compute degree sequences; (b) The
edges of G represented as a relation R(Src,Dest); (c) An attributed degree sequence;
(d) An unattributed degree sequence.
the frequency of occurrence of all terms (but not the terms themselves). This can be
used, for instance, in predicting cache performance.
Another important application, especially in the context of this thesis, is measur-
ing the degree sequence of a graph. Given an undirected graph G, the degree sequence
is a monotonic non-decreasing sequence of the degrees of its nodes. A directed graph
has two degree sequences, a sequence of in-degrees and a sequence of out-degrees. For
example, for the graph in Figure 5.2(a), its out-degree sequence is 〈0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3〉
and its in-degree sequence is 〈0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 4〉.
Degree sequences as unattributed histograms Degree sequences can be viewed
as instances of unattributed histograms. To compute a degree sequence as an unat-
tributed histogram, we first represent the edges of a (directed) graph as a binary
relation R(Src,Dest). For example, the edges of the graph in Figure 5.2(a) are
shown as a relation in Figure 5.2(b). The out-degree sequence is an unattributed
histogram on Src; the in-degree sequence is an unattributed histogram on Dest.
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For example, the out-degree sequence of the directed graph in Figure 5.2(a) is
equal to the unattributed histogram on Src shown in Figure 5.2(d).
For an undirected graph, if we represent an edge (u, v) as two symmetric tuples
in R – tuples (u, v) and (v, u) are in R if and only if edge (u, v) is in the graph –
then the degree sequence is an unattributed histogram on Src in R. (Each edge in
the graph is counted twice in the histogram.)
A conventional histogram would be an attributed degree sequence and would pro-
vide an additional association of each degree with a named individual. For example,
the attributed out-degree sequence of the graph shown in Figure 5.2(a) is equal to
the conventional histogram on Src shown in Figure 5.2(c).
Most uses of the degree sequence are concerned with the distribution of degrees in
the graph, and not the degrees of particular individuals, so the unattributed degree
sequence is sufficient.
While an unattributed histogram can be derived from a conventional histogram,
we distinguish it because it is possible to estimate unattributed histograms much
more accurately under differential privacy. Because the association between bin and
frequency is not needed, we have greater flexibility in designing query strategies.
Next, we describe innovative strategies for estimating unattributed histograms under
differential privacy.
5.1.2 Solution: inference on queries with constraints
We developed two related strategies for computing an unattributed histogram
under differential privacy. Both strategies share a common three step procedure for
computing the histogram. First, we carefully formulate a query such that its answer,
a sequence of numbers, is constrained so that relationships hold among the numbers.
The query is answered using the Laplace mechanism (Section 2.2) to obtain noisy
answer that is differentially private. The addition of random noise may result in a
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sequence of numbers that violate the constraints. So, the final step refines the noisy
answer using statistical inference to produce an answer that is consistent with the
constraints. The inferred sequence can be much more accurate. The two strategies
differ in their choice of query.
We formally define the two strategies in the next section. In the remainder of
this section, we convey the main ideas behind the first strategy, by describing the
query and showing how enforcing constraints through inference can result in a more
accurate answer. The second strategy and the details of the first strategy are described
in Section 5.2.
In the first strategy, we ask for the frequencies of the unattributed histogram in
rank order. For a histogram over n bins, the answer is a sequence of n numbers, where
the ith number is the ith smallest frequency in the histogram. The true answer to
the query is a monotonic non-decreasing sequence of numbers. To achieve differential
privacy, we show it is sufficient to add (appropriately scaled) independent random
noise to each number. Thus, the analyst receives a sequence of n numbers, where
the ith number is the ith smallest frequency plus noise. Since noise has been added,
the numbers may no longer be monotonically non-decreasing. But we can use the
monotonicity constraint to infer a potentially more accurate answer. We propose an
inference procedure that takes the noisy sequence and derives an estimate for the
unknown monotonic sequence. The output of the inference is the closest monotonic
sequence to the noisy sequence.
Inference can reduce error, but it will depend on the frequencies in the histogram.
The greatest reduction occurs when all bins have the same frequency. Here is an
example for a histogram over n = 10 bins where all bins have the same frequency, 12.
The Laplace mechanism adds independent random noise to each count.
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True answer 〈12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12〉
Noisy answer 〈12.3, 13.2, 12.9, 11.4, 12.0, 11.6, 9.5, 11.4, 12.4, 11.5〉
Inferred answer 〈11.8, 11.8, 11.8, 11.8, 11.8, 11.8, 11.8, 11.8, 11.9, 11.9〉
In this case, inference effectively averages the noisy observations, thereby reducing
variance and producing a more accurate estimate of the count. At the other extreme,
if all bins have vastly different frequencies, then the noisy sequence may not violate
the monotonicity constraints. For example, consider this histogram over n = 5 bins.
True answer 〈12, 25, 50, 97, 123〉
Noisy answer 〈11.5, 25.2, 49.6, 95.2, 124.8〉
Inferred answer 〈11.5, 25.2, 49.6, 95.2, 124.8〉
The noisy answers are already monotonically increasing and therefore there is nothing
to be done during inference. The inferred answer is identical to the noisy answer and
there is no improvement in accuracy. Fortunately, in real world applications such
as estimating the degree sequence of a private graph, the histograms tend to more
closely resemble the former example, in which case inference greatly boosts accuracy.
There are several challenges in executing the above strategy, which we explore
in the rest of this chapter. First, we must formally define our query strategies and
prove that differential privacy is satisfied. This requires describing the mechanism
for adding random noise and proving it is differentially private. This is the focus of
Section 5.2. Second, we must formalize the inference process and demonstrate its
effectiveness. The inference process is common to both strategies and described in
Sections 5.3 & 5.4, and its performance is evaluated theoretically in Section 5.3.2 and
experimentally in Section 5.5.
110
5.2 Query strategies
We describe three query strategies. The first is a baseline strategy, in which
our strategy for computing an unattributed histogram is to simply compute a con-
ventional histogram and ignore attribution. This strategy does not work well: the
noise introduced to ensure privacy greatly distorts the answer. We then describe
our two innovative strategies. Both strategies ask queries where ordering constraints
hold among the answers, which will then be exploited by the inference mechanism
described in Section 5.3.
While our query strategies are simply alternative representations of the same
information, we find that representation matters when answers can be revealed only
approximately. If we were able to return exact answers, then there is no distinction
between alternative representations: the answer to one query can be used to derive
the answer for the other. But under differential privacy, we must add noise and the
choice of representation determines where the noise is introduced. We will show in
experiments that the consequence is that different representations exhibit different
performance.
5.2.1 Baseline strategy: conventional histogram
We first describe the baseline strategy of asking a conventional histogram query,
introducing common notational conventions along the way.
All of the query strategies considered in this paper are formulated as query se-
quences where each element of the sequence is a query on the database. We use Q to
denote a generic query sequence. We refer to query sequences using bold letters (Q,
C, S). When Q is evaluated on a database instance I, the output, Q(I), includes
one answer to each numerical query, so Q(I) is a vector of numbers. The ith query
in Q is Q[i]. Table 5.1 reviews notational conventions.
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Table 5.1. Notational conventions for query sequences.
Q Sequence of queries
C Conventional histogram
S Unattrib. histogram via Sorting
F Unattrib. histogram via Frequency
γQ Constraint set for query Q
Q˜, C˜, S˜, F˜ Randomized query sequence
S,F Randomized query sequence,
returning minimum L2 solution
I Private database instance
C(I),S(I),F(I) Output sequence (truth)
d˜ = C˜(I), s˜ = S˜(I), f˜ = F˜(I) Output sequence (noisy)
s = S(I), f = F(I) Output sequence (inferred)
We can express a histogram as a sequence of counting queries on range attribute
A. We write intervals as [x, y] for x, y ∈ dom, and abbreviate [x, x] as [x]. For a given
interval [x, y], a counting query c([x, y]) reports the number of tuples whose value of
A is contained by the interval:
c([x, y]) = SELECT COUNT(*) FROM R WHERE x ≤ R.A ≤ y
A histogram is computed with respect to a user-specified partition of dom into n
disjoint intervals [x1, y1], [x2, y2], . . . , [xn, yn] whose union is equal to dom. We refer
to each interval as a bin. We use C to denote the query sequence of a conventional
histogram. It is defined as:
C = 〈c([x1, y1]), c([x2, y2]), . . . , c([xn, yn])〉
For example, consider a histogram on attribute Condition with unit-length intervals
(each contains a single condition). The histogram expressed as a query sequence is:
C = 〈c([Asthma]), c([Cancer]), c([Flu]), c([Healthy])〉
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The answer to C is a vector of n numbers, corresponding to the number of tuples in
each bin. For example, if I is the relation in Figure 5.1(a) and C is the histogram on
attribute Condition, then the answer is.
C(I) = 〈2, 0, 2, 1〉
To ensure differential privacy, we do not return exact answers to queries. Instead,
random noise is added. For all of our query strategies, we rely on the Laplace mech-
anism. This mechanism adds independent noise to each answer, where the noise is
drawn from a zero mean, appropriately scaled Laplace distribution. As described in
Section 2.2, the scale depends on the sensitivity of the query—informally, the amount
by which the query answer can change due to the addition or removal of an individ-
ual’s private data. This mechanism can be applied to any query sequence and satisfies
the rigorous privacy guarantee of differential privacy.
To apply the Laplace mechanism to C, we must determine the sensitivity of C,
denoted ∆C.
Proposition 5.1 (Sensitivity of C). The sensitivity of C, denoted ∆C, is 1.
Proof. Let I and I ′ be neighboring databases that differ by the tuple t. This tuple
affects the answer to a single query in C, specifically it changes the count for the
interval that contains t.A by exactly 1. Therefore, ‖C(I)−C(I ′)‖1 = 1.
We use C˜ to denote the application of the Laplace mechanism to the query se-
quence C. Let 〈Lap(b)〉n denote a vector of independent Laplace random variables
each with scale b.
Definition 5.1 (C˜). The randomized algorithm C˜ is defined as the application of
the Laplace mechanism to the query sequence C. It returns the following randomized
vector:
C˜(I) = C(I) + 〈Lap(∆C/)〉n
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It follows from Proposition 2.2 that this is -differentially private.
5.2.2 First strategy: frequencies in rank order
The first query strategy returns the frequencies of the unattributed histogram in
rank order. Let S denote the n-length query sequence where the ith query returns the
frequency of the ith lowest frequency bin. Formally, for input I let pi : [1, n] → [1, n]
be a permutation of the bins specific to I such that if i < j, then c([xpi(i), ypi(i)]) ≤
c([xpi(j), ypi(j)]) on input I. Then S[i] = c([xpi(i), ypi(i)]) for i = 1 to n.
For example, if S is an unattributed histogram on attribute Condition, then S[1]
is the frequency of the rarest condition and S[4] is the frequency of the most common
condition (out of four possible conditions).
The answer to S is a vector of length n, corresponding to the bin frequencies.
The numbers in the vector are monotonically non-decreasing. Following the previous
example, if I is a database consisting of the relation in Figure 5.1(a) and S is an
unattributed histogram on attribute Condition, then S(I) is:
S(I) = 〈0, 1, 2, 2〉
Query sequences C and S are similar, but with one key distinction. Both compute
the same set of n counts over the intervals [x1, y1] to [xn, yn], and so when evaluated,
they return the same multiset of numbers. The distinction between them is how those
numbers are indexed: in C the query answers are indexed by domain—the ith answer
is the frequency of ith smallest attribute value in the domain—and in S the answers
are indexed by their rank—the ith answer is the ith smallest frequency.
To answer S using the Laplace mechanism, we must determine its sensitivity.
Perhaps surprisingly, the sensitivity of S is no larger than the sensitivity of C. (In
fact, ∆S = ∆C = 1.) This follows from the following claim.
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Proposition 5.2 (Sensitivity of S). For any query sequence Q, let SQ be the query
sequence that returns the answers of Q in rank order. Then ∆SQ ≤ ∆Q.
Proof. Let x and y be two vectors of length n. Let pix : [1, n]→ [1, n] be a permutation
that sorts x, i.e., if i < j, then xpix(i) ≤ xpix(j). Similarly, let piy be a permutation that
sorts y. First, we claim that
∥∥〈xpix(1), . . . , xpix(n)〉 − 〈ypiy(1), . . . , ypiy(n)〉∥∥1 ≤ ‖x− y‖1
If this claim is true, it implies for any databases I and I ′, ‖SQ(I)− SQ(I ′)‖1 ≤
‖Q(I)−Q(I ′)‖1.
We now prove the claim. While pix is specific to x, we can still apply the same
permutation to y, to obtain 〈ypix(1), . . . , ypix(n)〉. If we apply the same permutation to
both vectors, this does not change the L1 distance between them since the alignment
between x and y is preserved under the permutation. Thus, we have:
∥∥〈xpix(1), . . . , xpix(n)〉 − 〈ypix(1), . . . , ypix(n)〉∥∥1 = ‖x− y‖1
Now consider swapping any out-of-order pair in the permuted y: i.e., if there exists
a pair ypi(i), ypi(j) such that i < j but ypix(i) > ypix(j), then let pi
′ be a new permutation
identical to pix except pi
′(i) = pix(j) and pi′(j) = pix(i). This can only decrease L1
distance, as the smaller (resp. larger) number in y is now aligned with the smaller
(resp. larger) number in x. That is,
∥∥〈xpix(1), . . . , xpix(n)〉 − 〈ypi′(1), . . . , ypi′(n)〉∥∥1
≤ ∥∥〈xpix(1), . . . , xpix(n)〉 − 〈ypix(1), . . . , ypix(n)〉∥∥1
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If we repeat this step, swapping any out-of-order pair in y and updating pi′ accordingly,
the L1 can only decrease at each step. Eventually, no out-of-order pairs will remain,
and pi′ will be a permutation that sorts y; i.e., pi′ = piy and we have shown that
∥∥〈xpix(1), . . . , xpix(n)〉 − 〈ypiy(1), . . . , ypiy(n)〉∥∥1
≤ ∥∥〈xpix(1), . . . , xpix(n)〉 − 〈ypix(1), . . . , ypix(n)〉∥∥1
= ‖x− y‖1
completing the proof.
Again, we can obtain a differentially private estimate of S using the Laplace
mechanism.
Definition 5.2 (S˜). The randomized algorithm S˜ is defined as the application of
the Laplace mechanism to the query sequence S. It returns the following randomized
vector:
S˜(I) = S(I) + 〈Lap(∆S/)〉n
It follows from Proposition 2.2 that this is -differentially private:
Since the same magnitude of noise is added to S as to C, it appears as though the
accuracies of S˜ and C˜ are the same. However, S implies a powerful set of constraints.
Notice that the ordering occurs before noise is added. Thus, the returned counts are
ordered according to the true rank order. If the returned answer contains out-of-order
counts, this must be caused by the addition of random noise.
We use γ to denote the set of constraints associated with a query. For the query
S, γS contains the set of inequalities S[i] ≤ S[i+ 1] for 1 ≤ i < n. (The query C has
no constraints between the answers, so γC is empty.) In Section 5.3, we show how to
exploit these constraints to boost accuracy.
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5.2.3 Second strategy: frequency of frequencies
The main idea behind the second strategy is as follows. We can view the frequen-
cies of an unattributed histogram as simply a collection of n numbers. Each number
is an integer in the range [0, N ] where N is the number of tuples in the database.
For now, we assume N is known. Treating these n numbers as data, we can measure
the data distribution, for example by computing a histogram. In other words, we
are computing the frequency of frequencies: the number of times that each frequency
occurs in the unattributed histogram.
Our second approach computes a particular kind of histogram over these numbers,
a cumulative histogram. The query sequence is denoted F and has length N . For
k = 1 to N , the kth query in the sequence is defined as
F[k] =
n∑
i=1
I[c([xi, yi]) ≥ k]
where I[·] is the indicator function, equal to 1 when its argument is true and 0 oth-
erwise. In words, F[k] reports the number of bins (in the unattributed histogram)
whose frequency is k or larger. The answer is an integer between 0—meaning that
no bins have at least this frequency—and n—meaning that all bins have at least this
frequency.
For example, if F is computed on attribute Condition, then F[1] is the number
of conditions that occur at least once, F[2] is the number of conditions that occur at
least twice, and so on. The length of the query depends on N , the number of tuples
in the relation. Observe that given an answer to F, we can derive the answer S, and
vice versa.
Evaluating this query on the input I shown in Figure 5.1(a), we have N = 5 and
therefore F(I) has length 5 and the answer is as follows
F(I) = 〈3, 2, 0, 0, 0〉
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This answer indicates that three conditions occur at least once, two conditions occur
twice, and zero conditions occur three or more times.
Like the S query, the answers of F are constrained. As k increases, the value of
F[k] can only decrease. Thus, γF consists of the set of inequalities F[i] ≥ F[i+ 1] for
1 ≤ i < N .
To apply the Laplace mechanism, we must determine the sensitivity of F.
Proposition 5.3 (Sensitivity of F). The sensitivity of F is ∆F = 1.
Proof. Let I and I ′ be neighboring databases such that I ′ has an additional tuple t.
Without loss of generality, let t fall into interval [xi, yi]. Further, suppose that on I,
c([xi, yi]) = k. On database I
′, the inclusion of t makes c([xi, yi]) = k + 1. Therefore
if F[k + 1] = a on I, then F[k + 1] = a+ 1 on I ′; note that F[k] is the same on both
I and I ′, as are all other positions. Therefore ‖F(I)− F(I ′)‖1 = 1.
Again, we can obtain a differentially private estimate of F using the Laplace
mechanism.
Definition 5.3 (F˜). The randomized algorithm F˜ is defined as the application of
the Laplace mechanism to the query sequence F. It returns the following randomized
vector:
F˜(I) = F(I) + 〈Lap(∆F/)〉N
It follows from Proposition 2.2 that this is -differentially private.
When N is unknown, a slightly more complex query strategy is necessary. Our
strategy is an interactive approach in which we incrementally compute F by iteratively
asking F[k] for increasing k until a stopping condition is reached. Observe that for
k ≥ N + 1, the true query answer, F[k], is zero. While the returned answers may
not be equal to zero due to the addition of random noise, the expected value of each
answer is zero. We can continue increasing k until the noisy answers appear to have
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“converged” to 0. For example, we can apply the central limit theorem to derive a
confidence interval around the mean of the last N0 observations and terminate when
the upper bound of the interval is less than 1. The number N0 is a function of the
noise magnitude ∆F/ and our desired level of confidence. The following proposition
claims that this interactive approach is differentially-private.
Proposition 5.4 (Interactive F). Let F˜k denote the randomized algorithm that re-
turns the following noisy answer:
F˜k(I) = F(I)[k] + Lap(∆F/)
The process that interactively asks F˜i for i = 1 up to any N
′ (where N ′ may depend
on the answers received) satisfies -differential privacy.
Proof. Consider a transcript of noisy answers Let 〈f1, . . . , fN ′〉 output by the interac-
tive process. We claim that for any two neighboring databases I and I ′ the probability
of returning 〈f1, . . . , fN ′〉 differs by at most a factor of exp(). There exists a single
k such that F(I)[k] 6= F(I ′)[k], for all i 6= k, F(I)[i] = F(I ′)[i]. Thus, for any i 6= k,
we have
Pr[F˜i(I) = fi|f1, . . . , fi−1] = Pr[F˜i(I ′) = fi|f1, . . . , fi−1]
and for k, the Laplace noise ensures that
Pr[F˜i(I) = fk|f1, . . . , fk−1] ≤ exp() Pr[F˜i(I ′) = fk|f1, . . . , fk−1]
Therefore
N ′∏
i=1
Pr[F˜i(I) = fi|f1, . . . , fi−1] ≤ exp()
N ′∏
i=1
Pr[F˜i(I
′) = fi|f1, . . . , fi−1]
and we have proved the claim.
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Special considerations for computing degree sequences We briefly remark on
some differences in computing sensitivity for the special case where the unattributed
histogram is the degree sequence of an undirected graph. The issue is that in the graph
setting, neighboring instances may differ by more than a single tuple. Neighboring
graphs can differ by multiple edges under k-edge differential privacy for k > 1 and
under node-differential privacy (Section 2.4).
For k-edge differential privacy, it is sufficient to analyze the special case of k = 1
because existing results (Section 2.2) show that differential privacy for k = 1 extends
naturally to k > 1. Therefore, we focus on the case of k = 1. For directed graphs,
removing one edge is equivalent to removing one tuple, so our analysis of unattributed
histograms applies immediately to the (in or out) degree sequence of a directed graph.
For an undirected graph, each edge is counted twice in the unattributed histogram,
once for each endpoint. Therefore the sensitivity must be doubled.
For node differential privacy, it is not hard to see that the sensitivity is large,
specifically O(n). In other words, the magnitude of the noise added by the Laplace
mechanism matches the range of the query answers and therefore, the answers are so
noisy, they are useless. For this reason, in the remainder of this chapter, we adopt
k-edge differential privacy as the privacy standard.
A final issue for degree sequences is that n, the number of bins in the unattributed
histogram, depends on the graph and may not be public knowledge. This impacts
the S query, because its length is n. Recall from Section 5.1.1, there is a bin for
each node in the graph. Releasing the exact number of nodes in the graph does not
technically satisfy k-edge differential privacy. This is not a significant issue, and can
be remedied similarly to the way the issue of unknown N is handled with the F
query. Specifically, first we slightly modify the definition of S: we return frequencies
(degrees) in descending, rather than ascending order, and the ith smallest degree for
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any i > |V | = n is defined as −1. Then we apply the incremental approach described
for the F query, stopping when the answers appear to “converge” at -1.
5.3 Inference
Here we describe how we can use statistical inference to refine noisy answers to ob-
tain estimates that are consistent with the query constraints. For the query sequences
we consider here – S and F – the primary constraint is an ordering constraint. How-
ever, inference can be applied to other query sequences, resulting in consistent answers
and, in some cases, increased accuracy [55, 76]. We first describe the general inference
framework and then describe the specific approach for handling order constraints.
Given a query sequence Q, let γQ denote the set of constraints which must hold
among the answers. The inference process takes the randomized output of the query,
denoted q˜ = Q˜(I), and finds the sequence of query answers q that is “closest” to q˜
and also satisfies the constraints of γQ. Here closest is determined by L2 distance,
and the result is the minimum L2 solution:
Definition 5.4 (Minimum L2 solution). Let minL2(·, ·) be a function that takes noisy
sequence q˜ and constraints γQ and outputs a vector q that satisfies the constraints γQ
and at the same time minimizes ||q˜− q||2. We say that q is the minimum L2 solution.
Examples of minimum L2 solutions are shown in Figure 5.1 for two different queries
that have ordering constraints.
Finding the minimum L2 solution requires no access to the private database, only
q˜, the output of a differentially private algorithm, and γQ, a property of the query. In
fact, the computation can be carried out by the analyst after receiving q˜. Nevertheless,
we now formally prove that q can be computed under differential privacy. We use Q
to denote the two step randomized process in which the data owner first computes
q˜ = Q˜(I) and then computes q = minL2(q˜, γQ).
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Proposition 5.5 (Inference preserves privacy). If Q˜ satisfies -differential privacy,
then Q satisfies -differential privacy.
Proof. For any set of outputs O of the function minL2(·, ·), let IO denote O’s pre-
image: IO = {q˜ | minL2(q˜, γQ) ∈ O}. For any I and I ′ ∈ nbrs(I), the following
shows that Q is -differentially private:
Pr[Q(I) ∈ O] = Pr[Q˜(I) ∈ IO]
≤ exp() Pr[Q˜(I ′) ∈ IO]
= exp() Pr[Q(I ′) ∈ O]
where the inequality is due to the fact that Q˜ is -differentially private.
We will show that for some queries, inference produces more accurate answers.
In other words, by moving the noisy answer to the closest answer that is consistent
with the constraints, we also move it closer to the true answer. One can show that
when the constraints define a solution set that is convex, as is the case with the
queries we study here, then inference can only reduce error [114]. However, we find
that inference not only does not harm, but it can substantially reduce error, as was
suggested previously by the examples in Section 5.1.2
Next we show how to compute the minimum L2 solution for queries with ordering
constraints.
5.3.1 Inference for ordering constraints
We now present the minimum L2 solution for the case of ordering constraints.
It can be applied to any query sequence where ordering constraints hold among the
answers. This includes S and F. Let O be any n-length query sequence where ascend-
ing order constraints γO hold among the answers, i.e., γO contains the inequalities
O[i] ≤ O[i + 1] for all 1 ≤ i < n. Of course, we can apply our solution to queries
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with descending order constraints—such as F—by reversing the vector before apply-
ing inference. Let o˜ denote a random output from the Laplace mechanism applied to
O.
For ordering constraints, finding the minimum L2 solution can be cast as a con-
vex optimization problem. A convex optimization problem involves minimizing (or
maximizing) a convex objective function subject to convex constraints on its argu-
ments [18].
Problem 1 (Inference under order constraints). Given o˜ and γO, the problem of find-
ing the minimum L2 solution, o = minL2(o˜, γO) is equivalent to solving the following
convex optimization problem.
minimize
n∑
i=1
(o˜[i]− o[i])2
subject to o[i] ≤ o[i+ 1], 1 ≤ i < n.
(5.1)
The solution to this problem has an elegant, closed form as shown the following
theorem. The proof is in Section 5.7.1.
Theorem 5.1. [Minimum L2 Solution for ordering constraints] For a given o˜, let
o˜[i, j] denote the subsequence 〈o˜[i], o˜[i + 1], . . . , o˜[j]〉 and M [i, j] the average of this
subsequence: M [i, j] =
∑j
k=i o˜[k]/(j − i + 1). For each position k, let Lk and Uk be
defined as
Lk = min
k≤j≤n
max
1≤i≤n
M [i, j]
and
Uk = max
1≤i≤k
min
i≤j≤n
M [i, j]
The minimum L2 solution, o = minL2(o˜, γO), is unique and is equal to o[k] = Lk =
Uk.
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After we developed our solution to Problem 1, we learned that this problem is an
instance of isotonic regression, a problem that has been analyzed in statistics. The
statistics literature has several characterizations, including the max-min formula we
present above (cf. Barlow et al. [14]). To our knowledge, our extension to include
additional constraints (below) and our utility analysis (next section) are novel.
We describe a linear time algorithm for computing minL2(o˜, γO) in Section 5.4.
It is in fact a variant of an existing algorithm for isotonic regression, though we
developed it independently.
Here are a few examples of short sequences o˜ and their minimal L2 solutions o.
Table 5.2. Examples of private outputs o˜ = O˜(I) and their closest ordered sequence
o.
original output inferred output L2 distance
o˜ o ||o˜− o||2
〈9, 10, 14〉 〈9, 10, 14〉 0
〈9, 14, 10〉 〈9, 12, 12〉 4
〈14, 9, 10, 15〉 〈11, 11, 11, 15〉 14
Example 7. Table 5.2 gives three examples of o˜ and its closest ordered sequence
o. First, suppose o˜ = 〈9, 10, 14〉. Since o˜ is already ordered, o is equal to o˜. In the
second example, o˜ = 〈9, 14, 10〉, the last two elements are out of order. The closest
ordered sequence is o = 〈9, 12, 12〉. Finally, let o˜ = 〈14, 9, 10, 15〉. The sequence is
in order except for o˜[1]. While changing the first element from 14 to 9 would make
it ordered, its distance from o˜ would be (14 − 9)2 = 25 which is further away than
o = 〈11, 11, 11, 15〉, which is 14 from o˜.
Since the Laplace mechanism introduces random noise to each numerical answer
in the sequence, both the output o˜ and o may include numbers that are non-integral
and/or negative. In many applications, there may be additional constraints of inte-
grality and non-negativity. This motivates the following problem.
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Problem 2 (Inference under order, integrality, and bound constraints). Let γ′O be
the constraint set γO augmented with the additional constraints that each answer
be integral and between given lower and upper bounds, respectively denoted L and
U . The problem of finding the minimum L2 solution minL2(o˜, γ
′
O) is equivalent to
solving the following optimization problem.
minimize
n∑
i=1
(o˜[i]− o[i])2
subject to L ≤ o[i] ≤ o[i+ 1] ≤ U, 1 ≤ i < n.
o[i] ∈ Z, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(5.2)
Despite the fact that integrality constraints make the problem non-convex, The-
orem 5.2 shows that including these constraints can be easily incorporated. The
resulting solution is equal to o rounded to the nearest non-negative integers. The
proof is in Section 5.7.2.
Theorem 5.2. [Minimum L2 Solution for order, integrality, and bound constraints]
Given o = minL2(o˜, γO), let o
′ denote the sequence derived from o in which each
element o[k] is rounded to the nearest integer in [L,U ]. Then o′ = minL2(o˜, γ′O).
5.3.2 Utility analysis
We analyze O and show under what conditions inference can lead to improved
accuracy. To our knowledge, prior work in isotonic regression has only shown that
inference cannot increase error [58]. Before presenting a theoretical statement of such
conditions, we first give an illustrative example of how inference can reduce error for
an instance of the S query.
Example 8. Figure 5.3(a) shows a sequence S(I) along with a sampled s˜ and inferred
s. While the values in s˜ deviate considerably from S(I), s lies very close to the true
answer. In particular, for subsequence [1, 20], the true sequence S(I) is uniform
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Figure 5.3. (a) Example of how inference reduces the error: s is more accurate than
s˜; (b) Error bars show expected error for s at each position, showing lower error in
the middle of the uniform subsequence.
and the constrained inference process effectively averages out the noise of s˜. At the
twenty-first position, which is a unique count in S(I), and constrained inference does
not refine the noisy answer, i.e., s[21] = s˜[21]. Figure 5.3(b) shows the expected error
per position; error is lowest in the middle of the uniform subsequence, and larger at
the ends.
Figure 5.3(a) suggests that error will be low for sequences in which many counts
are the same. To analyze the accuracy of the randomized query sequences proposed
in this work we quantify their error. O˜ can be considered an estimator for the true
value O(I). We use the common Mean Squared Error as a measure of accuracy.
Definition 5.5 (Error). For a randomized query sequence Q˜ whose input is Q(I),
the error(Q˜) is
∑
i E(Q˜[i]−Q[i])2 Here E is the expectation taken over the possible
randomness in generating Q˜.
For example, error(S˜) =
∑
i E(S˜[i]−S[i])2 which simplifies to: nE[Lap(∆S/)2] =
8n/2.
The following theorem quantifies the accuracy of O precisely. Let n and d denote
the number of values and the number of distinct values in O(I) respectively. Let
n1, n2, . . . , nd be the number of times each of the d distinct values occur in O(I) (thus∑
i ni = n). The proof appears in Section 5.7.3.
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Theorem 5.3. [Utility of inference] There exist constants c1 and c2 independent of
n and d such that
error(O) ≤
d∑
i=1
∆2O
2
(c1 log
3 ni + c2)
Thus error(O) = O(
∆2O
2
d log3 n) whereas error(O˜) = Θ(
∆2O
2
n).
The above theorem shows that constrained inference can boost accuracy, and the
improvement depends on properties of the input O(I). In particular, if the number of
distinct elements d is 1, then error(O) = O(
∆2O
2
log3 n), while error(O˜) = Θ(
∆2O
2
n).
On the other hand, if d = n, then error(O) = O(
∆2O
2
n) and thus both error(O) and
error(O˜) scale linearly in n. For many practical applications, d  n, which makes
error(O) significantly lower than error(O˜). In Sec. 5.5, experiments on real data
demonstrate that the error of O can be orders of magnitude lower than that of O˜.
Theorem 5.3 also demonstrates the existence of a -differentially private where the
magnitude of the error depends on the instance. While there are other algorithms
that add instance dependent noise, the privacy definition must be relaxed to allow
for the (very low probability) event that the output discloses too much about the
instance [102].
5.4 Inference algorithm
We now describe an efficient algorithm for computing o = minL2(o˜, γO). A
straightforward approach for computing o is to construct a dynamic program based
on the solution given in Theorem 5.1. However, it requires linear time to compute
each o[k], making the total runtime quadratic, infeasible for large sequences. We
present an algorithm that requires only linear time.
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We first described this algorithm Hay et al. [52]. Since that time, we learned that
Algorithm 3 is in fact a variant of the Pool Adjacent Violators Algorithm (cf. Barlow
et al. [13]).
The design of the algorithms stems from the following observation. If o˜ violates
the ordering constraints, then there exists at least one adjacent pair that is out of
order. We can replace each of these observations with their average without affecting
the minimum L2 solution.
Lemma 5.1 (Solution Invariant). Let o˜[k] and o˜[k + 1] be any adjacent pair such
that o˜[k] ≥ o˜[k + 1]. Let o˜′ be equivalent to o˜ except that o˜′[k] = o˜′[k + 1] =
(o˜[k] + o˜[k + 1])/2. Then minL2(o˜, γO) = minL2(o˜
′, γO).
Proof. First, we show that o[k] = o[k + 1] whenever o˜[k] ≥ o˜[k + 1]. We know that
o[k] ≤ o[k + 1] because of the ordering constraints. Suppose o[k] < o[k + 1]. We
are free to increase o[k] or reduce o[k + 1] without violating the order constraints.
There are two cases. If o˜[k + 1] < o[k + 1] then decreasing o[k + 1] reduces the
L2 distance, contradicting the fact that o has minimal L2 distance to o˜. Otherwise,
we have o˜[k] ≥ o˜[k + 1] ≥ o[k + 1] > o[k] and increasing o[k] reduces L2 distance,
contradicting minimality. Either way, we reach a contradiction and therefore o[k] =
o[k + 1] whenever o˜[k] ≥ o˜[k + 1].
The above implies o[k] = o[k + 1] and o′[k] = o′[k + 1]. We now show that
o[k] = o′[k]. Let y denote the value of the solution at positions k and k + 1. Let us
write the objective function of (5.1) as a function of y. On input o˜, the objective is
to minimize:
f(y) = (o˜[k]− y)2 + (o˜[k + 1]− y)2 +
∑
j 6∈{k,k+1}
(o˜[j]− o[j])
and on input o˜′ the objective is to minimize:
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g(y) = 2((o˜[k] + o˜[k + 1])/2− y)2 +
∑
j 6∈{k,k+1}
(o˜[j]− o[j])
Algebraic manipulation reveals that g(y) = f(y) + c where c is constant with respect
to y. Therefore, both f and g are minimized at the same value of y and we have
shown that the minimal L2 solution is the same for o˜ and o˜
′.
The algorithm exploits this observation as follows. Starting at the end of the
sequence, it descends the sequence until an out-of-order pair is found, say o˜[k] and
o˜[k + 1]. This pair of observations is replaced with two observations equal to their
average. This may result in a new out-of-order pair – the revised o˜′[k + 1] may
now be larger than o˜[k + 2] – so the algorithm extends the average to include later
observations until it is less than or equal to the next observation in the sequence.
This entire subsequence of observations is replaced by a uniform subsequence equal
to their average. The algorithm then descends the sequence to find the next out-of-
order pair. When all pairs are in order, the algorithm has found the minimum L2
solution.
Algorithm 3 is a pseudocode implementation. The altered sequence is stored on a
stack, denoted S, where each item in the stack is a uniform subsequence, represented
by its length and value. In lines 2-16, the sequence is descended to identify out-of-
order observations. Line 4 checks whether the current observation is out-of-order. If
so, then the current observation is averaged with the observations stored in the stack
until the average is less than or equal to the next observation in the stack (lines 7-11),
and this average is placed on the stack (line 12). If it is not out-of-order, then the
current observation is simply pushed onto the stack (line 14). Lines 18-24 transform
the stack representation into a sequence.
The time and space complexity of Algorithm 3 is O(n). First, iterating through
the observations (lines 2-16) requires linear time: in each step, the run time of the
while loop (lines 7-11) is proportional to the number of items popped from S during
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Algorithm 3 An algorithm for computing o = minL2(o˜, γO)
1: first← 〈length : 1, value : o˜[n]〉
2: for k from n− 1 to 1 do
3: next← S.top()
4: if o˜[k] > next.value then
5: sum← o˜[k]
6: len← 1
7: while S 6= ∅ and sum
len
> next.value do
8: sum← sum+ next.value× next.length
9: len← len+ next.length
10: next← S.pop()
11: end while
12: S.push(〈length : len, value : sum〉)
13: else
14: S.push(〈length : 1, value : o˜[k]〉)
15: end if
16: end for
17:
18: o← 〈〉
19: while S 6= ∅ do
20: next← S.pop()
21: for 1 to next.length do
22: o.append(next.value)
23: end for
24: end while
25: return o
this step. Since each iteration pushes at most one item onto the stack (line 12 or 14),
the total number of pops is at most n. Therefore the amortized cost of a single step
is O(1). Second, once the stack S is completed, reconstructing o (lines 18-24) takes
only linear time. In the worst-case the stack S can require O(n) space. However,
only the top of the stack is accessed during computations and the rest can be written
to disk as needed.
Theorem 5.4. [Correctness] Algorithm 3 computes minL2(o˜, γO).
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 5.1. The algorithm takes the input sequence
and constructs an alternate sequence (lines 4-11) such that, according to Lemma 5.1,
its minimum L2 solution is the same as the input sequence.
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At step k, let o˜k denote the alternate sequence o˜k = 〈o˜[1], . . . , o˜[k], o˜S[k+1], . . . , o˜S[n]〉
where o˜S[k+1, . . . , n] corresponds to the subsequence stored on the stack. The invari-
ant of the algorithm is that the minimum L2 solution for o˜k is equal to the minimum
L2 solution for o˜.
Once k = 1, o˜1 is stored entirely on the stack S and it must satisfy the ordering
constraints, as the while loop ensures that subsequences are only pushed onto the
stack if they obey the ordering constraints. Thus, the minimum L2 solution for o˜1 is
itself and lines 18-24 simply transforms o˜1 from its stack representation to a sequence
representation.
5.5 Experiments
The primary goal of the experiments is to assess the utility of our proposed tech-
niques for estimating unattributed histograms. We compare three strategies: the
baseline strategy of computing a conventional histogram and ignoring attribution,
plus our two techniques based on carefully formulated queries followed by inference
(S and F).
We compare the techniques through several means. Each technique produces
an unattributed histogram, which can be viewed as simply a collection of numbers,
and we can measure its distribution. For each technique, we measure how closely
its distribution resembles the true distribution (the distribution of an unattributed
histogram computed on the private data). We do this several ways: through visual
comparison, using metrics such as KS distance and Mallows distance, comparing to
sampling error, and by carrying out a common analyses on the distribution, such
as modeling. We fit the parameters of a power-law model to each distribution and
compare their fit.
Asking a conventional histogram and then ignoring attribution yields the same
answer as asking the S query. Therefore, in the experiments, S˜ represents both the
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input to the inference-based approach S and the strategy of asking a conventional
histogram. For most of the experiments, we focus on S and S˜ and but we compare S
with F in Section 5.5.2.
Our experiments show that S and F are very accurate techniques for computing
unattributed histograms under differential privacy. They are much more accurate
than the baseline strategy of using the Laplace mechanism to compute a conventional
histogram (S˜). The accuracy of S and F is not uniform across the entire distribution,
and in fact, the techniques behave differently, achieving highest accuracy in different
parts of the distribution.
In addition to studying utility, we also assess the scalability of the inference al-
gorithm. Our evaluation shows that inference is very fast and can scale to large
inputs.
Datasets We focus on one the most compelling application of unattributed his-
tograms: measuring the degree sequence of a network. We use data derived from
real social networks and apply our technique to estimating the network’s degree se-
quence. The datasets are derived from crawls of four online social networking sites:
Flickr (≈1.8M nodes), LiveJournal (≈5.3M), Orkut (≈3.1M), and YouTube
(≈1.1M) [95]. To the best of our knowledge, these are the largest publicly available
social network datasets. We also evaluate the technique synthetic network including
Random, a classical random graph, which has a Poisson degree distribution (λ = 10),
and Power, a random graph with a power-law degree distribution (α = 1.5).
5.5.1 Utility
We use two measures to measure the accuracy of the estimated distribution. First,
we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff (KS) statistic, a measure used to test whether two
samples are drawn from the same distribution. Let the empirical cumulative distribu-
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tion function (CDF) of sample X = X1, . . . , Xn be defined as FX(x) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 I[Xi ≤
x]. Then the KS statistic between X and Y is KS(X, Y ) = maxx |FX(x)− FY (x)|.
The KS statistic is insensitive to differences in the tails of the two distributions, so
we also use the Mallows distance (aka Earth Mover’s distance) to capture deviations
in the tail. Given samples X and Y each of size n, with X(i) denoting the i
th largest
sample in X, the Mallows p-distance is
Mallowsp(X, Y ) =
( 1
n
n∑
i=1
∣∣X(i) − Y(i)∣∣p )1/p
An example shows how Mallows distance is more sensitive than the KS statistic to the
tail of the distribution. Consider three graphs A, B, and C in which all nodes have
degree 1, except in B one node has degree 2 and in C one node has degree n−1. The
KS statistic between A and either B or C is O(n−1). The Mallows distance (p = 1)
between A and B is O(n−1), but between A and C, the Mallows distance is O(1),
capturing the difference between their largest degrees.
A visual comparison of distributions Figure 5.4 shows the true degree distribu-
tion along with the differentially private approximations, revealing that S produces a
very accurate approximation while S˜ does not. The distributions are represented using
the complementary CDF (CCDF), denoted CF and defined as CFX(x) = 1−FX(x).
Thus, each line shows what fraction of nodes have a degree greater than the given
value on the x-axis. Abusing notation, we use S(I), s˜, and s, which are all degree
sequences, to refer to their corresponding degree distributions. Thus, the line la-
beled S(I) refers to the true degree distribution and the lines labeled s˜ and s refer
to the degree distributions derived from differentially private sequences s˜ and s (here
 = 0.01).
Figure 5.4 shows that noise added to produce s˜ substantially distorts the degree
distribution. In contrast, s is a much more accurate approximation of S(I). While
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Figure 5.4. Complementary CDFs of S(I), s˜ and s (top). Bias of S (bottom).
s exhibits some deviations from the true distribution, the deviations appear to os-
cillate around the true distribution. This demonstrates that, by exploiting the sort
constraints, constrained inference can filter out much of the noise in s˜.
Bias & variance analysis In addition to showing individual samples s˜ and s, we
also analyze the bias and variance of randomized algorithms S˜ and S. More precisely,
we measure bias of S as the expected difference between the CCDFs of S and S(I)
for each degree—i.e., biasS(x) = E[CFS(x)−CFS(I)(x)] where the expectation is over
the randomness in S. The variance of S is varS(x) = E[(CFS(x)−E[CFS(x)])2]. We
focus on S because it is evident from Figure 5.4 that S˜ exhibits substantial bias.
We evaluate the bias/variance of S empirically thru repeated sampling. The
results are shown in the bottom panel of Figure 5.4. The y-axis is the difference
in cumulative probability between S and S, CFS(x)−CFS(I)(x). The line shows the
average difference (bias) and the error bars depict the standard deviation from the
average (square root of variance). The line remains near 0, suggesting that S may be
an unbiased or nearly unbiased estimator of S(I). The variance peaks wherever the
CCDF exhibits steepest change.
Accuracy vs.  Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the relationship between  and accuracy
for two measures of accuracy—KS in 5.5, Mallows in 5.6. We report the average
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Figure 5.5. Accuracy (KS distance) across varying .
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Figure 5.6. Accuracy (Mallows distance with p = 2) across varying .
accuracy over 10 trials (random samplings of s˜). In both figures, the parameter 
varies along horizontal axis—smaller  corresponds to greater privacy protection.
The results show that S is uniformly more accurate than S˜, across all datasets,
settings of , and both measures of accuracy. Furthermore, for low settings of 
(stronger privacy), the difference in accuracy is greater, suggesting that the benefit
of constrained inference increases with privacy.
Also shown in the figure is the accuracy of an estimate based on random sampling
(10% of the degrees are sampled uniformly at random). While sampling does not
provide differential privacy, it can serve as a useful reference point. Sampling has
very low KS distance (as expected), but higher Mallows distance because random
sampling is unlikely to select the high degree nodes in the tail. In fact, sampling has
higher Mallows distance than S (except on Random, which is a distribution without
long tails). Since analysts often cannot obtain complete graphs and must rely on
samples, this result suggests that the additional error due to privacy can be small
compared to the sampling error.
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Figure 5.7. Size vs. Accuracy for fixed  = 0.01.
Accuracy vs. size Figure 5.7 shows how accuracy of S improves as the graph
increases in size. The figure reports accuracy on Power graphs of varying size, from
10K to 5M nodes. The results show a clear separation between S˜ and S: as the size
of the graph increases, the accuracy of S˜ remains constant whereas the accuracy of
S improves. Thus, with S, larger datasets yield either more privacy (given a fixed
accuracy target, we can lower ) or better utility (higher accuracy for fixed ).
The accuracy of S˜ does not improve with graph size because random noise is
added to each degree, thus the average error per degree does not change with the
size of the graph. However, as Example 8 showed, S can be very accurate when the
degree sequence contains long subsequences of uniform degrees. As the graph size
increases, accuracy improves because the subsequences of uniform degree grow longer
(in a power-law graph, the expected proportion of nodes with a given degree is a
constant independent of n).
Modeling power-law distributions Our final experiment assesses how accurately
the analyst can estimate the parameters of a power-law model using S˜ or S. The
experiment is designed as follows. First, we sample a Power graph with parameters
θ = (α = 1.5, xmin = 10). We fix this as the true degree distribution. Then we
sample s˜ and s and derive corresponding distributions. To each of these three degree
distributions, we fit a power-law model using maximum likelihood [27]. The result is
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Figure 5.8. Accuracy of estimating power-law model using S˜, S.
three different estimates for the parameters θ, which we denote θˆ, θ˜, and θ respectively.
We are interested in comparing the model fit to the true degree distribution, θˆ, to
the models fit under differential privacy, θ˜ and θ.
The individual parameter estimates are shown in the middle and right plot of
Figure 5.8, but the leftmost plot provides a holistic assessment of the model fit. It
assesses model fit using the D statistic of Clauset et al. [27] which measures the KS
statistic on the power-law tail of the distribution. We consider two variants of this
measure: in one, the tail is defined by the estimate of xmin under s˜ or s; in the other,
xmin is based on the true xmin.
The plots reveal that using either S˜ or S, the analyst will estimate a model that
has a close fit to the tail of the original (power-law) distribution, when the tail is
defined by the xmin estimated on the noisy distribution. However, it also shows that
the size of the tail is under-estimated (the power-law behavior becomes apparent only
for large degrees). If we compare the models based on how well they fit the true tail of
the power-law distribution (solid lines of leftmost plot), we see that S˜ has considerable
distortion (note the log-scale) while S is reasonably accurate even at small .
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Figure 5.9. On Flickr, a comparison of S and F.
5.5.2 Utility comparison: S vs. F
We now compare the query strategy S with the alternative strategy F. The results
are shown in Figure 5.9. We show results on Flickr, but the results are representative
of the trends across all datasets. Figure 5.9(a) shows the complementary CDFs of a
typical sample at  = 0.01. Both techniques approximate the true distribution quite
well; but F appears to be much more accurate, at least for the degrees shown (≤ 50).
This higher accuracy also reflected in the comparison of KS Distance: Figure 5.9(b)
shows that F has much lower KS distance than S. However, Figure 5.9(c) shows that
F is less accurate when it comes to Mallows distance. The higher Mallows distance
is due to the fact that F is not as accurate in the high degree nodes at the tail of the
degree distribution.
5.5.3 Scalability of inference
Figure 5.10 shows that the runtime of Algorithm 3 scales linearly and is extremely
fast. The left figure shows the runtime on the real datasets and the right figure
shows the runtime on even larger synthetic datasets of up to 200M nodes. In ad-
dition to Random and Power, we include two non-random synthetic distributions,
corresponding to the best- and worst-case inputs for the runtime of the algorithm.
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Figure 5.10. Runtime of Algorithm 3 on real (left) and larger synthetic datasets
(right).
The best-case is Regular, a uniform degree distribution (all nodes have degree 10),
the worst-case is Natural, a distribution having one occurrence of each degree in
{0, . . . , n− 1}.
The small variation in runtime across datasets shows that it is not particularly
sensitive to the type of degree distribution. Furthermore, it is extremely fast: pro-
cessing a 200 million node graph takes less than 6 seconds. The efficiency of the
algorithm makes the constrained inference approach practical for large graphs.
5.6 Conclusion
We introduced the concept of an unattributed histogram and showed how to
compute it accurately under differential privacy. An unattributed histogram is in some
sense less informative than a conventional histogram, but nevertheless has several
practical applications. For example, the degree sequence of a graph is an instance
of an unattributed histogram. Its significance lies in the context of the analysis of
private data: under differential privacy, it is possible, using our technique, to estimate
an unattributed much more accurately than a conventional histogram.
Our technique for estimating an unattributed histogram satisfies differential pri-
vacy, scales to large inputs, and produces extremely accurate approximations. The
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guarantee of differential privacy means that, unlike approaches based on anonymiza-
tion, it provides extremely robust protection, even against powerful adversaries. Our
algorithm runs in linear time and is demonstrably fast. The output is accurate and
has provably bounded error that scales with the number of distinct frequencies of a
histogram, rather than the number of bins.
Our technique achieves high accuracy by post-processing the noisy output of the
Laplace mechanism, a differentially private mechanism for answering an arbitrary
query sequence. The fact that we are able to reduce error comes from slack in the
system: the Laplace mechanism adds more noise than necessary to achieve differential
privacy. While it adds independent and identically distributed noise to each answer
in the sequence, intuitively, it seems that less noise is needed in the middle of uniform
subsequences, because changes in the database can only induce changes at the ends
of uniform subsequences. Our inference mechanism effectively reduces noise in the
regions of uniformity, while the noise at the regions’ ends remains sufficiently large
to protect privacy.
A natural goal is to describe directly the improved noise distributions implied
by our inference technique, and build a privacy mechanism that samples from it.
This could, in theory, avoid the inference step altogether. But it is seems quite
difficult to discover, describe, and sample these improved noise distributions, which
will be highly dependent on a particular query of interest. Our approach suggests that
constraints and statistical inference can be an effective path to discovering new, more
accurate noise distributions that satisfy differential privacy. As a practical matter, our
approach does not necessarily burden the analyst with the inference process because
the server can implement the post-processing step. In that case it would appear to
the analyst as if the server was sampling from the improved distribution.
We proposed two query strategies for unattributed histograms, S and F, and
showed experimentally how each is impacted by the added noise: with S, the largest
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distortion occurs at low degrees, with F, the largest distortion occurs in the tail of
high degrees. A successful strategy may be to ask both S and F, and combine the
answers using inference. Asking two queries requires increasing the magnitude of the
noise, but the accuracy boost from inference may offset the extra noise.
Finally, given the importance of the degree sequence to the structure of a graph,
we believe that our techniques are a critical first step towards the ultimate goal of
publishing synthetic graphs that are both accurate and ensure differential privacy.
5.7 Proofs
5.7.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1
We first restate the theorem below.
Theorem 5.1. [Minimum L2 Solution for ordering constraints] For a given o˜, let
o˜[i, j] denote the subsequence 〈o˜[i], o˜[i + 1], . . . , o˜[j]〉 and M [i, j] the average of this
subsequence: M [i, j] =
∑j
k=i o˜[k]/(j − i + 1). For each position k, let Lk and Uk be
defined as
Lk = min
k≤j≤n
max
1≤i≤n
M [i, j]
and
Uk = max
1≤i≤k
min
i≤j≤n
M [i, j]
The minimum L2 solution, o = minL2(o˜, γO), is unique and is equal to o[k] = Lk =
Uk.
Proof. In the proof, we abbreviate the notation and implicitly assume that the range
of i is [1, n] or [1, j] when j is specified. Similarly, the range of j is [1, n] or [i, n] when
i is specified.
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We start with the easy part, showing that Uk ≤ Lk. Define an n × n matrix Ak
as follows:
Akij =

M [i, j] if i ≤ j
∞ if j < i ≤ k
−∞ otherwise
Then minj maxiA
k
ij = Lk and maxi minj A
k
ij = Uk. In any matrix A
k, maxi minj A
k
ij ≤
minj maxiA
k
ij: this is a simple fact that can be checked directly, or see [103], hence
Uk ≤ Lk.
We show next that if o is the minimum L2 solution, then Lk ≤ o[k] ≤ Uk. If
we show this, then the proof of the theorem is completed, as then we will then have
o[k] = Lk = Uk. The proof relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2. Let o be the minimum L2 solution. Then (i) o[1] ≤ U1, (ii) o[n] ≥ Ln,
(iii) for all k, min(o[k + 1],maxiM [i, k]) ≤ o[k] ≤ max(o[k − 1],minjM [k, j]).
The proof of the lemma appears below, but now we use it to complete the proof
of Theorem 5.1. First, we show that o[k] ≤ Uk using induction on k. The base case
is k = 1 and it is stated in the lemma, part (i). For the inductive step, assume
o[k − 1] ≤ Uk−1. From (iii), we have that
o[k] ≤ max(o[k − 1],min
j
M [k, j])
≤ max(Uk−1,min
j
M [k, j]) = Uk
The last step follows from the definition of Uk. A similar induction argument shows
that o[k] ≥ Lk, except the order is reversed: the base case is k = n and the inductive
step assumes o[k + 1] ≥ Lk+1.
The only remaining step is to prove the lemma.
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of Lemma 5.2. For (i), it is sufficient to prove that o[1] ≤ M [1, j] for all j ∈ [1, n].
Assume the contrary. Thus there exists a j such that for o[1] > M [1, j]. Let δ =
o[1] −M [1, j]. Thus δ > 0. Further, for all i, denote δi = o[i] − o[1]. Consider the
sequence o′ defined as follows:
o′[i] =
 o[i]− δ if i ≤ jo[i] otherwise
It is obvious to see that since o is a sorted sequence, so is o′.
We now claim that ||o′ − o˜||2 < ||o − o˜||2. For this note that since the sequence
o′[j + 1, n] is identical to the sequence o[j + 1, n], it is sufficient to prove ||o′[1, j] −
o˜[1, j]||2 < ||o[1, j] − o˜[1, j]||2. To prove that, note that ||o[1, j] − o˜[1, j]||2 can be
expanded as
||o[1, j]− o˜[1, j]||2 =
j∑
i=1
(o[i]− o˜[i])2 =
j∑
i=1
(o[1] + δi − o˜[i])2
=
j∑
i=1
(M [1, j] + δ + δi − o˜[i])2
Suppose for a moment that we fix M [1, j] and δi’s, and treat ||o[1, j]− o˜[1, j]||2 as a
function f over δ. The derivative of f(δ) is:
f ′(δ) = 2
j∑
i=1
(M [1, j] + δ + δi − o˜[i])
= 2
(
jM [1, j]−
j∑
i=1
o˜[i]
)
+ 2jδ + 2
j∑
i=1
δi
= 2jδ + 2
j∑
i=1
δi
Since δi ≥ 0 for all i, then the derivative is strictly greater than zero for any δ > 0,
which implies that f is a strictly increasing function of δ and has a minimum at
143
δ = 0. Therefore, ||o[1, j] − o˜[1, j]||2 = f(δ) > f(0) = ||o′[1, j] − o˜[1, j]||2. This is a
contradiction since it was assumed that o was the minimum solution. This completes
the proof for (i).
For (ii), the proof of o[n] ≥ maxiM [i, n] follows from a similar argument: if
o[n] < M [i, n] for some i, define δ = M [i, n]− o[n] and the sequence o′ with elements
o′[j] = o[j] + δ for j ≥ i. Then o′ can be shown to be a strictly better solution than
o, proving (ii).
For the proof of (iii), we first show that o[k] ≤ max(o[k−1],minjM [k, j]). Assume
the contrary, i.e. there exists a k such that o[k] > o[k − 1] and o[k] > minjM [k, j].
In other words, we assume there exists a k and j such that o[k] > o[k − 1] and
o[k] > M [k, j]. Denote δ = o[k] −max(o[k − 1],M [k, j]). By our assumption above,
δ > 0. Define the sequence
o′[i] =
 o[i]− δ if k ≤ i ≤ jo[i] otherwise
Note that by construction, o′[k] = o[k]−δ = o[k]−(o[k]−max(o[k−1],M [k, j])) =
max(o[k − 1],M [k, j]). It is easy to see that o′ is sorted (indeed the only inversion
in the sort order could have occurred if o′[k − 1] > o′[k], but doesn’t as o′[k − 1] =
o[k − 1] ≤ max(o[k − 1],M [k, j]) = o′[k]).
Now a similar argument as in the proof of (i) for the sequence o˜[k, j], yields that
the error ||o′[k, j]− o˜[k, j]||2 < ||o[k, j]− o˜[k, j]||2. Thus ||o′ − o˜||2 < ||o′ − o˜||2 and o′
is a strictly better solution than o. This yields a contradiction as o is the minimum
L2 solution. Hence o[k] ≤ max(o[k − 1],minjM [k, j]).
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A similar argument in the the reverse direction shows that o[k] ≥
min(ok+1,maxiM [i, k]) completing the proof of (iii).
5.7.2 Proof of Theorem 5.2
We prove the following result.
Theorem 5.2. [Minimum L2 Solution for order, integrality, and bound constraints]
Given o = minL2(o˜, γO), let o
′ denote the sequence derived from o in which each
element o[k] is rounded to the nearest integer in [L,U ]. Then o′ = minL2(o˜, γ′O).
Lemma 5.3. If ok = ok+1 = . . . = oj∗ = M [k, j
∗], for any k ≤ i ≤ j∗, M [i, j∗] ≤
M [k, j∗].
Proof. According to Theorem 5.1, M [k, j∗] = minj≥kM [k, j]. If there exists an k ≤
i∗ ≤ j∗ such that M [i∗, j∗] > M [k, j∗], we have M [k, i∗] < M [k, j∗], which comes to a
contradiction.
Theorem 5.5 (Minimum L2 with boundary constraints). Let {γS, [L,U ]} be the
constraint set γS augmented with the additional constraint that each count be in range
[L,U ]. Given o = minL2((, o˜), γS), let o
L,U denote the sequence derived from o in
which
oL,Uk =

L ok ≤ L
ok L < ok < U
U ok ≥ U
Then oL,U = minL2((, o˜), {γS, [L,U ]}).
Proof. Without loss of generality, here we just consider the case L = −∞ and prove
it by contradiction. Assume that o′ = minL2((, o˜), {γS, [L,U ]}). Let k0 = mink{ok ≥
U}. Since ok0 ≥ U > ok0−1, according to Theorem 5.1, ok0 = minj≥k0 M [k0, j]. If
o′k0 < U , let k1 = maxk{o′k = o′k0}. Consider function f(x) =
∑k1
k=k0
(o˜k − x)2,
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f ′(x) = 2(k1 − k0 + 1)(x −M [k0, k1]). Since o′k0 < o′k1+1 ≤ U ≤ ok0 ≤ M [k0, k1], we
know
k1∑
k=k0
(o˜k − o′k0)2 = f(o′k0) > f(o′k1+1) =
k1∑
k=k0
(o˜k − o′k1+1)2,
which contradicts with the fact that o′ = minL2((, o˜), {γS, [L,U ]}). Therefore o′k0 =
U .
Since o′k0 = U and ok0−1 < U , from the definition of o and o
′, we know both
o1, o2, . . . , ok0−1 and o
′
1, o
′
2, . . . , o
′
k0−1 are the minimun L2 solution of o˜1, o˜2, . . . , o˜k0−1
that satisfies the constraint set {γS, [−∞, U ]}. Since o is unique, o1, o2, . . . , ok0−1 and
o′1, o
′
2, . . . , o
′
k0−1 are identical. Above all,
o−∞,U = minL2((, o˜), {γS, [−∞, U ]}).
According to Theorem 5.5, one can easily get the following corollaries:
Corollary 2. Let L ≤ U1 ≤ U2. If oL,U1n < U1, oL,U1 = oL,U2.
Corollary 3. Let L1 ≤ L2 ≤ U . If oL2,U1 > L2, oL1,U = oL2,U .
Now we can further generate Theorem 5.5 to integer case.
Theorem 5.6 (Minimum L2 with integer and boundary constraints). Given integer
L,U . Let {γS, [L,U ], int} be the constraint set {γS, [L,U ]} augmented with the addi-
tional constraint that each count be an integer. Given oL,U = minL2((, o˜), {γS, [L,U ]}),
let sˆL,U denote the sequence derived from oL,U in which each element oL,Uk is rounded
to its nearest integer. Then sˆL,U is a minimum L2 solution that satisfies the constraint
set {γS, [L,U ], int}.
Proof. Proof by induction over n. The conclusion is trivial for n = 1. Suppose the
theorem hold for all n ≤ k, and consider that n = k + 1.
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Case 1: oL,U isn’t a constant sequence, which means there exists 1 ≤ j∗ ≤
k such that L ≤ oL,Uj∗ < oL,Uj∗+1 ≤ U . Let’s consider oL,U as two subsequences
oL,U1 , o
L,U
2 , . . . , o
L,U
j∗ and o
L,U
j∗+1, o
L,U
j∗+2, . . . , o
L,U
n .
Now let’s consider the first subsequence. Since the subsequence oL,U1 , o
L,U
2 , . . . , o
L,U
i
is the minimum L2 solution of o˜1, o˜2, . . . , o˜i that satisfies the constraint set {γS, [L, o˜i+1]},
according to Corollary 2, it is also the minimum L2 solution of o˜1, o˜2, . . . , o˜i that sat-
isfies the constraint set {γS, [L,U ]}. Therefore, according to the induction hypothe-
sis, by rounding each element of oL,U1 , o
L,U
2 , . . . , o
L,U
i to its nearest integer, which are
sˆL,U1 , sˆ
L,U
2 , . . . , sˆ
L,U
i , we get a minimum L2 solution of o˜1, o˜2, . . . , o˜i that satisfies the
constraint set {γS, [L,U ], int}.
Similarly, sˆL,Ui+1 , sˆ
L,U
i+2 , . . . , sˆ
L,U
k+1 is a minimum L2 solution of o˜i+1, o˜i+2, . . . , o˜k+1 that
satisfies the constraint set {γS, [L,U ], int}. Thus sˆL,U is a minimum L2 solution that
satisfies the constraint set {γS, [L,U ], int}.
Case 2: Otherwise, oL,U is a constant sequence. If they all equal to an integer (i.e.
L, U or in case that M [1, n] is an integer), then the conclusion is obvious. Otherwise,
let’s consider a minimum L2 solution sˆ1, sˆ2, . . . , sˆn that satisfies the constraint set
{γS, [L,U ], int}. If sˆ1 < M [1, n], let i1 = maxi{sˆi = sˆ1}. Since M [1, i1] ≥ M [1, n],
to minimize
∑i1
i=1(o˜i − sˆi)2, we know sˆ1 > bM [1, n]c. Here bxc is the maximum
integer that smaller than or equal to x. Otherwise we can assign sˆ1 = . . . = sˆi1 =
min{bM [1, n]c, sˆi1+1} to get a even smaller L2 solution. Similarly, we can prove that
if sˆn > M [1, n], sˆn ≤ dM [1, n]e. Here dxe is the minimum integer that larger than
or equal to x. Above all, we know bM [1, n]c ≤ sˆ1, sˆ2, . . . , sˆn ≤ dM [1, n]e. Let
m = M [1, n]− bM [1, n]c, remind i1 = maxi{sˆi = sˆ1}. Therefore:
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n∑
i=1
(o˜i − sˆi)2 (5.3)
=
i1∑
i=1
(o˜i −M [1, n] +m)2 +
n∑
i=i1+1
(o˜i −M [1, n]− (1−m))2
=
n∑
i=1
(o˜i −M [1, n])2 (5.4)
+ 2mi1(M [1, i1]−M [1, n]) + 2(1−m)(n− i1)(M [1, n]−M [i1 + 1, n])
+ i1m
2 + (n− i1)(1−m)2 (5.5)
According to Lemma 5.3 and Theorem 5.1, M [i, n] ≤ M [1, n] ≤ M [1, i]. Thus (5.5)
becomes
(5.5) ≥
n∑
i=1
(o˜i −M [1, n])2 + i1m2 + (n− i1)(1−m)2
≥
n∑
i=1
(o˜i −M [1, n])2 + nmin{m2, (1−m)2} (5.6)
Notice that for any t,
n∑
i=1
(o˜i −M [1, n] + t)2 =
n∑
i=1
(o˜i −M [1, n])2 + nt2 + t
n∑
i=1
(o˜i −M [1, n])
=
n∑
i=1
(o˜i −M [1, n])2 + nt2 + t(
n∑
i=1
o˜i − nM [1, n])
=
n∑
i=1
(o˜i −M [1, n])2 + nt2
we know
(5.6) = min{
n∑
i=1
(o˜i −M [1, n])2 + nm2,
n∑
i=1
(o˜i −M [1, n])2 + n(m− 1)2}
= min{
n∑
i=1
(o˜i −M [1, n] +m)2,
n∑
i=1
(o˜i −M [1, n] + (m− 1))2}
= min{
n∑
i=1
(o˜i − (M [1, n]−m))2,
n∑
i=1
(o˜i − (M [1, n]−m+ 1))2}
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Thus, assigning sˆi to the nearest integer of M [1, n] gives a minimum L2 solution.
Above all, we finish the induction and the theorem is proved.
In particular, with the boundary condition [0, n − 1], Theorem 5.6 becomes the
Theorem 5.2.
5.7.3 Proof of Theorem 5.3
We first restate the theorem below. Denote n and d as the number of values and
the number of distinct values in O(I) respectively. Let n1, n2, . . . , nd be the number
of times each of the d distinct values occur in O(I) (thus
∑
i ni = n).
Theorem 5.3. [Utility of inference] There exist constants c1 and c2 independent of
n and d such that
error(O) ≤
d∑
i=1
∆2O
2
(c1 log
3 ni + c2)
Thus error(O) = O(
∆2O
2
d log3 n) whereas error(O˜) = Θ(
∆2O
2
n).
Before showing the proof, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4. Let o = O(I) be the input sequence. Call a translation of o the operation
of subtracting from each element of o a fixed amount δ. Then error(O[i]) is invariant
under translation for all i.
Proof. Denote Pr(o|o) (Pr(o˜|o)) the probability that o (o˜) is output on the input
sequence o. Denote o′, o′, and o˜′ the sequence obtained by translating o, o, and o˜ by
δ, respectively.
First observe that Pr(o˜|o) = Pr(o˜′|o′) as o˜ and o˜′ are obtained by adding the
same Laplacian noise to o and o′, respectively. Using Theorem 5.1 (since all Uk’s and
Lk’s shift by δ on translating o˜ by delta), we get that if o is the minimum L2 solution
given o˜, then o′ is the minimum L2 solution given o˜′. Thus, Pr(o|o) = Pr(o′|o′) for
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all sequences o. Further, since o[i] and o′[i] yield the same L2 error with o[i] and
o′[i] respectively, we get that the expected error(O[i]) is same for both inputs o and
o′.
Lemma 5.5. Let X be any positive random variable that is bounded (limx→∞ xPr(X >
x) exists). Then
E(X) ≤
∫ ∞
0
Pr(X > x)dx
Proof. The proof follows from the following chain of equalities.
E(X) =
∫ ∞
0
x
∂
∂x
(Pr(X ≤ x))
= −
∫ ∞
0
x
∂
∂x
(Pr(X > x))
= −[xPr(X > x)]∞0 +
∫ ∞
0
(Pr(X ≤ x)− 1)dx (by parts)
= − lim
x→∞
xPr(X > x) +
∫ ∞
0
Pr(X > x)dx
≤
∫ ∞
0
Pr(X > x)dx
Here the last equality follows as X is bounded and therefore the limit exists and
is positive. This completes the proof.
We next state a theorem that was shown in [25].
Theorem 5.7 (Theorem 3.4 [25]). Suppose that X1, X2, . . . , Xn are independent
random variables satisfying Xi ≤ E(Xi) + M , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We consider the sum
X =
∑n
i=1Xi with expectation E(X) =
∑n
i=1E(Xi) and V ar(X) =
∑n
i=1 V ar(Xi).
Then, we have
Pr(X ≥ E(X) + λ) ≤ e −λ
2
2(V ar(X)+Mλ/3)
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For a random variable X, denote I[X] the indicator function that X ≥ 0 (thus
I[X] = 1 if X ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise). Using Theorem 5.7, we prove the following
lemma.
Lemma 5.6. Suppose i, j are indices such that for all k ∈ [i, j], o[k] ≤ 0. Then there
exists a constant c such that for all τ ≥ 1 the following holds.
Pr
(
M˜ [i, j]2I[M˜ [i, j]] ≥ c( log
2 ((j − i+ 1)τ)
(j − i+ 1)2 )
)
≤ 1
(j − i+ 1)2τ 2
Proof. We apply Theorem 5.7 on o˜[k] for k ∈ [i, j]. First note that E(o˜[k]) = o[k] ≤ 0.
Further V ar(o˜[k]) = 2
2
as o˜[k] is obtained by adding Laplace noise to o[k] which has
this variance. We also know that o˜[k] ≥ M + o[k] happens with probability at most
e−M/2.
For simplicity, call n to be j − i + 1. Denoting X = ∑k∈[i,j] o˜[k], we see that
E(X) ≤ 0 and V ar(X) = 2n
2
. Further, set M = 3 log (nτ)/. Denote B the event
that for some k, o˜[k] ≥ M + o[k]. Thus Pr(B) ≤ ne−M/2 ≤ 1
2n2τ3
. If B does not
happen, we know that o˜[k] ≤ M + o[k] for all k ∈ [i, j]. Thus we can then apply
Theorem 5.7 to get:
Pr (X ≥ E(X) + λ) ≤ e −λ
2
2(2n/2+λ log (nτ)/) + Pr(B)
= e
−λ2
2(2n/2+λ log (nτ)/) +
1
2n2τ 3
Setting λ = 8

√
n log (nτ) gives us that
Pr
(
X ≥ E(X) + 8

√
n log (nτ)
)
≤ 1
n2τ 2
Since E(X) ≤ 0, we get
Pr
(
X ≥ 8

√
n log (nτ)
)
≤ 1
n2τ 2
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Also we observe that M˜ [i, j] = X/n, which yields
Pr
(
M˜ [i, j] ≥ 8 log (nτ)√
n
)
≤ 1
n2τ 2
Finally, observe that M˜ [i, j] ≤ c implies that M˜ [i, j]2I[M˜ [i, j]] ≤ c2. Thus we get
Pr
(
M˜ [i, j]2I[mm[i, j]] ≥ 64 log
2 (nτ)
n2
)
≤ 1
n2τ 2
Putting n = j − i+ 1 and using c = 64 gives us the required result.
Now we can give the proof of Theorem 5.3. In the proof we assume without loss
of generality that ∆O = 1.
of Theorem 5.3. The proof of error(O˜) = Θ(n/2) is obvious since:
error(O˜) =
n∑
k=1
error(o˜[i]) = n(
2
2
)
In the rest of the proof, we shall show bound error(O). Let o = O(I) be the
input sequence. We know that o consists of d distinct elements. Denote or as the r
th
distinct element of o. Also denote [lr, ur] as the set of indices corresponding to or,
i.e. ∀i∈[lr,ur]o[i] = or and ∀i/∈[lr,ur]o[i] 6= or. Let M [i, j] record the mean of elements in
o[i, j], i.e. M [i, j] =
∑j
k=i o[k]/(i− j + 1).
To bound error(O), we shall bound error(O[i]) separately for each i. To bound
error(O[i]), we can assume W.L.O.G that s[i] is 0. This is because if o[i] 6= 0,
then we can translate the sequence o by o[i]. As shown in Lemma 5.4 this preserves
error(O[i]), while making o[i] = 0.
Let k ∈ [lr, ur] be any index for the rth distinct element of o. By definition,
error(O[k]) = E(o[k] − o[k])2 = E(o[k]2) (as we can assume W.L.O.G o[k] = 0).
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From Theorem 5.1, we know that o[k] = Uk. Thus error(O[k]) = E(U2k ). Here we
treat Uk = maxi≤kminjM˜ [i, j] as a random variable. Now by definition of E, we have
E(U2k ) = E(U2k I[Uk]) + E(U2k (1− I[Uk])) = A+B (say)
We shall bound A and B separately. For bounding A, denote Uk = maxi≤kM˜ [i, ur].
It is apparent that Uk ≥ Uk and thus U2k I[Uk] ≥ U2k I[Uk]. To bound A, we observe
that
A = E(U2k I[Uk]) ≤ E(U2k I[Uk])
Further, since Uk = maxi≤kM˜ [i, ur], we know that U2k I[Uk] = maxi≤kM˜ [i, ur]2I[M˜ [i, ur]].
Thus we can write:
A ≤ E(U2k I[Uk]) = E
(
maxi≤kM˜ [i, ur]2I[M˜ [i, ur]]
)
Let τ > 1 be any number and c be the constant used in Lemma 5.6. Let us denote
ei the event that:
M˜ [i, ur]
2I[M˜ [i, ur]] ≥ c( log
2 ((ur − i+ 1)τ)
(ur − i+ 1)2 )
We can apply lemma 5.6 to compute the probability of ei as o[j] ≤ 0 for all
j ≤ ur (as we assumed W.L.O.G s[k] = 0). Thus we get Pr(ei) ≤ 1(ur−i+1)2τ2 .
Define e = ∨uri=1ei. Then Pr(e) ≤
∑ur
i=1 Pr(ei) = 2/τ
2 (as
∑ur
i=1 1/i
2 ≤ 2). If the
event e does not happen, then it is easy to see that
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U2k I[Uk] = maxi≤kM˜ [i, ur]2I[M˜ [i, ur]]
≤ c( log
2 ((ur − k + 1)τ)
(ur − k + 1)2 )
Thus with at least probability 1 − 2/τ 2 (which is Pr(¬e)), we get U2k I[Uk] is
bounded as above. This yields that there exist constants c1 and c2 such that E(U2k I[Uk]) ≤
c1 log
2 (ur−k+1)+c2
(ur−k+1)2 . The proof is by the application of Lemma 5.5 (as Uk is bounded)
and a simple integration over τ ranging from 1 to ∞. Finally we get that A ≤
E(U2k I[Uk]) ≤ c1 log
2 (ur−k+1)+c2
(ur−k+1)2 .
Recall that B = E(U2k (1−I[Uk])). We can write B as E(L2k(1−I[Lk])) as Lk = Uk.
Using the exact same arguments as above for Lk but on sequence −O yields that
B ≤ c1 log2 (k−lr+1)+c2
(k−lr+1)2 .
Finally, we get that O[k] = A+B which is less than c1 log
2 (ur−k+1)+c2
(ur−k+1)2 +
c1 log
2 (k−lr+1)+c2
(k−lr+1)2 .
To obtain a bound on the total error(O).
error(O) =
d∑
r=1
∑
k∈[lr,ur]
error(O[k])
≤
d∑
r=1
∑
k∈[lr,ur]
c1 log
2 (ur − k + 1) + c2
(ur − k + 1)2 +
d∑
r=1
∑
k∈[lr,ur]
c1 log
2 (k − lr + 1) + c2
(k − lr + 1)2
≤
d∑
r=1
c1 log
3 (ur − lr + 1) + c2
2
Finally noting that ur − lr + 1 is just nr, the number of occurrences of or in o,
we get error(O) =
∑
r
c1 log
3 nr+c2
2
= O(d log3 n/2). This completes the proof of the
theorem.
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CHAPTER 6
ESTIMATING OTHER STATISTICS UNDER STRONG
PRIVACY
While being able to compute the degree distribution under differential privacy is an
important result, it is only one of many network properties that an analyst may wish
to measure. Network analysis is an often mentioned goal in the differential privacy
literature, but relatively few concrete results exist that demonstrate the feasibility of
differential privacy for network data. Below we highlight a few results and discuss
some of the challenges.
As described previously (Chapter 2), the Laplace mechanism can be used to ap-
proximately answer any query or query sequence. The accuracy of the answer depends
the query’s sensitivity, with lower sensitivity yielding greater accuracy. Some analy-
ses of networks can be computed with queries that are low sensitivity. For example,
one measure of network resiliency can be approximated with a low sensitivity query.
The query asks how many edges must be removed until the network becomes, say,
disconnected, and it has a sensitivity of one [38]. In addition, for weighted graphs
with edge weights in [0, 1], the weight of a minimum edge-cut or a minimum spanning
tree are both low-sensitivity queries [38].
However, the fact that an analysis can be computed using a query, or sequence
of queries, with low sensitivity does not necessarily imply that the analysis will be
accurate under differential privacy. Our investigation of the degree distribution is
an illustration of this point. The query sequences described earlier – C, S, F –
all have low sensitivity. Yet because the query sequence is linear in the size of the
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graph, the small amount of noise on individual queries accumulates, resulting in severe
distortion of the degree distribution. To achieve acceptable accuracy, we had to design
query strategies where constraints held between query answers and then exploit those
constraints to reduce noise.
While these are promising results, open questions remain about the accuracy
obtainable for many common network analyses. It is not known if the strategy used for
the degree sequence can be applied to other high-dimensional degree statistics, such
as the paired in-out degree sequence of the p1 model [56] or degree correlations [87].
For other important analyses, the prospects for accurate analysis under differ-
ential privacy seem poor. Computations such as transitivity, clustering coefficient,
centrality, and path-lengths involve joins on the edge table. It is not hard to show
that the sensitivity of such statistics is extremely high. We give illustrative examples
for two counting queries: the number of triangles (i.e., cycles of length 3) and the
number of paths of length two. Among other things, these two statistics can be used
to compute transitivity.
Figure 6.1 shows two graphs that correspond to worst-case inputs for the two
respective queries. In Figure 6.1(a), when the edge (Bob,Alice) is present, there are
m − 2 triangles; when it is absent, there are 0 triangles. Therefore the sensitivity
of the query that returns the number of triangles is at least m − 2 where m is the
number of nodes in the graph. Therefore, using the Laplace mechanism, it would be
necessary to add Laplace noise with scale O(m/). Since real graphs are typically
sparse, the total number of triangles is typically at most O(m), so the large noise
renders the answer useless. Similarly, Figure 6.1(b) shows the sensitivity of counting
the number of length two paths is also O(m).
These are not limitations of the Laplace mechanism, specifically, but of any dif-
ferentially private mechanism. This is formalized in the following proposition which
says that any -differentially private algorithm will likely have error at least ∆Q/2 on
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Alice Bob
m-2
. . .
(a) Triangles
m-2
. . .
Alice
Bob
(b) Length 2 paths
Figure 6.1. Example graphs illustrating the high sensitivity of triangle and path
queries.
some inputs. The probability of this event depends on , but it is non-negligible for
reasonable .
Proposition 6.1 (Limits of differential privacy). Let Q be any query sequence and
A be any -differentially private algorithm. There exists inputs I such that with
probability at least e
−
1+e− ,
‖Q(I)−A(Q(I))‖1 ≥
∆Q
2
Proof. Let I and I ′ be worst-case neighboring instances such that ‖Q(I)−Q(I ′)‖1 =
∆Q. Let OI be the set of outputs “near” I, meaning for any o ∈ OI , we have
‖o−Q(I)‖1 < ∆Q/2. Let δ be such that for all I, Pr[A(I) ∈ OI ] ≥ 1− δ. Therefore
we have the following chain of inequalities:
δ ≥ Pr[A(I) 6∈ OI ] ≥ Pr[A(I) ∈ OI′ ] ≥ e−Pr[A(I ′) ∈ OI′ ] ≥ e−(1− δ)
which implies δ ≥ e−
1+e− .
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The reason for these limits is that differential privacy is a guarantee under two
worst-case assumptions. Recall from Section 2.2 the semantic interpretation of dif-
ferential privacy as a bound on the ratio between an adversary’s prior and posterior
beliefs. The first assumption is that the adversary is nearly omniscient and has com-
plete knowledge of the private data except for one tuple (or, more generally, one
differential object). Second, the guarantee holds for all inputs, regardless of how
likely they are to occur in practice. The combined result is that for an analysis like
the number of triangles, it is possible to construct a graph where the number of tri-
angles depends entirely on a single edge. On this input, against an adversary who
knows every edge save this one, it is impossible to simultaneously produce accurate
answers and prevent the adversary from learning about the edge.
Circumventing these limitations requires addressing at least one of these worst-
case assumptions. In Rastogi et al. [105], we propose an approach based on relaxing
the former assumption; Nissim et al. [102] propose an approach that is based on
addressing the latter assumption. We briefly describe each approach, and summarize
their application to network statistics.
The basic idea behind Nissim et al. [102] is that while privacy should hold on all
inputs, the accuracy of the query answer may depend on the instance. When the input
is a worst-case input, accuracy is necessarily low. But when the input is “far” from a
worst-case input, it is possible to achieve much higher accuracy. A tempting solution
is to use the local sensitivity of the given input I—i.e., the maximum change between
Q(I) and Q(I ′) for any I ′ ∈ nbrs(I). However, this can leak information because
the local sensitivity itself can change substantially between neighboring instances and
thus an approach that uses it directly would fail to satisfy differential privacy. Their
approach is based on smooth sensitivity, an upper bound on local sensitivity that
varies smoothly over the space of possible databases. Using the Laplace mechanism
with smooth sensitivity in place of global sensitivity satisfies (, δ)-differential pri-
158
vacy. The weakening to (, δ)-differential privacy is necessary because the smooth
sensitivity can differ on two neighboring instances (albeit by a bounded amount) and
so some outputs become much more likely on one instance as compared to its neigh-
bor; however, the probability of observing such an output is very rare (δ is typically
exponentially small in n).
Nissim et al. [102] apply the smooth sensitivity idea to the problem of computing
the number of triangles. They show how to efficiently compute the smooth sensitivity
for a given graph and also show that random graphs are likely to have low smooth
sensitivity. Since the smooth sensitivity is bounded below by the local sensitivity, a
particular input will have low smooth sensitivity only if it has low local sensitivity. For
the triangle query, local sensitivity is low when high degree nodes share few common
neighbors. In real-world graphs, this may not be the case, and so the local sensitivity
(and therefore the smooth sensitivity) may be high.
In Rastogi et al. [105], we designed an alternative approach by “relaxing” differ-
ential privacy. Recall that differential privacy implies protection against adversaries
who are practically omniscient. We considered more realistic adversaries who have
greater uncertainty about the input. We developed an algorithm that is a variant on
the Laplace mechanism, however it is not differentially private. Instead it satisfies
adversarial privacy, a definition based on bounding the prior and posterior beliefs
of adversaries within a restricted class. Against adversaries who know a small sub-
graph (of size O(log n)) and whose prior belief about the rest of the graph is based
on a sparse random graph model, it is possible to accurately release the number of
triangles. In addition, several other statistics can be accurately released, including
queries about path lengths, cycles, and cliques and other subgraph motifs. Error
scales poly-logarithmically with the size of the graph. Details are provided in [105].
Finally, another potential solution for high sensitivity queries is to reformulate
them into lower sensitivity queries. High sensitivity means that for some networks,
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the change of a single edge can profoundly alter the query answer. Given that network
data is often incomplete and noisy, analysts need measures that are robust to minor
perturbations of network structure. In fact, there has been some work looking at
how some common analyses are affected by small perturbations [59]. The connection
between robust statistics and differentially private algorithms has been explored, but
existing results are limited to high sensitivity queries of tabular data [37].
Despite the poor prospects for some network analyses, it is nevertheless impor-
tant to identify analyses that can be accurately computed under differential privacy,
such as the degree distribution. Differential privacy is so rigorous that even if it is
ultimately necessary to adopt weaker privacy definitions, any differentially private
techniques can be easily integrated into a complete solution.
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CHAPTER 7
RELATED WORK
While the broader topics of privacy-preserving data publication and privacy-
preserving data analysis have a long and well-documented history (cf. [2, 23, 35]),
addressing these issues for network data is a topic that has only recently gained at-
tention. Work on this topic includes attacks of naive anonymization and alternative
approaches to network anonymization. We review relevant work below, and there are
also several recent surveys [53, 81, 124, 135].
When it comes to network data, particularly the data stored in online social
networks, there are a number of privacy issues beyond those that arise with analysis
and publication. We also briefly review some of the work addressing other privacy
issues with network data.
We also discuss work in differential privacy that is related to the techniques pro-
posed in Chapter 5.
7.1 Attacks
Backstrom et al. [9] propose an active attack on anonymized networks, where
the adversary is capable of adding nodes and edges prior to anonymization. The
attack re-identifies an arbitrary set of targets by inserting a random subgraph that
will be unique with high probability (independent of the input graph) and then con-
necting the subgraph to the targets. Active attacks, while relevant to online social
networks, are difficult or impossible to carry out in many other networks (such as
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contact networks used to study disease transmission or email networks internal to an
organization).
Passive attacks—where the adversary attacks an already published network—have
been more extensively studied. We first introduced the passive attack based on Hi
degree signatures in Hay et al. [51]. We also studied adversaries with knowledge of
partial subgraph patterns around a target, and knowledge of connections to hubs in
the network. Narayanan and Shmatikov [97] propose a passive attack in which the
adversary exploits access to an auxiliary network whose membership overlaps with the
anonymized network. Such an attack can lead to breaches of privacy if for instance
the anonymized network includes sensitive attributes or additional edges absent from
the auxiliary network. Singh and Zhan [113] measure the vulnerability to attack as
a function of well known topological properties of the graph, and Wang et al. [119]
propose a measure of anonymity based on description logic.
7.2 Network anonymization algorithms
There are three primary approaches to network anonymization: directed alter-
ation, generalization, and random alteration. With directed alteration, the graph
structure is altered, using operations such as edge insertions, to create common struc-
tural patterns. Nodes in the output graph are more likely to look more similar to one
another, but the graph may be missing data or contain spurious information. With
generalization/clustering, the structure of the graph is generalized at a granularity
that is coarse enough to provide some privacy but fine enough to reveal the essen-
tial features of the network’s topology. Most approaches to generalization, including
the one described in Chapter 4, are based on clustering nodes into groups and then
describing the graph at the group level. Finally, with random alteration, the graph
is altered stochastically, through random edge additions and deletions. Structural
patterns in the original graph are disguised by the random alteration.
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7.2.1 Directed alteration
Liu and Terzi [82] propose several algorithms for anonymizing a graph through
the insertion and removal of edges, altering the graph so that nodes cannot be dis-
tinguished by degree. We compare against their SimultaneousSwap algorithm in
Section 4.3.
Zhou and Pei [134] propose a similar problem formulation as Liu and Terzi [82]
but with a stronger privacy condition. The condition requires that for each node in
the graph, its neighborhood—the subgraph induced by the node and its neighbors—
is isomorphic with at least k − 1 other neighborhoods. Any graph satisfying this
condition will also satisfy the condition of Liu and Terzi [82] because if two nodes have
isomorphic neighborhoods, then they must have equal degrees. Another difference is
that the data model includes labels on the nodes, which must also be anonymized.
They show that the problem of determining the minimal set of edge insertions that
satisfy the privacy condition is NP-Hard. They propose a greedy algorithm, however,
due to a subgraph matching step, its runtime remains exponential in the worst-case.
Thompson and Yao [118] propose a more efficient algorithm for this problem.
Zou et al. [136] further strengthen the privacy condition, requiring that each node
be automorphically equivalent with at least k − 1 others. Since nodes in the same
automorphic equivalence class are structurally indistinguishable, no adversary can
successfully re-identify a target node beyond a set of at least k nodes. They pro-
pose an algorithm in which the graph is partitioned into subgraphs, and then the
subgraphs are placed into groups containing at least k subgraphs. The subgraphs
within each group are made automorphic with each other through a process of ver-
tex/edge insertions and deletions. They compare the utility of this approach against
the approaches described above as well as our generalization approach described in
Chapter 4. Recent work by Cheng et al. [24] adopts a similar approach of altering
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the graph to ensure automorphic equivalence, but do so in a way that also limits edge
disclosure.
7.2.2 Generalization/clustering
In their initial work on graph anonymization, Cormode et al. [30] consider bipartite
graph data—representing, for example, associations between people and products
they purchase—and propose an anonymization algorithm that breaks the association
between identifying attributes and nodes in the graph. The main threat considered is
an adversary with knowledge of node attributes, and so under these assumptions, it is
safe to release a naive anonymization of the graph. They propose an algorithm that
groups nodes so that those within a group cannot be distinguished by their attributes.
Further, they impose a safety condition that two nodes in the same group do not have
common neighbors, thereby preventing edge disclosure.
In subsequent work, Cormode et al. [29] extend their approach to handle a richer
class of data, such as social networks with multiple edge types and attributes on nodes
and edges. They also consider an approach which protects against an adversary with
knowledge of graph structure. They propose a partitioning based approach that we
compare against in Section 4.3.
Campan and Truta [20] propose an approach similar to the generalization approach
described in Chapter 4. In terms of graph structure, their masked social network
appears to be equivalent to our generalized graph. They also include identifying
attributes on the nodes, handling them using standard techniques from tabular data.
To generalize the graph, Campan and Truta apply an iterative, greedy algorithm that
anonymizes nodes in batches of k, similar to the algorithm of Zhou and Pei [134].
Zheleva et al. [132] consider a related but distinct problem. They study an ad-
versary who might be capable of predicting sensitive edges (e.g., friendship relations)
given knowledge of non-sensitive attributes and non-sensitive edges (e.g., classmate
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relations). The sensitive data is never published, not even in an anonymized form.
The purpose of the study is to measure to what extent non-sensitive properties leak
information about sensitive properties, and they consider several alternative strategies
for coarsening the non-sensitive properties to prevent accurate inference.
7.2.3 Random alteration
Rastogi et al. [106] present a mechanism for tables that has a natural interpre-
tation for graphs. They randomly remove a fraction of original edges and randomly
add a fraction of new edges. The resulting edge table is released in its entirety. They
show that the parameters of the random process can be chosen to ensure strong pro-
tection against edge disclosure while allowing a class of counting queries to estimated
accurately. Unfortunately it does not address queries that require joins on the edge
table, which are crucial to network analysis.
Hay et al. [54] consider randomly permuting some fraction of the network’s edges.
They show this is effective at limiting an adversary’s ability to re-identify a target
based on node degree. However, the graph structure is changed considerably: a 10%
change in the edge structure results in a roughly 33% change in the value of some
important graph metrics. Although the analyst may be able to reduce the error
through statistical post-processing, the results suggest that the gain in privacy is
offset by a substantial loss in utility.
To address the loss of utility, Ying and Wu [128] consider a more complex random-
ization strategy that is guided by the graph structure, choosing a random alteration
that preserves key properties of the network. The technique is based on the observa-
tion that many important network properties are related to the graph’s spectrum—
i.e., the set of eigenvalues of the graph’s adjacency matrix or other matrices derived
from it. Thus, they develop a random-alteration algorithm where edges are randomly
added and deleted, but the random choice is guided based on how the change affects
165
the graph’s spectrum. They show that the utility of the randomly altered network—
measured both in terms of common metrics and spectral properties—is much im-
proved. However, they do not assess what impact spectrum-based randomization has
on privacy. The protection must necessarily be weaker than pure randomization: the
noise is influenced by the structure of the graph which means the adversary may be
able to use his knowledge of graph structure to infer likely edge swaps. It is unclear
how much this improves the adversary’s ability to breach privacy.
Additional work by the same authors considers imposing additional constraints [129]
and a more in depth study of the risk of edge disclosure with randomization based
approaches [131]. Ying et al. [130] compare random alteration and directed alteration
approaches.
7.3 Other privacy issues arising with network data
The anonymization of existing networks is not the only privacy problem that arises
with network data.
Some work has looked at the problem of reconstructing a private graph under
various access restrictions. Frikken and Golle [44] designed a protocol for privately
assembling a graph that is distributed among a large number of parties. The output
of the protocol is a naively-anonymized graph. Korolova et al. [66] consider an ad-
versary who tries to re-assemble the graph from a set of views of local neighborhoods
(obtained, for example, by breaking into user accounts in an online social network
setting).
There are many privacy concerns with online social networks. At least two works
have looked at how a user’s private information can sometimes be inferred from the
public information available on friends’ profiles or from knowledge of group mem-
berships [49, 133]. Others have looked at ways to mitigate user exposure. Liu and
Terzi [83] propose a way of computing a privacy “score” for an online profile that
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measures a user’s risk, with higher scores indicating the user profile discloses more
sensitive information. Fang and LeFevre [41] propose a privacy “wizard,” an applica-
tion that aids users in configuring their privacy settings, identifying communities of
friends that should be granted the same access privileges. Carminati et al. [22] look
at access-control models for protecting privacy in online social networks.
7.4 Related work in differential privacy
Differential privacy has been an active area of research. Dwork has written com-
prehensive reviews of differential privacy [34, 35]. In Chapter 6, we reviewed applica-
tions of differential privacy to network analyses. Differential privacy also has applica-
tions in network security, where it has been proposed as a tool for network operators
to conduct collaborative intrusion detection without disclosing sensitive information
about individual client’s network traffic [107]. Recent work looks at carrying out
common network trace analyses under differential privacy [90].
The technique introduced in Chapter 5 involved post-processing the answers of
a differentially private mechanism to ensure consistency. This idea of using statisti-
cal inference to post-process answers and boost accuracy has broader applications.
We used this technique to design a mechanism for publishing synthetic data that is
accurate for range queries [55]. It asks a hierarchical tree of range queries and uses
summation constraints to infer accurate answers for all range queries. We extended
this approach to support inference over a set of linear counting queries where arbitrary
linear constraints may hold among the answers. Using this framework, we showed
that it is possible to design optimal strategies for support workloads of queries, using
tools from convex optimization [76].
The basic idea of post-processing was introduced in Barak et al. [11], who proposed
a linear program for making a set of marginals consistent, non-negative, and integral.
However, unlike the present work, the post-processing is not shown to improve accu-
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racy. (While it is true that their Fourier transformations can increase accuracy for
low-order marginals, this is a pre-processing step that reformulates queries to avoid
issues of consistency and does not improve accuracy on the queries considered in the
present paper.)
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
This dissertation addresses the challenge of enabling accurate analysis of network
data while ensuring the protection of network participants’ privacy. This is an im-
portant problem: massive amounts of data are being collected, there is huge interest
in analyzing the data, but the data are not being shared due, in large part, to con-
cerns about privacy. Recent incidents have demonstrated that releasing data without
properly addressing these concerns can be a damaging exercise, with negative conse-
quences for both data manager and data participant [12, 98, 115]. Although there
have been decades of research in privacy-preserving data publication and privacy-
preserving data analysis, existing technologies provide an inadequate solution because
they were designed for tables, not networks, and cannot be easily adapted to handle
the complexities of network data.
We develop several technologies that advance us toward our goal. Our contribu-
tions represent important first steps in addressing the problem and we see opportu-
nities to extend the work in new and promising directions.
8.1 Review of contributions
In Chapter 3, we demonstrated that simple strategies fail to provide adequate
protection. We studied the risk of publishing a network after applying naive anon-
ymization, in which external identifiers are replaced and identifying attributes are
suppressed. In carrying out this task, our workhorse was the vertex refinement query:
it is efficient to evaluate and capable of modeling a range of adversaries. Using vertex
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refinement queries, we found that real networks are diverse in their risk but in some
networks, nodes are highly vulnerable to re-identification attack, especially if the ad-
versary has knowledge beyond a target node’s immediate neighborhood (e.g., this is
true of the HepTh network). Re-identification risk depends on the network’s struc-
ture and we showed, through the analytical study of Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs,
that density has a profound influence on risk, with sparse graphs being at low risk
and dense graphs being at high risk. Our study of risk supports our overarching goal
because it provides data managers with algorithms that they can use to assess risk
prior to publication, and because it demonstrates that there is a need for technolo-
gies to mitigate risk. The rest of the dissertation was devoted to the design of such
technologies.
In Chapter 4 we presented an algorithm for transforming a network to prevent node
re-identification. Our algorithm transforms the network by generalizing it, replacing
groups of nodes with supernodes and sets of edges with superedges. Effectively, it
produces a coarse-grained summary of the network’s topology, describing it in terms
of the edge density between and within groups. The process of summarization prov-
ably lowers re-identification risk; and the data manager can choose the appropriate
setting of k to tradeoff lower risk against greater information loss. Through experi-
ments on real and synthetic networks, we evaluate how well the transformed network
preserves the topology of the original network, and compare our approach with other
techniques. In comparison with the LT and BCKS algorithms, we find our technique
preserves the input comparably or better. One notable distinction between tech-
niques is that the other techniques do not account for topology when transforming
the network—for instance, LT minimizes the number of edge insertions, but edges
can be inserted anywhere, even between disconnected components. Our approach is
explicitly guided by the network structure, using search to place nodes into clusters
of “similar” nodes, similar to stochastic block-modeling. This has its advantages: we
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find that our technique more accurately preserves distinctive features, such as mesh
or tree patterns, and the low degree correlations of the HOT network. This work
contributes to the goal of this dissertation: we provide a practical tool that a data
manager can use to publish a transformed network that has provably bounded risk.
Also, our study gives insights into the kinds of distortions that are inevitably caused
by the transformations.
In Chapters 5 & 6, we address the problem of computing accurate network statis-
tics under strong privacy protections, such as those afforded by differential privacy.
Our main contribution is a technique for estimating the degree sequence of a network
(Chapter 5). The algorithm satisfies k-edge -differential privacy, produces extremely
accurate estimates, and is computationally efficient, capable of running on networks
with hundreds of millions of nodes. A data manager can now release (an approxima-
tion of) the degree sequence of a private network with assurances that the error in the
approximation is provably low and that the output does not leak private information,
even to powerful, informed adversaries. In addition, the technique, which relies on
applying inference to the noisy answers of a differentially private mechanism, is inno-
vative and has broader applications. Our works shows that existing mechanisms can
add more noise than is strictly necessary and inference can be an appealing strategy
for reducing excess noise. We have investigated other applications of inference in
subsequent work [55, 76].
Admittedly, the degree sequence of a network is only one statistic (though an
important one), and questions remain about what other statistics can be accurately
learned under differential privacy. We summarize known results, including additional
work of our own, in Chapter 6. Unfortunately, we find limitations with differential
privacy: network statistics like clustering coefficient involve joins on the edge table
and have high sensitivity. This provably limits the accuracy with which they can be
estimated under differential privacy. As a potential remedy to this conflict between
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privacy and accuracy, we show that if the adversary has limited information about
the network—such as knowing only a small subgraph of it—then a relatively small
amount of noise is sufficient to ensure strong privacy (albeit not differential privacy).
The work of Nissim et al. [102] provides another possible remedy and relies on a
modest relaxation of differential privacy.
8.2 Future directions
We see a number of directions for future work. We briefly highlight a few of them:
• Empirical comparison At this point, many network transformation algo-
rithms have been developed (see Chapter 7) and their relative benefits are not
clearly understood. We could extend the empirical evaluation we undertook in
Chapter 4 to include a broader array of techniques and thereby provide a more
comprehensive evaluation.
• Vulnerabilities Most algorithms for network data transformation define pri-
vacy using an adaptation of k-anonymity to networks. In the tabular data
setting, k-anonymity (and variants of it) has been shown to be vulnerable to
attack (Chapter 2). It is unclear whether those attacks, or new ones, apply to
the network anonymization algorithms.
• Attributes Our work has focused on network structure. It would be interesting
to investigate supporting analyses of structure and attributes. For instance, can
we approximately measure homophily under differential privacy?
• High Sensitivity High sensitivity queries are problematic under differential
privacy. Many network analyses have high sensitivity often because of the ex-
istence of some pathological worst-case input that is highly unlikely to arise in
practice. How can we incorporate background knowledge about realistic net-
work structure to rule out pathological instances?
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One of the directions for future work that we find most intriguing is model-based
synthetic data. The idea behind model-based synthetic data is to take an existing
statistical parametric model and use query answer perturbation techniques to accu-
rately estimate the model parameters. An instantiated model defines a probability
distribution over networks from which one can sample synthetic networks. Because
the model was fit under differential privacy, both the model and the networks can be
safely released to the public.
This approach represents, in some sense, a synthesis between transformed data
release and query answer perturbation, the two approaches that have been considered
in this dissertation and in other work on this topic. But it has the potential to alleviate
some of the limitations of each of the current approaches.
Query answer perturbation provides very strong privacy, and for some queries,
it achieves very high accuracy. However, it does have some practical limitations.
Some analyses cannot be easily reduced to a small set of queries. For instance,
some analyses are not statistics, but involve running algorithms over the network or
carrying out simulations. It can be hard to determine the sensitivity of such complex
procedures. Also, the user may find it frustrating to only be able to access the data
through a query interface, especially during the initial phase of analysis, which is often
exploratory, open-ended, and iterative. In addition, the data manager is responsible
for processing queries. For the manager, this means he must invest resources in query
processing and for the analyst, he must reveal his analyses to the data manager. For
these reasons, there is a significant benefit to having techniques for publishing data.
While there are now several algorithms for publishing transformed network data
(Chapter 4 and the related work described in Chapter 7), these too have limitations.
Compared to the query answer perturbation techniques, the privacy protections are
weak. In addition, while the transformations inevitably distort some properties of the
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network, these approaches provide no theoretical bounds on how large that distortion
may be.
Model-based synthetic data has the potential to provide the best of both worlds.
The analyst can use the model to produce synthetic networks and then run analyses
on the sampled networks. The approach ensures rigorous privacy, as all interactions
with the private data are through a differentially private mechanism. In addition,
this approach may provide a clearer picture of how noise distorts the network. For
instance, it may be possible to derive error bounds on the accuracy of the parameter
estimates, allowing the analyst to account for the distortion introduced by the privacy
mechanism. In addition, the biases of the model are often made explicit as the
structure of the model encodes independence assumptions and the analyst can reason
about their realism and the consequences of their invalidity.
To pursue this approach it will be necessary to identify existing statistical mod-
els that may fit well with the query answer perturbation approach. Many network
models have been developed in the last couple of decades [48], and a few stand out as
potentially well-suited for the task. The dK family of models [87] is based on node
degrees and degree correlations, and in fact our current techniques can be immedi-
ately applied to fit the 1K model, the simplest model in the dK family. Also, the
exponential random graph model (ERGM) family [50, 89, 108] is intriguing because
the model is defined by a set of sufficient statistics and so it fits naturally with the
framework of using query answer perturbation. ERGMs can also handle attributes.
Of the many models in the ERGM family, the p1 model [56] is particularly interesting
because its sufficient statistics include the in- and out-degree sequence of the network.
There are of course a number of challenges to address to understand whether
model-based synthetic data will yield the hoped for benefits. We believe that the
contributions of this dissertation provide lessons and insights that will be valuable in
addressing these challenges.
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